Files
coder/coderd/workspaceresourceauth.go
T
Jakub Domeracki 1a1f06aa79 fix: verify PKCS7 signature on Azure instance identity tokens (#25286)
Migrates Azure instance identity verification from
`go.mozilla.org/pkcs7` and `github.com/fullsailor/pkcs7` to
`github.com/smallstep/pkcs7`, using `VerifyWithChainAtTime` to validate
both the PKCS7 signature and the certificate chain in one call. The
previous code only verified the signer certificate against a set of
intermediates/roots but did not verify that the PKCS7 signature itself
covered the content, meaning tampered payloads could be accepted.

The `Options` struct is restructured to accept `Roots`, `Intermediates`,
and `CurrentTime` as explicit fields instead of embedding
`x509.VerifyOptions`. The test helper `NewAzureInstanceIdentity` now
builds a realistic 3-level certificate chain (Root CA -> Intermediate CA
-> Signing Cert) matching real Azure trust hierarchy. New tests
(`TestValidate_TamperedContent`,
`TestValidate_UntrustedCertWithValidSignature`) confirm tampered and
untrusted envelopes are rejected.

Addresses GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf.

> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents.

<details>
<summary>Implementation Plan</summary>

### Files Changed

| File | Summary |
|------|---------|
| `coderd/azureidentity/azureidentity.go` | Replace `signer.Verify()`
with `VerifyWithChainAtTime`; restructure `Options` struct; add
`ParseCertificates()` helper |
| `coderd/azureidentity/azureidentity_test.go` | Add `testCertChain`
builder, tampered-content and untrusted-cert tests; update existing
tests for new `Options` API |
| `coderd/coderd.go` | Change `AzureCertificates` field from
`x509.VerifyOptions` to `azureidentity.Options` |
| `coderd/workspaceresourceauth.go` | Pass `api.AzureCertificates`
directly instead of wrapping |
| `coderd/coderdtest/coderdtest.go` | Migrate to `smallstep/pkcs7`;
build 3-level cert chain in test helper |
| `go.mod` / `go.sum` | Add `github.com/smallstep/pkcs7`; remove
`fullsailor/pkcs7` and `go.mozilla.org/pkcs7` |

</details>
2026-05-13 14:14:07 +00:00

215 lines
7.6 KiB
Go

package coderd
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/awsidentity"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/azureidentity"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database/dbauthz"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/agentsdk"
)
// Azure supports instance identity verification:
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux#tabgroup_14
//
// @Summary Authenticate agent on Azure instance
// @ID authenticate-agent-on-azure-instance
// @Security CoderSessionToken
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Tags Agents
// @Param request body agentsdk.AzureInstanceIdentityToken true "Instance identity token. The optional agent_name field disambiguates when multiple agents share the same instance ID."
// @Success 200 {object} agentsdk.AuthenticateResponse
// @Router /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identity [post]
func (api *API) postWorkspaceAuthAzureInstanceIdentity(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
var req agentsdk.AzureInstanceIdentityToken
if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
return
}
instanceID, err := azureidentity.Validate(r.Context(), req.Signature, api.AzureCertificates)
if err != nil {
// Log the full error for operators but return only a
// generic message to the caller. Errors from the
// certificate fetch path may contain fragments of
// internal HTTP responses, so exposing them would be
// an information disclosure risk.
api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "azure identity validation failed",
slog.Error(err),
)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid Azure identity.",
Detail: "Signature verification failed.",
})
return
}
api.handleAuthInstanceID(rw, r, instanceID, req.AgentName)
}
// AWS supports instance identity verification:
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html
// Using this, we can exchange a signed instance payload for an agent token.
//
// @Summary Authenticate agent on AWS instance
// @ID authenticate-agent-on-aws-instance
// @Security CoderSessionToken
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Tags Agents
// @Param request body agentsdk.AWSInstanceIdentityToken true "Instance identity token. The optional agent_name field disambiguates when multiple agents share the same instance ID."
// @Success 200 {object} agentsdk.AuthenticateResponse
// @Router /api/v2/workspaceagents/aws-instance-identity [post]
func (api *API) postWorkspaceAuthAWSInstanceIdentity(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
var req agentsdk.AWSInstanceIdentityToken
if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
return
}
identity, err := awsidentity.Validate(req.Signature, req.Document, api.AWSCertificates)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid AWS identity.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
api.handleAuthInstanceID(rw, r, identity.InstanceID, req.AgentName)
}
// Google Compute Engine supports instance identity verification:
// https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/verifying-instance-identity
// Using this, we can exchange a signed instance payload for an agent token.
//
// @Summary Authenticate agent on Google Cloud instance
// @ID authenticate-agent-on-google-cloud-instance
// @Security CoderSessionToken
// @Accept json
// @Produce json
// @Tags Agents
// @Param request body agentsdk.GoogleInstanceIdentityToken true "Instance identity token. The optional agent_name field disambiguates when multiple agents share the same instance ID."
// @Success 200 {object} agentsdk.AuthenticateResponse
// @Router /api/v2/workspaceagents/google-instance-identity [post]
func (api *API) postWorkspaceAuthGoogleInstanceIdentity(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
var req agentsdk.GoogleInstanceIdentityToken
if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
return
}
// We leave the audience blank. It's not important we validate who made the token.
payload, err := api.GoogleTokenValidator.Validate(ctx, req.JSONWebToken, "")
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid GCP identity.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
claims := struct {
Google struct {
ComputeEngine struct {
InstanceID string `mapstructure:"instance_id"`
} `mapstructure:"compute_engine"`
} `mapstructure:"google"`
}{}
err = mapstructure.Decode(payload.Claims, &claims)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Error decoding JWT claims.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
api.handleAuthInstanceID(rw, r, claims.Google.ComputeEngine.InstanceID, req.AgentName)
}
func (api *API) handleAuthInstanceID(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, instanceID string, agentName string) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Instance identity auth happens before the agent has a session token, so
// these lookups must use a restricted system context.
//nolint:gocritic // Instance identity auth happens before agent auth.
systemCtx := dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx)
agentName = strings.TrimSpace(agentName)
agents, err := api.Database.GetWorkspaceBuildAgentsByInstanceID(systemCtx, instanceID)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error fetching workspace agent.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if len(agents) == 0 {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusNotFound, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Instance with id %q not found.", instanceID),
})
return
}
selected := agents[0]
if agentName != "" {
found := false
for _, candidate := range agents {
if candidate.WorkspaceAgent.Name == agentName {
selected = candidate
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusNotFound, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("No agent found with instance ID %q and name %q.", instanceID, agentName),
})
return
}
} else if len(agents) != 1 {
// Include agent names in the error message to help operators
// configure CODER_AGENT_NAME. The caller has already proven
// cloud instance identity, so agent names are not sensitive
// here.
names := make([]string, len(agents))
for i, candidate := range agents {
names[i] = candidate.WorkspaceAgent.Name
}
sort.Strings(names)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusConflict, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf(
"Multiple agents found with instance ID %q. Set CODER_AGENT_NAME to one of: %s",
instanceID,
strings.Join(names, ", "),
),
})
return
}
agent := selected.WorkspaceAgent
// This token should only be exchanged if the instance ID is valid
// for the latest history. If an instance ID is recycled by a cloud,
// we'd hate to leak access to a user's workspace.
latestHistory, err := api.Database.GetLatestWorkspaceBuildByWorkspaceID(systemCtx, selected.WorkspaceTable.ID)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error fetching the latest workspace build.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if latestHistory.ID != selected.WorkspaceBuildID {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Resource found for id %q, but isn't registered on the latest history.", instanceID),
})
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, agentsdk.AuthenticateResponse{
SessionToken: agent.AuthToken.String(),
})
}