RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation
RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9)
Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary
audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC.
**Tables:**
- `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK,
`confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID
is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default).
Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives.
- `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK,
`sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail
fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed).
**Indexes (per RFC):**
- `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path
- `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path
**Queries:**
- `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID`
- `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID`
- `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before`
exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception
sequence numbers
- `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running
transactions
**Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`),
dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on
`ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics).
No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log`
RBAC resource type.
> Generated by Coder Agents
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike.
## Stack Context
This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental
personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is
restacked directly on `main`.
Stack order:
1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK
2. #25365 API test coverage
3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration
4. #25066 settings UI and docs
5. #25386 personal skills slash menu
## What?
Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources
and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD
endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types.
Follow-up review and restack fixes:
- Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database
constraints.
- Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts.
- Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are
targeted.
- Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read
and delete but not create or update.
- Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants
covered by tests.
- Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type.
- Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database
default.
- Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to
`000502_user_skills`.
## Why?
Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner
authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface
before chatd can consume them.
## Validation
- `make gen`
- `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$'
-count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run
'^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1`
- `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk`
- `make lint`
- pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d`
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api
## Summary
Adds the `group_ai_budgets` table and the following endpoints:
- `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
- `PUT /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
- `DELETE /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
Each group may have at most one budget row. If no row exists, no budget
is enforced.
### Feature gate
Added `RequireFeatureMW(FeatureAIBridge)` on the `/ai/budget` sub-route.
## RBAC
Authorization reuses `rbac.ResourceGroup` with the existing
`.InOrganization(...).WithID(...)` scoping model.
The `dbauthz` wrappers load the parent `groups` row and authorize
against it.
No new resource type is introduced. As a result, anyone with
`group:update` permissions (Owner, OrgAdmin, or UserAdmin within the
organization) can manage AI budgets for that group.
## Read access for group members
`database.Group.RBACObject()` grants `policy.ActionRead` to all members
of the group through the group ACL:
```go
func (g Group) RBACObject() rbac.Object {
return rbac.ResourceGroup.WithID(g.ID).
InOrg(g.OrganizationID).
// Group members can read the group.
WithGroupACL(map[string][]policy.Action{
g.ID.String(): {
policy.ActionRead,
},
})
}
```
Because the `GET` endpoint authorizes against the same loaded `Group`
object, any group member can call:
```text
GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget
```
`PUT` and `DELETE` remain admin-only. The group ACL grants only
`ActionRead`, so write operations continue to require role-based
`group:update` permissions.
## Alternative considered
A dedicated `rbac.ResourceGroupAiBudget` resource would allow budget
management to be separated from general group administration.
We decided not to add that complexity for now.
# Summary
Implements
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator
This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI
Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking:
a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in
sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures
every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing
requests.
The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a
community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator
script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for
now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository.
On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new
releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since
the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices;
rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched.
# Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches
Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an
embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers,
potentially 4000+).
Each row is:
```text
(provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price)
```
Any of the four price columns can be:
- `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension”
- explicit `0` → “free”
The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing
rows pick up new prices.
We considered three implementations.
---
## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop
```go
for _, row := range rows {
if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{
Provider: row.Provider,
Model: row.Model,
InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice),
// ...
}); err != nil {
return err
}
}
```
### Pros
- Trivial.
- NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`.
### Cons
- `N` round-trips per seed.
- With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup,
even inside a transaction.
- Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+.
---
## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays
Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in
parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`.
```sql
INSERT INTO ai_model_prices (
provider,
model,
input_price,
output_price,
cache_read_price,
cache_write_price
)
SELECT
UNNEST(@providers::text[]),
UNNEST(@models::text[]),
NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1),
NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1),
NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1),
NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1)
ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET
input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price,
output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price,
cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price,
cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price,
updated_at = NOW();
```
Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices.
Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL`
into a `bigint[]` element.
```go
providers := make([]string, len(rows))
models := make([]string, len(rows))
inputs := make([]int64, len(rows))
outputs := make([]int64, len(rows))
cacheR := make([]int64, len(rows))
cacheW := make([]int64, len(rows))
for i, r := range rows {
providers[i] = r.Provider
models[i] = r.Model
inputs[i] = -1
if r.InputPrice != nil {
inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice
}
outputs[i] = -1
if r.OutputPrice != nil {
outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice
}
cacheR[i] = -1
if r.CacheReadPrice != nil {
cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice
}
cacheW[i] = -1
if r.CacheWritePrice != nil {
cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice
}
}
return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{
Providers: providers,
Models: models,
InputPrices: inputs,
OutputPrices: outputs,
CacheReadPrices: cacheR,
CacheWritePrices: cacheW,
})
```
### Pros
- Single round-trip.
### Cons
- The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't
represent `NULL`.
---
## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb`
(chosen)
Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse
it.
```sql
INSERT INTO ai_model_prices (
provider,
model,
input_price,
output_price,
cache_read_price,
cache_write_price
)
SELECT
elem->>'provider',
elem->>'model',
(elem->>'input_price')::bigint,
(elem->>'output_price')::bigint,
(elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint,
(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint
FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem
ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET
input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price,
output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price,
cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price,
cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price,
updated_at = NOW();
```
Go side reduces to:
```go
return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON)
```
### Pros
- Single round-trip.
- NULLs fall out naturally:
- `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL`
- no sentinels
- The seed is already JSON:
- Existing precedent:
- `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase
### Cons
- Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST`
- Slightly less standard than `UNNEST`
- Readers need familiarity with:
- `jsonb_array_elements`
- `->>` extraction syntax
- Postgres pays JSON parse cost
- negligible at our scale
---
---
# Decision
We picked Approach 3.
It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without:
- nullable-array workarounds
- sentinel values
Add a deployment-wide user secrets summary to the telemetry snapshot so
we can track adoption of user secrets
The summary reports:
- A breakdown of secrets by which injection fields are populated:
EnvNameOnly, FilePathOnly, Both, Neither
- The distribution of secrets per user (max, p25, p50, p75, p90)
All metrics are scoped to active non-system users. Soft-deleted users
are excluded. The percentile distribution is computed across the entire
active non-system user base, including users with zero secrets, so the
percentiles reflect deployment-wide adoption.
Assisted by Coder Agents.
**Breaking change for changelog:**
> `codersdk.Chat.last_error` now returns a structured `ChatError` object
(`{message, kind, provider, retryable, status_code, detail}`) instead of
a plain string. The chats API is experimental
(`/api/experimental/chats`), so this ships without a deprecation cycle;
consumers reading `chat.last_error` as a string must update to read
`chat.last_error.message`. SDK/generated TypeScript terminal error
payloads now use the single `ChatError` type; the live stream error
payload type is renamed from `ChatStreamError` to `ChatError`.
Persisted chat errors now carry the same provider-specific detail (kind,
provider, retryable, HTTP status, optional detail) as the live stream,
so refreshing a failed chat rehydrates with the full structured error
instead of a one-line headline.
Existing rows are migrated in place: legacy text errors are wrapped into
`{message, kind: "generic"}` so already-errored chats still render, and
rows with `last_error IS NULL` stay NULL. Internally, persisted fallback
decoding now reuses the existing `chaterror.KindGeneric` constant, with
no JSON value change.
Closes CODAGT-239
## Summary
- rename the `allow_in_plan_mode` migration pair from `000472` to
`000473`
- rename the matching fixture file and update its comment
- remove the duplicate migration version that broke containerized
database startup
## Testing
- `go test ./coderd/database/migrations -run '^TestMigrate$' -count=1
-timeout 15m`
- validated `iofs.New` for `coderd/database/migrations` and
`coderd/database/migrations/testdata/fixtures`
Closescoder/internal#1483
> Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf.
## Summary
Allow root plan-mode chats to use MCP tools from external servers that
an admin has explicitly approved for plan mode. Workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents remain blocked.
## Problem
`chatd.go` excluded every MCP tool when `isPlanModeTurn` was true, so
planning had no access to tools like docs search, ticketing, etc.
Lifting that guard wholesale was unsafe: `mcp_server_configs` already
has centralized admin governance, but workspace-local MCP (discovered
from agent `.mcp.json`) does not, and subagents use a narrower trust
boundary.
## Fix
Add an admin-controlled per-server `allow_in_plan_mode` flag (default
`false`) and gate plan-mode MCP access on it.
### Backend / schema
- New migration `000472_mcp_server_allow_in_plan_mode.{up,down}.sql` and
matching fixture update.
- `mcpserverconfigs.sql` + generated code: persist and read the new
column.
- `codersdk/mcp.go`: thread the field through `MCPServerConfig`,
`Create*`, and `Update*` request types.
- `coderd/mcp.go`: validate, persist, and return the flag in
get/list/create/update handlers.
### chatd
- `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go`: pre-filter selected external MCP configs by
`AllowInPlanMode` before calling `mcpclient.ConnectAll` on plan-mode
root turns. Workspace MCP discovery is skipped entirely on plan-mode
turns.
- Single helper decides whether a tool is available in plan mode, used
both at construction and for active-tool filtering (defense in depth).
Plan-mode subagents, dynamic tools, provider-native tools, computer-use,
and workspace MCP stay unchanged.
- `coderd/x/chatd/prompt.go`: update the root plan-mode overlay text to
match the new boundary.
### UI
- `MCPServerAdminPanel.tsx`: add an explicit toggle ("Allow all tools
from this MCP server in root plan mode") next to the existing governance
controls.
- Regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.
### Docs
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/architecture.md`: replace the blanket "MCP is
unavailable in plan mode" note with the new root-only, external-only,
admin-approved policy. Explicitly call out that workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents are still excluded.
### Tests
- Plan-mode visibility (approved vs non-approved external server).
- Plan-mode invocation of an approved external MCP tool.
- End-to-end plan-mode workflow that uses an approved MCP tool and then
reaches `propose_plan`.
- Regressions: workspace MCP still excluded in plan mode; plan-mode
subagents still on the restricted tool boundary; existing tool
allow/deny list filtering still applies.
## Policy precedence
`allow_in_plan_mode` is an **additional** requirement on top of existing
`enabled`, availability, chat-selected / forced server IDs, and tool
allow/deny lists. It approves **all tools on that server** for root plan
mode; a per-tool plan allowlist is deliberately deferred.
## Follow-ups (explicitly out of scope)
- Whether plan-mode subagents should inherit approved external MCP
tools.
- Workspace-local MCP safety model (agent-side `.mcp.json` schema vs. a
coderd-managed workspace MCP config).
## Validation
- `go vet ./coderd/x/chatd/...`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'TestPlan.*|TestMCP.*' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -count=1 -timeout 5m` (full chatd suite)
- `make fmt` (no diff)
> Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf.
Needed by #23833
Adds a `chat_file_links` association table to track which files are
associated with each chat.
- `AppendChatFileIDs` query links a file to a chat with deduplication
- `GetChatFileMetadataByIDs` query returns lightweight file metadata by
IDs
- Tool-created files (e.g. `propose_plan`) are linked to the chat after
insert
- User-uploaded files are linked to the chat when the referencing
message is sent
- Single-chat GET endpoint hydrates `files: ChatFileMetadata[]` on the
response
> 🤖 Created by Coder Agents and massaged into shape by a human.
## Summary
Adds the database schema, API endpoints, SDK types, and encryption
wrappers for admin-managed MCP (Model Context Protocol) server
configurations that chatd can consume. This is the backend foundation
for allowing external MCP tools (Sentry, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to be
used during AI chat sessions.
## Database
Two new tables:
- **`mcp_server_configs`**: Admin-managed server definitions with URL,
transport (Streamable HTTP / SSE), auth config (none / OAuth2 / API key
/ custom headers), tool allow/deny lists, and an availability policy
(`force_on` / `default_on` / `default_off`). Includes CHECK constraints
on transport, auth_type, and availability values.
- **`mcp_server_user_tokens`**: Per-user OAuth2 tokens for servers
requiring individual authentication. Cascades on user/config deletion.
New column on `chats` table:
- **`mcp_server_ids UUID[]`**: Per-chat MCP server selection, following
the same pattern as `model_config_id` — passed at chat creation,
changeable per-message with nil-means-no-change semantics.
## API Endpoints
All routes are under `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/` and gated behind
the `agents` experiment.
**Admin endpoints** (`ResourceDeploymentConfig` auth):
- `POST /` — Create MCP server config
- `PATCH /{id}` — Update MCP server config (full-replace)
- `DELETE /{id}` — Delete MCP server config
**Authenticated endpoints** (all users, enabled servers only for
non-admins):
- `GET /` — List configs (admins see all, members see enabled-only with
admin fields redacted)
- `GET /{id}` — Get config by ID (with `auth_connected` populated
per-user)
**OAuth2 per-user auth flow:**
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/connect` — Initiate OAuth2 flow (state cookie CSRF
protection)
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/callback` — Handle OAuth2 callback, store tokens
- `DELETE /{id}/oauth2/disconnect` — Remove stored OAuth2 tokens
## Security
- **Secrets never returned**: `OAuth2ClientSecret`, `APIKeyValue`, and
`CustomHeaders` are never in API responses — only boolean indicators
(`has_oauth2_secret`, `has_api_key`, `has_custom_headers`).
- **Field redaction for non-admins**: `convertMCPServerConfigRedacted`
strips `OAuth2ClientID`, auth URLs, scopes, and `APIKeyHeader` from
non-admin responses.
- **dbcrypt encryption at rest**: All 5 secret fields use `dbcrypt_keys`
encryption with full encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read wrappers (11
dbcrypt method overrides + 2 helpers), following the same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`.
- **OAuth2 CSRF protection**: State parameter stored in `HttpOnly`
cookie with `HTTPCookies.Apply()` for correct `Secure`/`SameSite` behind
TLS-terminating proxies.
- **dbauthz authorization**: All 18 querier methods have authorization
wrappers. Read operations use `ActionRead`, write operations use
`ActionUpdate` on `ResourceDeploymentConfig`.
## Governance Model
| Control | Implementation |
|---------|---------------|
| **Global kill switch** | `enabled` defaults to `false` |
| **Availability policy** | `force_on` (always injected), `default_on`
(pre-selected), `default_off` (opt-in) |
| **Per-chat selection** | `mcp_server_ids` on `CreateChatRequest` /
`CreateChatMessageRequest` |
| **Auth gate** | OAuth2 servers require per-user auth before tools are
injected |
| **Tool-level allow/deny** | Arrays on `mcp_server_configs` for
granular tool filtering |
| **Secrets encrypted at rest** | Uses `dbcrypt_keys` (same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`) |
## Tests
8 test functions covering:
- Full CRUD lifecycle (create, list, update, delete)
- Non-admin visibility filtering (enabled-only, field redaction)
- `auth_connected` population for OAuth2 vs non-OAuth2 servers
- Availability policy validation (valid values + invalid rejection)
- Unique slug enforcement (409 Conflict)
- OAuth2 disconnect idempotency
- Chat creation with `mcp_server_ids` persistence
## Known Limitations (Deferred)
These are documented and intentional for an experimental feature:
- **Audit logging** not yet wired — will add when feature stabilizes
- **Cross-field validation** (e.g., OAuth2 fields required when
`auth_type=oauth2`) — admin-only endpoint, will add when stabilizing
- **`force_on` auto-injection** — query exists but not yet wired into
chatd tool injection (follow-up)
- **Additional test coverage** — 403 auth tests, GET-by-ID tests,
callback CSRF tests planned for follow-up
## What's NOT in this PR
- Frontend UI (admin panel + chat picker)
- Actual MCP client connections (`chatd/chatmcp/` manager)
- Tool injection into `chatloop/`
Introduce a three-way workspace sharing setting (none, everyone,
service_accounts) replacing the boolean workspace_sharing_disabled.
In service_accounts mode, only service account-owned workspaces can be
shared while regular members' share permissions are removed. Adds a
new organization-service-account system role with per-org permissions
reconciled alongside the existing organization-member system role.
Related to:
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-28/feat-service-accounts-sharing-mode-and-rbac-role
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kayla はな <mckayla@hey.com>
Creates a new table `ai_seat_state` to keep track of when users consume an ai_seat. Once a user consumes an AI seat, they will forever in this table (as it stands today).
This change adds support for image attachments to chat via add button
and clipboard paste. Files are stored in a new `chat_files` table and
referenced by ID in message content. File data is resolved from storage
at LLM dispatch time, keeping the message content column small.
Upload validates MIME types via content type or content sniffing against
an allowlist (png, jpeg, gif, webp). The retrieval endpoint serves files
with immutable caching headers. On the frontend, uploads start eagerly
on attach with a background fetch to pre-warm the browser HTTP cache so
the timeline renders instantly after send.
feat: add boundary usage telemetry database schema and RBAC
Adds the foundation for tracking boundary usage telemetry across Coder
replicas. This includes:
- Database schema: `boundary_usage_stats` table with per-replica stats
(unique workspaces, unique users, allowed/denied request counts)
- Database queries: upsert stats, get aggregated summary, reset stats,
delete by replica ID
- RBAC: `boundary_usage` resource type with read/update/delete actions,
accessible only via system `BoundaryUsageTracker` subject (not regular
user roles)
- Tracker skeleton + docs: stub implementation in `coderd/boundaryusage/`
The tracker accumulates stats in memory and periodically flushes to the
database. Stats are aggregated across replicas for telemetry reporting,
then reset when a new reporting period begins. The tracker implementation
and plumbing will be done in a subsequent commit/PR.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creates migration 000409 with the database foundation for pausing and
resuming task workspaces.
The task_snapshots table stores conversation history (AgentAPI messages)
so users can view task logs even when the workspace is stopped. Each task
gets one snapshot, overwritten on each pause.
Three new build_reason values (task_auto_pause, task_manual_pause,
task_resume) let us distinguish task lifecycle events in telemetry and
audit logs from regular workspace operations.
Uses a regular table rather than UNLOGGED for snapshots. While UNLOGGED
would be faster, losing snapshots on database crash creates user confusion
(logs disappear until next pause). We can switch to UNLOGGED post-GA if
write performance becomes a problem.
Closescoder/internal#1250
## Problem
Migration 000401 introduced a hardcoded `public.` schema qualifier which
broke deployments using non-public schemas (see #21493). We need to
prevent this from happening again.
## Solution
Adds a new `lint/migrations` Make target that validates database
migrations do not hardcode the `public` schema qualifier. Migrations
should rely on `search_path` instead to support deployments using
non-public schemas.
## Changes
- Added `scripts/check_migrations_schema.sh` - a linter script that
checks for `public.` references in migration files (excluding test
fixtures)
- Added `lint/migrations` target to the Makefile
- Added `lint/migrations` to the main `lint` target so it runs in CI
## Testing
- Verified the linter **fails** on current `main` (which has the
hardcoded `public.` in migration 000401)
- Verified the linter **passes** after applying the fix from #21493
```bash
# On main (fails)
$ make lint/migrations
ERROR: Migrations must not hardcode the 'public' schema. Use unqualified table names instead.
# After fix (passes)
$ make lint/migrations
Migration schema references OK
```
## Depends on
- #21493 must be merged first (or this PR will fail CI until it is)
---------
Signed-off-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
Co-authored-by: blink-so[bot] <211532188+blink-so[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
Previously the `idx_custom_roles_name_lower` index prevented that.
A check constraint was also added to ensure the `organization_id` column cannot be set to the all-zero UUID.
closes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20899
This is in response to a migration in v2.27 that takes very long on
deployments with large `api_keys` tables.
NOTE: The optimization causes the _up_ migration to delete old data
(keys that expired more than 7 days ago). The _down_ migration won't
resurrect the deleted data.
- Adds a new table to keep track of which payloads have already been
reported since we only report for the last clock hour
- Adds a query to gather and aggregate all the data by
provider/model/client
Relates to https://github.com/coder/coder-telemetry-server/issues/27
- Adds FK from `aibridge_interceptions.initiator_id` to `users.id`
- This is enforced by deleting any rows that don't have any users. Since
this is an experimental feature AND coder never deletes user rows I
think this is acceptable.
- Adds `name` as a property on `codersdk.MinimalUser`
- This matches the `visible_users` view in the database. I'm unsure why
`name` wasn't already included given that `username` is.
- Adds a new `initiator` field to `codersdk.AIBridgeInterception` which
contains `codersdk.MinimalUser` (ID, username, name, avatar URL)
- Removes `initiator_id` from `codersdk.AIBridgeInterception`
- Should be fine since we're still in early access
This change updates the `task_workspace_apps` table structure for
improved linking to workspace builds and adds queries to manage tasks
and a view to expose task status.
Updates coder/internal#948
Supersedes coder/coder#20212
Supersedes coder/coder#19773
Not used in coderd yet, see stack.
Adds two new packages:
- `coderd/usage`: provides an interface for the "Collector" as well as a stub implementation for AGPL
- `enterprise/coderd/usage`: provides an interface for the "Publisher" as well as a Tallyman implementation
Relates to https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/814
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/780
## Summary of changes:
- added `user_secrets` table
- `user_secrets` table contains `env_name` and `file_path` fields which
are not used at the moment, but will be used in later PRs
- `user_secrets` table doesn't contain `value_key_id`, I will add it in
a separate migration in a dbcrypt PR
- on one hand I don't want to add fields which are not used (because
it's a risk smth may change in implementation later), on the other hand
I don't want to add too many migrations for user secrets table
- added unique sql indexes
- added sql queries for CRUD operations on user-secrets
- introduced new `ResourceUserSecret` resource
- basic unit-tests for CRUD ops and authorization behavior
- Role updates:
- owner:
- remove `ResourceUserSecret` from site-wide perms
- add `ResourceUserSecret` to user-wide perms
- orgAdmin
- remove `ResourceUserSecret` from org-wide perms; seems it's not
strictly required, because `ResourceUserSecret` is not tied to
organization in dbauthz wrappers?
- memberRole
- no need to change memberRole because it implicitly has access to
user-secrets thanks to the `allPermsExcept`
- is it enough changes to roles?
Main questions:
- [ ] We will have 2 migrations for user-secrets:
- initial migration (in current PR)
- adding `value_key_id` in dbcrypt PR
- is this approach reasonable?
- [ ] Are changes to roles's permissions are correct?
- [ ] Are changes in roles_test.go are correct?
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
### Breaking Change (changelog note):
> User connections to workspaces, and the opening of workspace apps or ports will no longer create entries in the audit log. Those events will now be included in the 'Connection Log'.
Please see the 'Connection Log' page in the dashboard, and the Connection Log [documentation](https://coder.com/docs/admin/monitoring/connection-logs) for details. Those with permission to view the Audit Log will also be able to view the Connection Log. The new Connection Log has the same licensing restrictions as the Audit Log, and requires a Premium Coder deployment.
### Context
This is the first PR of a few for moving connection events out of the audit log, and into a new database table and web UI page called the 'Connection Log'.
This PR:
- Creates the new table
- Adds and tests queries for inserting and reading, including reading with an RBAC filter.
- Implements the corresponding RBAC changes, such that anyone who can view the audit log can read from the table
- Implements, under the enterprise package, a `ConnectionLogger` abstraction to replace the `Auditor` abstraction for these logs. (No-op'd in AGPL, like the `Auditor`)
- Routes SSH connection and Workspace App events into the new `ConnectionLogger`
- Updates all existing tests to check the values of the `ConnectionLogger` instead of the `Auditor`.
Future PRs:
- Add filtering to the query
- Add an enterprise endpoint to query the new table
- Write a query to delete old events from the audit log, call it from dbpurge.
- Implement a table in the Web UI for viewing connection logs.
> [!NOTE]
> The PRs in this stack obviously won't be (completely) atomic. Whilst they'll each pass CI, the stack is designed to be merged all at once. I'm splitting them up for the sake of those reviewing, and so changes can be reviewed as early as possible. Despite this, it's really hard to make this PR any smaller than it already is. I'll be keeping it in draft until it's actually ready to merge.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/312
Depends on https://github.com/coder/terraform-provider-coder/pull/408
This PR adds support for defining an **autoscaling block** for
prebuilds, allowing number of desired instances to scale dynamically
based on a schedule.
Example usage:
```
data "coder_workspace_preset" "us-nix" {
...
prebuilds = {
instances = 0 # default to 0 instances
scheduling = {
timezone = "UTC" # a single timezone is used for simplicity
# Scale to 3 instances during the work week
schedule {
cron = "* 8-18 * * 1-5" # from 8AM–6:59PM, Mon–Fri, UTC
instances = 3 # scale to 3 instances
}
# Scale to 1 instance on Saturdays for urgent support queries
schedule {
cron = "* 8-14 * * 6" # from 8AM–2:59PM, Sat, UTC
instances = 1 # scale to 1 instance
}
}
}
}
```
### Behavior
- Multiple `schedule` blocks per `prebuilds` block are supported.
- If the current time matches any defined autoscaling schedule, the
corresponding number of instances is used.
- If no schedule matches, the **default instance count**
(`prebuilds.instances`) is used as a fallback.
### Why
This feature allows prebuild instance capacity to adapt to predictable
usage patterns, such as:
- Scaling up during business hours or high-demand periods
- Reducing capacity during off-hours to save resources
### Cron specification
The cron specification is interpreted as a **continuous time range.**
For example, the expression:
```
* 9-18 * * 1-5
```
is intended to represent a continuous range from **09:00 to 18:59**,
Monday through Friday.
However, due to minor implementation imprecision, it is currently
interpreted as a range from **08:59:00 to 18:58:59**, Monday through
Friday.
This slight discrepancy arises because the evaluation is based on
whether a specific **point in time** falls within the range, using the
`github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/schedule/cron` library, which performs
per-minute matching rather than strict range evaluation.
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
This does ~95% of the backend work required to integrate the AI work.
Most left to integrate from the tasks branch is just frontend, which
will be a lot smaller I believe.
The real difference between this branch and that one is the abstraction
-- this now attaches statuses to apps, and returns the latest status
reported as part of a workspace.
This change enables us to have a similar UX to in the tasks branch, but
for agents other than Claude Code as well. Any app can report status
now.
* Adds `codersdk.ExperimentWebPush` (`web-push`)
* Adds a `coderd/webpush` package that allows sending native push
notifications via `github.com/SherClockHolmes/webpush-go`
* Adds database tables to store push notification subscriptions.
* Adds an API endpoint that allows users to subscribe/unsubscribe, and
send a test notification (404 without experiment, excluded from API docs)
* Adds server CLI command to regenerate VAPID keys (note: regenerating
the VAPID keypair requires deleting all existing subscriptions)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kyle Carberry <kyle@carberry.com>
This change allows specifying devcontainers in terraform and plumbs it
through to the agent via agent manifest.
This will be used for autostarting devcontainers in a workspace.
Depends on coder/terraform-provider-coder#368
Updates #16423
This change adds support for workspace app auditing.
To avoid audit log spam, we introduce the concept of app audit sessions.
An audit session is unique per workspace app, user, ip, user agent and
http status code. The sessions are stored in a separate table from audit
logs to allow use-case specific optimizations. Sessions are ephemeral
and the table does not function as a log.
The logic for auditing is placed in the DBTokenProvider for workspace
apps so that wsproxies are included.
This is the final change affecting the API fo #15139.
Updates #15139
This pull requests adds the necessary migrations and queries to support
presets within the coderd database. Future PRs will build functionality
to the provisioners and the frontend.
As requested for [this
issue](https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/245) we need to have a
new resource `resources_monitoring` in the agent.
It needs to be parsed from the provisioner and inserted into a new db
table.
Addresses https://github.com/coder/nexus/issues/175.
## Changes
- Adds the `telemetry_items` database table. It's a key value store for
telemetry events that don't fit any other database tables.
- Adds a telemetry report when HTML is served for the first time in
`site.go`.
Sas Swart