package rbac

import (
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"sort"
	"strconv"
	"strings"

	"github.com/google/uuid"
	"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/ast"
	"golang.org/x/xerrors"

	"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/rbac/policy"
	"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/util/slice"
)

const (
	owner         string = "owner"
	member        string = "member"
	templateAdmin string = "template-admin"
	userAdmin     string = "user-admin"
	auditor       string = "auditor"
	agentsAccess  string = "agents-access"
	// customSiteRole is a placeholder for all custom site roles.
	// This is used for what roles can assign other roles.
	// TODO: Make this more dynamic to allow other roles to grant.
	customSiteRole         string = "custom-site-role"
	customOrganizationRole string = "custom-organization-role"

	orgAdmin                string = "organization-admin"
	orgMember               string = "organization-member"
	orgServiceAccount       string = "organization-service-account"
	orgAuditor              string = "organization-auditor"
	orgUserAdmin            string = "organization-user-admin"
	orgTemplateAdmin        string = "organization-template-admin"
	orgWorkspaceCreationBan string = "organization-workspace-creation-ban"

	prebuildsOrchestrator string = "prebuilds-orchestrator"
)

func init() {
	// Always load defaults
	ReloadBuiltinRoles(nil)
}

// RoleIdentifiers is a list of user assignable role names. The role names must be
// in the builtInRoles map. Any non-user assignable roles will generate an
// error on Expand.
type RoleIdentifiers []RoleIdentifier

func (names RoleIdentifiers) Expand() ([]Role, error) {
	return rolesByNames(names)
}

func (names RoleIdentifiers) Names() []RoleIdentifier {
	return names
}

// RoleIdentifier contains both the name of the role, and any organizational scope.
// Both fields are required to be globally unique and identifiable.
type RoleIdentifier struct {
	Name string
	// OrganizationID is uuid.Nil for unscoped roles (aka deployment wide)
	OrganizationID uuid.UUID
}

func (r RoleIdentifier) IsOrgRole() bool {
	return r.OrganizationID != uuid.Nil
}

// RoleNameFromString takes a formatted string '<role_name>[:org_id]'.
func RoleNameFromString(input string) (RoleIdentifier, error) {
	var role RoleIdentifier

	arr := strings.Split(input, ":")
	if len(arr) > 2 {
		return role, xerrors.Errorf("too many colons in role name")
	}

	if len(arr) == 0 {
		return role, xerrors.Errorf("empty string not a valid role")
	}

	if arr[0] == "" {
		return role, xerrors.Errorf("role cannot be the empty string")
	}

	role.Name = arr[0]

	if len(arr) == 2 {
		orgID, err := uuid.Parse(arr[1])
		if err != nil {
			return role, xerrors.Errorf("%q not a valid uuid: %w", arr[1], err)
		}
		role.OrganizationID = orgID
	}
	return role, nil
}

func (r RoleIdentifier) String() string {
	if r.OrganizationID != uuid.Nil {
		return r.Name + ":" + r.OrganizationID.String()
	}
	return r.Name
}

func (r RoleIdentifier) UniqueName() string {
	return r.String()
}

func (r *RoleIdentifier) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
	return json.Marshal(r.String())
}

func (r *RoleIdentifier) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
	var str string
	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &str)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	v, err := RoleNameFromString(str)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	*r = v
	return nil
}

// The functions below ONLY need to exist for roles that are "defaulted" in some way.
// Any other roles (like auditor), can be listed and let the user select/assigned.
// Once we have a database implementation, the "default" roles can be defined on the
// site and orgs, and these functions can be removed.

func RoleOwner() RoleIdentifier      { return RoleIdentifier{Name: owner} }
func CustomSiteRole() RoleIdentifier { return RoleIdentifier{Name: customSiteRole} }
func CustomOrganizationRole(orgID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: customOrganizationRole, OrganizationID: orgID}
}
func RoleTemplateAdmin() RoleIdentifier { return RoleIdentifier{Name: templateAdmin} }
func RoleUserAdmin() RoleIdentifier     { return RoleIdentifier{Name: userAdmin} }
func RoleMember() RoleIdentifier        { return RoleIdentifier{Name: member} }
func RoleAuditor() RoleIdentifier       { return RoleIdentifier{Name: auditor} }
func RoleAgentsAccess() string          { return agentsAccess }

func RoleOrgAdmin() string {
	return orgAdmin
}

func RoleOrgMember() string {
	return orgMember
}

func RoleOrgServiceAccount() string {
	return orgServiceAccount
}

func RoleOrgAuditor() string {
	return orgAuditor
}

func RoleOrgUserAdmin() string {
	return orgUserAdmin
}

func RoleOrgTemplateAdmin() string {
	return orgTemplateAdmin
}

func RoleOrgWorkspaceCreationBan() string {
	return orgWorkspaceCreationBan
}

// ScopedRoleOrgAdmin is the org role with the organization ID
func ScopedRoleOrgAdmin(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgAdmin(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

// ScopedRoleOrgMember is the org role with the organization ID
func ScopedRoleOrgMember(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgMember(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func ScopedRoleOrgAuditor(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgAuditor(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func ScopedRoleOrgUserAdmin(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgUserAdmin(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func ScopedRoleOrgTemplateAdmin(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgTemplateAdmin(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func ScopedRoleOrgWorkspaceCreationBan(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleOrgWorkspaceCreationBan(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func ScopedRoleAgentsAccess(organizationID uuid.UUID) RoleIdentifier {
	return RoleIdentifier{Name: RoleAgentsAccess(), OrganizationID: organizationID}
}

func allPermsExcept(excepts ...Objecter) []Permission {
	resources := AllResources()
	var perms []Permission
	skip := make(map[string]bool)
	for _, e := range excepts {
		skip[e.RBACObject().Type] = true
	}

	for _, r := range resources {
		// Exceptions
		if skip[r.RBACObject().Type] {
			continue
		}
		// This should always be skipped.
		if r.RBACObject().Type == ResourceWildcard.Type {
			continue
		}
		// Owners can do everything else
		perms = append(perms, Permission{
			Negate:       false,
			ResourceType: r.RBACObject().Type,
			Action:       policy.WildcardSymbol,
		})
	}
	return perms
}

// builtInRoles are just a hard coded set for now. Ideally we store these in
// the database. Right now they are functions because the org id should scope
// certain roles. When we store them in the database, each organization should
// create the roles that are assignable in the org. This isn't a hard problem to solve,
// it's just easier as a function right now.
//
// This map will be replaced by database storage defined by this ticket.
// https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/1194
var builtInRoles map[string]func(orgID uuid.UUID) Role

type RoleOptions struct {
	NoOwnerWorkspaceExec bool
	NoWorkspaceSharing   bool
	NoChatSharing        bool
}

// ReservedRoleName exists because the database should only allow unique role
// names, but some roles are built in. So these names are reserved
func ReservedRoleName(name string) bool {
	_, ok := builtInRoles[name]
	return ok
}

// ReloadBuiltinRoles loads the static roles into the builtInRoles map.
// This can be called again with a different config to change the behavior.
//
// TODO: @emyrk This would be great if it was instanced to a coderd rather
// than a global. But that is a much larger refactor right now.
// Essentially we did not foresee different deployments needing slightly
// different role permissions.
func ReloadBuiltinRoles(opts *RoleOptions) {
	if opts == nil {
		opts = &RoleOptions{}
	}

	denyPermissions := []Permission{}
	if opts.NoWorkspaceSharing {
		denyPermissions = append(denyPermissions, Permission{
			Negate:       true,
			ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
			Action:       policy.ActionShare,
		})
	}
	if opts.NoChatSharing {
		denyPermissions = append(denyPermissions, Permission{
			Negate:       true,
			ResourceType: ResourceChat.Type,
			Action:       policy.ActionShare,
		})
	}

	ownerWorkspaceActions := ResourceWorkspace.AvailableActions()
	if opts.NoOwnerWorkspaceExec {
		// Remove ssh and application connect from the owner role. This
		// prevents owners from have exec access to all workspaces.
		ownerWorkspaceActions = slice.Omit(
			ownerWorkspaceActions,
			policy.ActionApplicationConnect, policy.ActionSSH,
		)
	}

	// Static roles that never change should be allocated in a closure.
	// This is to ensure these data structures are only allocated once and not
	// on every authorize call. 'withCachedRegoValue' can be used as well to
	// preallocate the rego value that is used by the rego eval engine.
	ownerRole := Role{
		Identifier:  RoleOwner(),
		DisplayName: "Owner",
		Site: append(
			// Workspace dormancy and workspace are omitted.
			// Workspace is specifically handled based on the opts.NoOwnerWorkspaceExec.
			// Owners can inspect and delete personal skills for operability and
			// abuse handling, but cannot create or edit user-authored instructions.
			allPermsExcept(ResourceWorkspaceDormant, ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace, ResourceWorkspace, ResourceUserSecret, ResourceUserSkill, ResourceUsageEvent, ResourceBoundaryUsage, ResourceBoundaryLog, ResourceAiSeat),
			// This adds back in the Workspace permissions.
			Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
				ResourceWorkspace.Type:        ownerWorkspaceActions,
				ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type: {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionDelete, policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionWorkspaceStop, policy.ActionCreateAgent, policy.ActionDeleteAgent, policy.ActionUpdateAgent},
				ResourceUserSkill.Type:        {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionDelete},
				// PrebuiltWorkspaces are a subset of Workspaces.
				// Explicitly setting PrebuiltWorkspace permissions for clarity.
				// Note: even without PrebuiltWorkspace permissions, access is still granted via Workspace permissions.
				ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace.Type: {policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
				// Owners can read all boundary logs. Delete is reserved for
				// DBPurge only. Create is user-scoped (inherited from member).
				ResourceBoundaryLog.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			})...,
		),
		User:    []Permission{},
		ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{},
	}.withCachedRegoValue()

	memberRole := Role{
		Identifier:  RoleMember(),
		DisplayName: "Member",
		Site: append(
			Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
				ResourceAssignRole.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
				// All users can see OAuth2 provider applications.
				ResourceOauth2App.Type:      {policy.ActionRead},
				ResourceWorkspaceProxy.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			}),
			denyPermissions...,
		),
		User: append(
			allPermsExcept(ResourceWorkspaceDormant, ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace, ResourceWorkspace, ResourceUser, ResourceOrganizationMember, ResourceBoundaryUsage, ResourceBoundaryLog, ResourceAibridgeInterception, ResourceChat, ResourceAiSeat),
			Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
				// Users cannot do create/update/delete on themselves, but they
				// can read their own details.
				ResourceUser.Type: {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionReadPersonal, policy.ActionUpdatePersonal},
				// Users can create provisioner daemons scoped to themselves.
				ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate},
				// Members can create and update AI Bridge interceptions but
				// cannot read them back.
				ResourceAibridgeInterception.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionUpdate},
				// Workspace agents create boundary logs under their owner's
				// identity. Create is user-scoped so agents can only write
				// logs owned by their workspace owner.
				// Read: owners and auditors. Delete: DBPurge only.
				ResourceBoundaryLog.Type: {policy.ActionCreate},
			})...,
		),
		ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{},
	}.withCachedRegoValue()

	auditorRole := Role{
		Identifier:  RoleAuditor(),
		DisplayName: "Auditor",
		Site: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
			ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceAuditLog.Type:      {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceConnectionLog.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			// Allow auditors to see the resources that audit logs reflect.
			ResourceTemplate.Type:           {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionViewInsights},
			ResourceUser.Type:               {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceGroup.Type:              {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceGroupMember.Type:        {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceOrganization.Type:       {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			// Allow auditors to query deployment stats and insights.
			ResourceDeploymentStats.Type:  {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceDeploymentConfig.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			// Allow auditors to query AI Bridge interceptions.
			ResourceAibridgeInterception.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			// Allow auditors to read boundary logs.
			ResourceBoundaryLog.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		}),
		User:    []Permission{},
		ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{},
	}.withCachedRegoValue()

	templateAdminRole := Role{
		Identifier:  RoleTemplateAdmin(),
		DisplayName: "Template Admin",
		Site: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
			ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceTemplate.Type:      ResourceTemplate.AvailableActions(),
			// CRUD all files, even those they did not upload.
			ResourceFile.Type:              {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceWorkspace.Type:         {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type:  {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace.Type: {policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
			// CRUD to provisioner daemons for now.
			ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
			// Needs to read all organizations since
			ResourceUser.Type:               {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceGroup.Type:              {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceGroupMember.Type:        {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceOrganization.Type:       {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		}),
		User:    []Permission{},
		ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{},
	}.withCachedRegoValue()

	userAdminRole := Role{
		Identifier:  RoleUserAdmin(),
		DisplayName: "User Admin",
		Site: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
			ResourceAssignRole.Type: {policy.ActionAssign, policy.ActionUnassign, policy.ActionRead},
			// Need organization assign as well to create users. At present, creating a user
			// will always assign them to some organization.
			ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type: {policy.ActionAssign, policy.ActionUnassign, policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceUser.Type: {
				policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete,
				policy.ActionUpdatePersonal, policy.ActionReadPersonal,
			},
			ResourceGroup.Type:        {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
			ResourceGroupMember.Type:  {policy.ActionRead},
			ResourceOrganization.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
			// Full perms to manage org members
			ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
			// Manage org membership based on OIDC claims
			ResourceIdpsyncSettings.Type: {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate},
		}),
		User:    []Permission{},
		ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{},
	}.withCachedRegoValue()

	builtInRoles = map[string]func(orgID uuid.UUID) Role{
		// admin grants all actions to all resources.
		owner: func(_ uuid.UUID) Role {
			return ownerRole
		},

		// member grants all actions to all resources owned by the user
		member: func(_ uuid.UUID) Role {
			return memberRole
		},

		// auditor provides all permissions required to effectively read and understand
		// audit log events.
		// TODO: Finish the auditor as we add resources.
		auditor: func(_ uuid.UUID) Role {
			return auditorRole
		},

		// templateAdmin grants all actions on templates, files,
		// provisioner daemons, and prebuilt workspaces.
		templateAdmin: func(_ uuid.UUID) Role {
			return templateAdminRole
		},

		// userAdmin grants all actions on users, groups, roles,
		// and organization membership.
		userAdmin: func(_ uuid.UUID) Role {
			return userAdminRole
		},

		// orgAdmin returns a role with all actions allows in a given
		// organization scope.
		orgAdmin: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: orgAdmin, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Organization Admin",
				Site: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
					// To assign organization members, we need to be able to read
					// users at the site wide to know they exist.
					ResourceUser.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
				}),
				User: []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					// Org admins should not have workspace exec perms.
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: append(
							allPermsExcept(ResourceWorkspace, ResourceWorkspaceDormant, ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace, ResourceAssignRole, ResourceUserSecret, ResourceBoundaryUsage, ResourceBoundaryLog, ResourceAiSeat),
							Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
								ResourceWorkspace.Type:        slice.Omit(ResourceWorkspace.AvailableActions(), policy.ActionApplicationConnect, policy.ActionSSH),
								ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type: {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionDelete, policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionWorkspaceStop, policy.ActionCreateAgent, policy.ActionDeleteAgent, policy.ActionUpdateAgent},
								// PrebuiltWorkspaces are a subset of Workspaces.
								// Explicitly setting PrebuiltWorkspace permissions for clarity.
								// Note: even without PrebuiltWorkspace permissions, access is still granted via Workspace permissions.
								ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace.Type: {policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
							})...,
						),
						Member: []Permission{},
					},
				},
			}
		},
		orgAuditor: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: orgAuditor, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Organization Auditor",
				Site:        []Permission{},
				User:        []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
							ResourceAuditLog.Type:      {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceConnectionLog.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
							// Allow auditors to see the resources that audit logs reflect.
							ResourceTemplate.Type:           {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionViewInsights},
							ResourceGroup.Type:              {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceGroupMember.Type:        {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceOrganization.Type:       {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
						}),
						Member: []Permission{},
					},
				},
			}
		},
		orgUserAdmin: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			// Manages organization members and groups.
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: orgUserAdmin, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Organization User Admin",
				Site: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
					// To assign organization members, we need to be able to read
					// users at the site wide to know they exist.
					ResourceUser.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
				}),
				User: []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
							// Assign, remove, and read roles in the organization.
							ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type:      {policy.ActionAssign, policy.ActionUnassign, policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceOrganization.Type:       {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
							ResourceGroup.Type:              ResourceGroup.AvailableActions(),
							ResourceGroupMember.Type:        ResourceGroupMember.AvailableActions(),
							ResourceIdpsyncSettings.Type:    {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate},
						}),
						Member: []Permission{},
					},
				},
			}
		},
		orgTemplateAdmin: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			// Manages organization members and groups.
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: orgTemplateAdmin, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Organization Template Admin",
				Site:        []Permission{},
				User:        []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
							ResourceTemplate.Type:          ResourceTemplate.AvailableActions(),
							ResourceFile.Type:              {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceWorkspace.Type:         {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type:  {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourcePrebuiltWorkspace.Type: {policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
							// Assigning template perms requires this permission.
							ResourceOrganization.Type:       {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceGroup.Type:              {policy.ActionRead},
							ResourceGroupMember.Type:        {policy.ActionRead},
							// Since templates have to correlate with provisioners,
							// the ability to create templates and provisioners has
							// a lot of overlap.
							ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionDelete},
							ResourceProvisionerJobs.Type:   {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate, policy.ActionCreate},
						}),
						Member: []Permission{},
					},
				},
			}
		},
		// orgWorkspaceCreationBan prevents creating & deleting workspaces. This
		// overrides any permissions granted by the org or user level. It accomplishes
		// this by using negative permissions.
		orgWorkspaceCreationBan: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: orgWorkspaceCreationBan, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Organization Workspace Creation Ban",
				Site:        []Permission{},
				User:        []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: []Permission{
							{
								Negate:       true,
								ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
								Action:       policy.ActionCreate,
							},
							{
								Negate:       true,
								ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
								Action:       policy.ActionDelete,
							},
							{
								Negate:       true,
								ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
								Action:       policy.ActionCreateAgent,
							},
							{
								Negate:       true,
								ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
								Action:       policy.ActionDeleteAgent,
							},
						},
						Member: []Permission{},
					},
				},
			}
		},
		// ActionDelete is intentionally excluded because hard-deletion goes through
		// ResourceSystem in dbpurge.
		agentsAccess: func(organizationID uuid.UUID) Role {
			return Role{
				Identifier:  RoleIdentifier{Name: agentsAccess, OrganizationID: organizationID},
				DisplayName: "Coder Agents User",
				Site:        []Permission{},
				User:        []Permission{},
				ByOrgID: map[string]OrgPermissions{
					organizationID.String(): {
						Org: []Permission{},
						Member: Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
							ResourceChat.Type: {
								policy.ActionCreate,
								policy.ActionRead,
								policy.ActionShare,
								policy.ActionUpdate,
							},
						}),
					},
				},
			}
		},
	}
}

// assignRoles is a map of roles that can be assigned if a user has a given
// role.
// The first key is the actor role, the second is the roles they can assign.
//
//	map[actor_role][assign_role]<can_assign>
var assignRoles = map[string]map[string]bool{
	"system": {
		owner:                   true,
		auditor:                 true,
		member:                  true,
		orgAdmin:                true,
		orgMember:               true,
		orgAuditor:              true,
		orgUserAdmin:            true,
		orgTemplateAdmin:        true,
		orgWorkspaceCreationBan: true,
		templateAdmin:           true,
		userAdmin:               true,
		customSiteRole:          true,
		customOrganizationRole:  true,
		agentsAccess:            true,
	},
	owner: {
		owner:                   true,
		auditor:                 true,
		member:                  true,
		orgAdmin:                true,
		orgMember:               true,
		orgAuditor:              true,
		orgUserAdmin:            true,
		orgTemplateAdmin:        true,
		orgWorkspaceCreationBan: true,
		templateAdmin:           true,
		userAdmin:               true,
		customSiteRole:          true,
		customOrganizationRole:  true,
		agentsAccess:            true,
	},
	userAdmin: {
		member:       true,
		orgMember:    true,
		agentsAccess: true,
	},
	orgAdmin: {
		orgAdmin:                true,
		orgMember:               true,
		orgAuditor:              true,
		orgUserAdmin:            true,
		orgTemplateAdmin:        true,
		orgWorkspaceCreationBan: true,
		customOrganizationRole:  true,
		agentsAccess:            true,
	},
	orgUserAdmin: {
		orgMember:    true,
		agentsAccess: true,
	},

	prebuildsOrchestrator: {
		orgMember: true,
	},
}

// ExpandableRoles is any type that can be expanded into a []Role. This is implemented
// as an interface so we can have RoleIdentifiers for user defined roles, and implement
// custom ExpandableRoles for system type users (eg autostart/autostop system role).
// We want a clear divide between the two types of roles so users have no codepath
// to interact or assign system roles.
//
// Note: We may also want to do the same thing with scopes to allow custom scope
// support unavailable to the user. Eg: Scope to a single resource.
type ExpandableRoles interface {
	Expand() ([]Role, error)
	// Names is for logging and tracing purposes, we want to know the human
	// names of the expanded roles.
	Names() []RoleIdentifier
}

// Permission is the format passed into the rego.
type Permission struct {
	// Negate makes this a negative permission
	Negate       bool          `json:"negate"`
	ResourceType string        `json:"resource_type"`
	Action       policy.Action `json:"action"`
}

func (perm Permission) Valid() error {
	if perm.ResourceType == policy.WildcardSymbol {
		// Wildcard is tricky to check. Just allow it.
		return nil
	}

	resource, ok := policy.RBACPermissions[perm.ResourceType]
	if !ok {
		return xerrors.Errorf("invalid resource type %q", perm.ResourceType)
	}

	// Wildcard action is always valid
	if perm.Action == policy.WildcardSymbol {
		return nil
	}

	_, ok = resource.Actions[perm.Action]
	if !ok {
		return xerrors.Errorf("invalid action %q for resource %q", perm.Action, perm.ResourceType)
	}

	return nil
}

// Role is a set of permissions at multiple levels:
// - Site permissions apply EVERYWHERE
// - Org permissions apply to EVERYTHING in a given ORG
// - User permissions apply to all resources the user owns
// - OrgMember permissions apply to resources in the given org that the user owns
// This is the type passed into the rego as a json payload.
// Users of this package should instead **only** use the role names, and
// this package will expand the role names into their json payloads.
type Role struct {
	Identifier RoleIdentifier `json:"name"`
	// DisplayName is used for UI purposes. If the role has no display name,
	// that means the UI should never display it.
	DisplayName string       `json:"display_name"`
	Site        []Permission `json:"site"`
	User        []Permission `json:"user"`
	// ByOrgID is a map of organization IDs to permissions. Grouping by
	// organization makes roles easy to combine.
	ByOrgID map[string]OrgPermissions `json:"by_org_id"`

	// cachedRegoValue can be used to cache the rego value for this role.
	// This is helpful for static roles that never change.
	cachedRegoValue ast.Value
}

type OrgPermissions struct {
	Org    []Permission `json:"org"`
	Member []Permission `json:"member"`
}

// Valid will check all it's permissions and ensure they are all correct
// according to the policy. This verifies every action specified make sense
// for the given resource.
func (role Role) Valid() error {
	var errs []error
	for _, perm := range role.Site {
		if err := perm.Valid(); err != nil {
			errs = append(errs, xerrors.Errorf("site: %w", err))
		}
	}

	for orgID, orgPermissions := range role.ByOrgID {
		for _, perm := range orgPermissions.Org {
			if err := perm.Valid(); err != nil {
				errs = append(errs, xerrors.Errorf("org=%q: org %w", orgID, err))
			}
		}
		for _, perm := range orgPermissions.Member {
			if err := perm.Valid(); err != nil {
				errs = append(errs, xerrors.Errorf("org=%q: member: %w", orgID, err))
			}
		}
	}

	for _, perm := range role.User {
		if err := perm.Valid(); err != nil {
			errs = append(errs, xerrors.Errorf("user: %w", err))
		}
	}

	return errors.Join(errs...)
}

type Roles []Role

func (roles Roles) Expand() ([]Role, error) {
	return roles, nil
}

func (roles Roles) Names() []RoleIdentifier {
	names := make([]RoleIdentifier, 0, len(roles))
	for _, r := range roles {
		names = append(names, r.Identifier)
	}
	return names
}

// CanAssignRole is a helper function that returns true if the user can assign
// the specified role. This also can be used for removing a role.
// This is a simple implementation for now.
func CanAssignRole(subjectHasRoles ExpandableRoles, assignedRole RoleIdentifier) bool {
	// For CanAssignRole, we only care about the names of the roles.
	roles := subjectHasRoles.Names()

	for _, myRole := range roles {
		if myRole.OrganizationID != uuid.Nil && myRole.OrganizationID != assignedRole.OrganizationID {
			// Org roles only apply to the org they are assigned to.
			continue
		}

		allowedAssignList, ok := assignRoles[myRole.Name]
		if !ok {
			continue
		}

		if allowedAssignList[assignedRole.Name] {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// RoleByName returns the permissions associated with a given role name.
// This allows just the role names to be stored and expanded when required.
//
// This function is exported so that the Display name can be returned to the
// api. We should maybe make an exported function that returns just the
// human-readable content of the Role struct (name + display name).
func RoleByName(name RoleIdentifier) (Role, error) {
	roleFunc, ok := builtInRoles[name.Name]
	if !ok {
		// No role found
		return Role{}, xerrors.Errorf("role %q not found", name.String())
	}

	// Ensure all org roles are properly scoped a non-empty organization id.
	// This is just some defensive programming.
	role := roleFunc(name.OrganizationID)
	if len(role.ByOrgID) > 0 && name.OrganizationID == uuid.Nil {
		return Role{}, xerrors.Errorf("expect a org id for role %q", name.String())
	}

	// This can happen if a custom role shares the same name as a built-in role.
	// You could make an org role called "owner", and we should not return the
	// owner role itself.
	if name.OrganizationID != role.Identifier.OrganizationID {
		return Role{}, xerrors.Errorf("role %q not found", name.String())
	}

	return role, nil
}

func rolesByNames(roleNames []RoleIdentifier) ([]Role, error) {
	roles := make([]Role, 0, len(roleNames))
	for _, n := range roleNames {
		r, err := RoleByName(n)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, xerrors.Errorf("get role permissions: %w", err)
		}
		roles = append(roles, r)
	}
	return roles, nil
}

// OrganizationRoles lists all roles that can be applied to an organization user
// in the given organization. This is the list of available roles,
// and specific to an organization.
//
// This should be a list in a database, but until then we build
// the list from the builtins.
func OrganizationRoles(organizationID uuid.UUID) []Role {
	var roles []Role
	for _, roleF := range builtInRoles {
		role := roleF(organizationID)
		if role.Identifier.OrganizationID == organizationID {
			roles = append(roles, role)
		}
	}
	return roles
}

// SiteBuiltInRoles lists all roles that can be applied to a user.
// This is the list of available roles, and not specific to a user
//
// This should be a list in a database, but until then we build
// the list from the builtins.
func SiteBuiltInRoles() []Role {
	var roles []Role
	for _, roleF := range builtInRoles {
		// Must provide some non-nil uuid to filter out org roles.
		role := roleF(uuid.New())
		if !role.Identifier.IsOrgRole() {
			roles = append(roles, role)
		}
	}
	return roles
}

// ChangeRoleSet is a helper function that finds the difference of 2 sets of
// roles. When setting a user's new roles, it is equivalent to adding and
// removing roles. This set determines the changes, so that the appropriate
// RBAC checks can be applied using "ActionCreate" and "ActionDelete" for
// "added" and "removed" roles respectively.
func ChangeRoleSet(from []RoleIdentifier, to []RoleIdentifier) (added []RoleIdentifier, removed []RoleIdentifier) {
	return slice.SymmetricDifferenceFunc(from, to, func(a, b RoleIdentifier) bool {
		return a.Name == b.Name && a.OrganizationID == b.OrganizationID
	})
}

// Permissions is just a helper function to make building roles that list out resources
// and actions a bit easier.
func Permissions(perms map[string][]policy.Action) []Permission {
	list := make([]Permission, 0, len(perms))
	for k, actions := range perms {
		for _, act := range actions {
			list = append(list, Permission{
				Negate:       false,
				ResourceType: k,
				Action:       act,
			})
		}
	}
	// Deterministic ordering of permissions
	sort.Slice(list, func(i, j int) bool {
		return list[i].ResourceType < list[j].ResourceType
	})
	return list
}

// DeduplicatePermissions removes duplicate Permission entries while preserving
// the original order of the first occurrence for deterministic evaluation.
func DeduplicatePermissions(perms []Permission) []Permission {
	if len(perms) == 0 {
		return perms
	}
	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(perms))
	deduped := make([]Permission, 0, len(perms))
	for _, perm := range perms {
		key := perm.ResourceType + "\x00" + string(perm.Action) + "\x00" + strconv.FormatBool(perm.Negate)
		if _, ok := seen[key]; ok {
			continue
		}
		seen[key] = struct{}{}
		deduped = append(deduped, perm)
	}
	return deduped
}

// PermissionsEqual compares two permission slices as sets.  Order and
// duplicate entries do not matter; it only checks that both slices
// contain the same unique permissions.
func PermissionsEqual(a, b []Permission) bool {
	setA := make(map[Permission]struct{}, len(a))
	for _, p := range a {
		setA[p] = struct{}{}
	}

	setB := make(map[Permission]struct{}, len(b))
	for _, p := range b {
		if _, ok := setA[p]; !ok {
			return false
		}
		setB[p] = struct{}{}
	}

	return len(setA) == len(setB)
}

// OrgSettings carries organization-level settings that affect system
// role permissions. It lives in the rbac package to avoid a cyclic
// dependency with the database package. Callers in rolestore map
// database.Organization fields onto this struct.
type OrgSettings struct {
	ShareableWorkspaceOwners ShareableWorkspaceOwners
}
type ShareableWorkspaceOwners string

const (
	ShareableWorkspaceOwnersNone            ShareableWorkspaceOwners = "none"
	ShareableWorkspaceOwnersEveryone        ShareableWorkspaceOwners = "everyone"
	ShareableWorkspaceOwnersServiceAccounts ShareableWorkspaceOwners = "service_accounts"
)

// OrgRolePermissions holds the two permission sets that make up a
// system role: org-wide permissions and member-scoped permissions.
type OrgRolePermissions struct {
	Org    []Permission
	Member []Permission
}

// OrgMemberPermissions returns the permissions for the organization-member
// system role, which can vary based on the organization's workspace sharing
// settings.
func OrgMemberPermissions(org OrgSettings) OrgRolePermissions {
	// Organization-level permissions that all org members get.
	orgPermMap := map[string][]policy.Action{
		// All users can see provisioner daemons for workspace creation.
		ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		// All org members can read the organization.
		ResourceOrganization.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		// Can read available roles.
		ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
	}

	// In all modes of workspace sharing but `none`, members need to
	// see other org members (including service accounts) to either
	// share with them or get access to their shared workspaces,
	// resolved through GET /users/{user}/workspace/{workspace}
	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners != ShareableWorkspaceOwnersNone {
		orgPermMap[ResourceOrganizationMember.Type] = []policy.Action{policy.ActionRead}
	}

	// When workspace sharing is open to members, they also need to
	// see org groups to share with them.
	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners == ShareableWorkspaceOwnersEveryone {
		orgPermMap[ResourceGroup.Type] = []policy.Action{policy.ActionRead}
	}

	orgPerms := Permissions(orgPermMap)

	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners == ShareableWorkspaceOwnersNone {
		// Org-level negation blocks sharing on ANY workspace in the
		// org. This overrides any positive permission from other
		// roles, including org-admin.
		orgPerms = append(orgPerms, Permission{
			Negate:       true,
			ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
			Action:       policy.ActionShare,
		})
	}

	// Enumerate the per-member resources explicitly so new resources do
	// not auto-grant to org members. Adding a resource to the codebase
	// requires an explicit decision to expose it here.
	//
	// Member-level grants only fire when input.object.owner ==
	// input.subject.id (see the org_member rule in
	// coderd/rbac/policy.rego). Only resources whose RBACObject() calls
	// WithOwner(...) at production call sites belong here; see the
	// "Intentionally omitted" block at the bottom.
	memberPerms := Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
		// Workspace lifecycle on resources owned by this member.
		ResourceWorkspace.Type: ResourceWorkspace.AvailableActions(),

		// Dormant workspaces share the workspace action set minus the
		// build, ssh, and exec actions.
		ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type: {
			policy.ActionRead,
			policy.ActionDelete,
			policy.ActionCreate,
			policy.ActionUpdate,
			policy.ActionWorkspaceStop,
			policy.ActionCreateAgent,
			policy.ActionDeleteAgent,
			policy.ActionUpdateAgent,
		},

		// Upload and read template files the member created during
		// workspace build (File.RBACObject sets WithOwner(CreatedBy)).
		ResourceFile.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},

		// Create and read user-scoped provisioner daemons. The Upsert
		// path in dbauthz sets WithOwner(tag_owner) when scope=user, so
		// members can run their own daemons. Read is granted for
		// symmetry with workspace ownership: members can inspect
		// daemons they spawned even though no production call site
		// currently uses the member-scope read path (read on the bare
		// InOrg object continues to require Org-level perms).
		ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},

		// Tasks ride along with workspaces and are owner-scoped.
		ResourceTask.Type: ResourceTask.AvailableActions(),

		// Read-self group-membership record. GroupMember.RBACObject
		// sets WithOwner to the user's own ID.
		ResourceGroupMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},

		// Read-self org-member record.
		ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},

		// Members can create and update AI Bridge interceptions they
		// initiate (dbauthz layer sets WithOwner(InitiatorID)) but
		// cannot read them back. Chat access requires the
		// agents-access role and is intentionally not granted here.
		ResourceAibridgeInterception.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionUpdate},

		// Own session tokens and workspace agent auth keys.
		ResourceApiKey.Type: ResourceApiKey.AvailableActions(),

		// User-scoped notification surfaces. All three resources are
		// addressed by WithOwner(user_id) at the call sites.
		ResourceNotificationMessage.Type:    {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate},
		ResourceNotificationPreference.Type: ResourceNotificationPreference.AvailableActions(),
		ResourceInboxNotification.Type:      ResourceInboxNotification.AvailableActions(),

		// Intentionally omitted at Member scope (resources without an
		// Owner field on their RBACObject; Member-level grants never
		// fire for them). Listed here so a future maintainer who sees
		// these dropped relative to the legacy allPermsExcept(...)
		// wildcard does not "restore" them:
		//
		//   - ResourceTemplate: templates have no owner. Org-member
		//     template.use is authorized via the ACL path
		//     (acl_group_list[org_owner] "Everyone" group, populated
		//     on each template's GroupACL).
		//   - ResourceGroup: groups have no owner. "Groups I'm a
		//     member of can read themselves" is granted via the
		//     per-group GroupACL.
		//   - ResourceWorkspaceProxy, ResourceProvisionerJobs,
		//     ResourceWorkspaceAgentResourceMonitor,
		//     ResourceWorkspaceAgentDevcontainers,
		//     ResourceTailnetCoordinator, ResourceReplicas: these
		//     resources have no DB model that sets Owner; all
		//     production call sites use the bare resource or
		//     .InOrg(...) only. Access for these flows through Org
		//     perms on the appropriate role (e.g. ProvisionerDaemon
		//     above), or through system / agent / template-admin
		//     roles defined elsewhere.
	})

	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners != ShareableWorkspaceOwnersEveryone {
		memberPerms = append(memberPerms, Permission{
			Negate:       true,
			ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
			Action:       policy.ActionShare,
		})
	}

	return OrgRolePermissions{Org: orgPerms, Member: memberPerms}
}

// OrgServiceAccountPermissions returns the permissions for the
// organization-service-account system role, which can vary based on
// the organization's workspace sharing settings.
func OrgServiceAccountPermissions(org OrgSettings) OrgRolePermissions {
	// Organization-level permissions that all org service accounts get.
	orgPermMap := map[string][]policy.Action{
		// All users can see provisioner daemons for workspace creation.
		ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		// All org members can read the organization.
		ResourceOrganization.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
		// Can read available roles.
		ResourceAssignOrgRole.Type: {policy.ActionRead},
	}

	// When workspace sharing is enabled, service accounts need to see
	// other org members and groups to share workspaces with them.
	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners != ShareableWorkspaceOwnersNone {
		orgPermMap[ResourceOrganizationMember.Type] = []policy.Action{policy.ActionRead}
		orgPermMap[ResourceGroup.Type] = []policy.Action{policy.ActionRead}
	}

	orgPerms := Permissions(orgPermMap)

	if org.ShareableWorkspaceOwners == ShareableWorkspaceOwnersNone {
		// Org-level negation blocks sharing on ANY workspace in the
		// org. If a service account has any other roles assigned,
		// this negation will override any positive perms in them, too.
		orgPerms = append(orgPerms, Permission{
			Negate:       true,
			ResourceType: ResourceWorkspace.Type,
			Action:       policy.ActionShare,
		})
	}

	// service account-scoped permissions (resources owned by the
	// service account). Enumerated explicitly so new resources do not
	// auto-grant to service accounts.
	//
	// Member-level grants only fire when input.object.owner ==
	// input.subject.id (see the org_member rule in
	// coderd/rbac/policy.rego). Only resources whose RBACObject() calls
	// WithOwner(...) at production call sites belong here; see the
	// "Intentionally omitted" block at the bottom.
	memberPerms := Permissions(map[string][]policy.Action{
		// Workspace lifecycle on resources owned by this service account.
		ResourceWorkspace.Type: ResourceWorkspace.AvailableActions(),

		// Dormant workspaces share the workspace action set minus the
		// build, ssh, and exec actions.
		ResourceWorkspaceDormant.Type: {
			policy.ActionRead,
			policy.ActionDelete,
			policy.ActionCreate,
			policy.ActionUpdate,
			policy.ActionWorkspaceStop,
			policy.ActionCreateAgent,
			policy.ActionDeleteAgent,
			policy.ActionUpdateAgent,
		},

		// Upload and read template files the service account created
		// during workspace build (File.RBACObject sets
		// WithOwner(CreatedBy)).
		ResourceFile.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},

		// Create and read user-scoped provisioner daemons. The Upsert
		// path in dbauthz sets WithOwner(tag_owner) when scope=user, so
		// service accounts can run their own daemons. Read is granted
		// for symmetry with workspace ownership: service accounts can
		// inspect daemons they spawned even though no production call
		// site currently uses the member-scope read path (read on the
		// bare InOrg object continues to require Org-level perms).
		ResourceProvisionerDaemon.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionRead},

		// Tasks ride along with workspaces and are owner-scoped.
		ResourceTask.Type: ResourceTask.AvailableActions(),

		// Read-self group-membership record. GroupMember.RBACObject
		// sets WithOwner to the user's own ID.
		ResourceGroupMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},

		// Read-self org-member record.
		ResourceOrganizationMember.Type: {policy.ActionRead},

		// Service accounts can create and update AI Bridge
		// interceptions they initiate (dbauthz layer sets
		// WithOwner(InitiatorID)) but cannot read them back. Chat
		// access requires the agents-access role and is intentionally
		// not granted here.
		ResourceAibridgeInterception.Type: {policy.ActionCreate, policy.ActionUpdate},

		// Own session tokens and workspace agent auth keys.
		ResourceApiKey.Type: ResourceApiKey.AvailableActions(),

		// User-scoped notification surfaces. All three resources are
		// addressed by WithOwner(user_id) at the call sites.
		ResourceNotificationMessage.Type:    {policy.ActionRead, policy.ActionUpdate},
		ResourceNotificationPreference.Type: ResourceNotificationPreference.AvailableActions(),
		ResourceInboxNotification.Type:      ResourceInboxNotification.AvailableActions(),

		// Intentionally omitted at Member scope. See
		// OrgMemberPermissions above for the rationale; the service
		// account role mirrors the same partition.
	})

	return OrgRolePermissions{Org: orgPerms, Member: memberPerms}
}