Files
coder/coderd/mcp.go
T
Michael Suchacz 9d0469fc4c feat: allow approved external MCP tools in root plan mode (#24509)
## Summary

Allow root plan-mode chats to use MCP tools from external servers that
an admin has explicitly approved for plan mode. Workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents remain blocked.

## Problem

`chatd.go` excluded every MCP tool when `isPlanModeTurn` was true, so
planning had no access to tools like docs search, ticketing, etc.
Lifting that guard wholesale was unsafe: `mcp_server_configs` already
has centralized admin governance, but workspace-local MCP (discovered
from agent `.mcp.json`) does not, and subagents use a narrower trust
boundary.

## Fix

Add an admin-controlled per-server `allow_in_plan_mode` flag (default
`false`) and gate plan-mode MCP access on it.

### Backend / schema
- New migration `000472_mcp_server_allow_in_plan_mode.{up,down}.sql` and
matching fixture update.
- `mcpserverconfigs.sql` + generated code: persist and read the new
column.
- `codersdk/mcp.go`: thread the field through `MCPServerConfig`,
`Create*`, and `Update*` request types.
- `coderd/mcp.go`: validate, persist, and return the flag in
get/list/create/update handlers.

### chatd
- `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go`: pre-filter selected external MCP configs by
`AllowInPlanMode` before calling `mcpclient.ConnectAll` on plan-mode
root turns. Workspace MCP discovery is skipped entirely on plan-mode
turns.
- Single helper decides whether a tool is available in plan mode, used
both at construction and for active-tool filtering (defense in depth).
Plan-mode subagents, dynamic tools, provider-native tools, computer-use,
and workspace MCP stay unchanged.
- `coderd/x/chatd/prompt.go`: update the root plan-mode overlay text to
match the new boundary.

### UI
- `MCPServerAdminPanel.tsx`: add an explicit toggle ("Allow all tools
from this MCP server in root plan mode") next to the existing governance
controls.
- Regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.

### Docs
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/architecture.md`: replace the blanket "MCP is
unavailable in plan mode" note with the new root-only, external-only,
admin-approved policy. Explicitly call out that workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents are still excluded.

### Tests
- Plan-mode visibility (approved vs non-approved external server).
- Plan-mode invocation of an approved external MCP tool.
- End-to-end plan-mode workflow that uses an approved MCP tool and then
reaches `propose_plan`.
- Regressions: workspace MCP still excluded in plan mode; plan-mode
subagents still on the restricted tool boundary; existing tool
allow/deny list filtering still applies.

## Policy precedence

`allow_in_plan_mode` is an **additional** requirement on top of existing
`enabled`, availability, chat-selected / forced server IDs, and tool
allow/deny lists. It approves **all tools on that server** for root plan
mode; a per-tool plan allowlist is deliberately deferred.

## Follow-ups (explicitly out of scope)

- Whether plan-mode subagents should inherit approved external MCP
tools.
- Workspace-local MCP safety model (agent-side `.mcp.json` schema vs. a
coderd-managed workspace MCP config).

## Validation

- `go vet ./coderd/x/chatd/...`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'TestPlan.*|TestMCP.*' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -count=1 -timeout 5m` (full chatd suite)
- `make fmt` (no diff)

> Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf.
2026-04-21 12:26:12 +02:00

1554 lines
48 KiB
Go

package coderd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database/dbauthz"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpmw"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/rbac"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/rbac/policy"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/x/chatd/mcpclient"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
)
// @Summary List MCP server configs
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) listMCPServerConfigs(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
// Admin users can see all MCP server configs (including disabled
// ones) for management purposes. Non-admin users see only enabled
// configs, which is sufficient for using the chat feature.
isAdmin := api.Authorize(r, policy.ActionRead, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig)
var configs []database.MCPServerConfig
var err error
if isAdmin {
configs, err = api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigs(ctx)
} else {
//nolint:gocritic // All authenticated users need to read enabled MCP server configs to use the chat feature.
configs, err = api.Database.GetEnabledMCPServerConfigs(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx))
}
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to list MCP server configs.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Look up the calling user's OAuth2 tokens so we can populate
// auth_connected per server. Attempt to refresh expired tokens
// so the status is accurate and the token is ready for use.
//nolint:gocritic // Need to check user tokens across all servers.
userTokens, err := api.Database.GetMCPServerUserTokensByUserID(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), apiKey.UserID)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get user tokens.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Build a config lookup for the refresh helper.
configByID := make(map[uuid.UUID]database.MCPServerConfig, len(configs))
for _, c := range configs {
configByID[c.ID] = c
}
tokenMap := make(map[uuid.UUID]bool, len(userTokens))
for _, tok := range userTokens {
cfg, ok := configByID[tok.MCPServerConfigID]
if !ok {
continue
}
tokenMap[tok.MCPServerConfigID] = api.refreshMCPUserToken(ctx, cfg, tok, apiKey.UserID)
}
resp := make([]codersdk.MCPServerConfig, 0, len(configs))
for _, config := range configs {
var sdkConfig codersdk.MCPServerConfig
if isAdmin {
sdkConfig = convertMCPServerConfig(config)
} else {
sdkConfig = convertMCPServerConfigRedacted(config)
}
if config.AuthType == "oauth2" {
sdkConfig.AuthConnected = tokenMap[config.ID]
} else {
sdkConfig.AuthConnected = true
}
resp = append(resp, sdkConfig)
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// @Summary Create MCP server config
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) createMCPServerConfig(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
if !api.Authorize(r, policy.ActionUpdate, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig) {
httpapi.Forbidden(rw)
return
}
var req codersdk.CreateMCPServerConfigRequest
if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
return
}
// Validate auth-type-dependent fields.
switch req.AuthType {
case "oauth2":
// When the admin does not provide OAuth2 credentials, attempt
// automatic discovery and Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)
// using the MCP server URL. This follows the MCP authorization
// spec: discover the authorization server via Protected Resource
// Metadata (RFC 9728) and Authorization Server Metadata
// (RFC 8414), then register a client dynamically.
if req.OAuth2ClientID == "" && req.OAuth2AuthURL == "" && req.OAuth2TokenURL == "" {
// Auto-discovery flow: we need the config ID first to
// build the correct callback URL. Insert the record
// with empty OAuth2 fields, perform discovery, then
// update.
customHeadersJSON, err := marshalCustomHeaders(req.CustomHeaders)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid custom headers.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
inserted, err := api.Database.InsertMCPServerConfig(ctx, database.InsertMCPServerConfigParams{
DisplayName: strings.TrimSpace(req.DisplayName),
Slug: strings.TrimSpace(req.Slug),
Description: strings.TrimSpace(req.Description),
IconURL: strings.TrimSpace(req.IconURL),
Transport: strings.TrimSpace(req.Transport),
Url: strings.TrimSpace(req.URL),
AuthType: strings.TrimSpace(req.AuthType),
OAuth2ClientID: "",
OAuth2ClientSecret: "",
OAuth2ClientSecretKeyID: sql.NullString{},
OAuth2AuthURL: "",
OAuth2TokenURL: "",
OAuth2Scopes: "",
APIKeyHeader: strings.TrimSpace(req.APIKeyHeader),
APIKeyValue: strings.TrimSpace(req.APIKeyValue),
APIKeyValueKeyID: sql.NullString{},
CustomHeaders: customHeadersJSON,
CustomHeadersKeyID: sql.NullString{},
ToolAllowList: coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(req.ToolAllowList)),
ToolDenyList: coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(req.ToolDenyList)),
Availability: strings.TrimSpace(req.Availability),
Enabled: req.Enabled,
ModelIntent: req.ModelIntent,
AllowInPlanMode: req.AllowInPlanMode,
CreatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
UpdatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
})
if err != nil {
switch {
case database.IsUniqueViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusConflict, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server config already exists.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
case database.IsCheckViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
default:
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to create MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
}
// Now build the callback URL with the actual ID.
callbackURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/experimental/mcp/servers/%s/oauth2/callback", api.AccessURL.String(), inserted.ID)
httpClient := api.HTTPClient
if httpClient == nil {
httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
}
result, err := discoverAndRegisterMCPOAuth2(ctx, httpClient, strings.TrimSpace(req.URL), callbackURL)
if err != nil {
// Clean up: delete the partially created config.
deleteErr := api.Database.DeleteMCPServerConfigByID(ctx, inserted.ID)
if deleteErr != nil {
api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to clean up MCP server config after OAuth2 discovery failure",
slog.F("config_id", inserted.ID),
slog.Error(deleteErr),
)
}
api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "mcp oauth2 auto-discovery failed",
slog.F("url", req.URL),
slog.Error(err),
)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OAuth2 auto-discovery failed. Provide oauth2_client_id, oauth2_auth_url, and oauth2_token_url manually, or ensure the MCP server supports RFC 9728 (Protected Resource Metadata) and RFC 7591 (Dynamic Client Registration).",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Determine scopes: use the request value if provided,
// otherwise fall back to the discovered value.
oauth2Scopes := strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2Scopes)
if oauth2Scopes == "" {
oauth2Scopes = result.scopes
}
// Update the record with discovered OAuth2 credentials.
updated, err := api.Database.UpdateMCPServerConfig(ctx, database.UpdateMCPServerConfigParams{
ID: inserted.ID,
DisplayName: inserted.DisplayName,
Slug: inserted.Slug,
Description: inserted.Description,
IconURL: inserted.IconURL,
Transport: inserted.Transport,
Url: inserted.Url,
AuthType: inserted.AuthType,
OAuth2ClientID: result.clientID,
OAuth2ClientSecret: result.clientSecret,
OAuth2ClientSecretKeyID: sql.NullString{},
OAuth2AuthURL: result.authURL,
OAuth2TokenURL: result.tokenURL,
OAuth2Scopes: oauth2Scopes,
APIKeyHeader: inserted.APIKeyHeader,
APIKeyValue: inserted.APIKeyValue,
APIKeyValueKeyID: inserted.APIKeyValueKeyID,
CustomHeaders: inserted.CustomHeaders,
CustomHeadersKeyID: inserted.CustomHeadersKeyID,
ToolAllowList: inserted.ToolAllowList,
ToolDenyList: inserted.ToolDenyList,
Availability: inserted.Availability,
Enabled: inserted.Enabled,
ModelIntent: inserted.ModelIntent,
AllowInPlanMode: inserted.AllowInPlanMode,
UpdatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
})
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to update MCP server config with OAuth2 credentials.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusCreated, convertMCPServerConfig(updated))
return
} else if req.OAuth2ClientID == "" || req.OAuth2AuthURL == "" || req.OAuth2TokenURL == "" {
// Partial manual config: all three fields are required together.
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OAuth2 auth type requires either all of oauth2_client_id, oauth2_auth_url, and oauth2_token_url (manual configuration), or none of them (automatic discovery via RFC 7591).",
})
return
}
case "api_key":
if req.APIKeyHeader == "" || req.APIKeyValue == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "API key auth type requires api_key_header and api_key_value.",
})
return
}
case "custom_headers":
if len(req.CustomHeaders) == 0 {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Custom headers auth type requires at least one custom header.",
})
return
}
}
customHeadersJSON, err := marshalCustomHeaders(req.CustomHeaders)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid custom headers.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
inserted, err := api.Database.InsertMCPServerConfig(ctx, database.InsertMCPServerConfigParams{
DisplayName: strings.TrimSpace(req.DisplayName),
Slug: strings.TrimSpace(req.Slug),
Description: strings.TrimSpace(req.Description),
IconURL: strings.TrimSpace(req.IconURL),
Transport: strings.TrimSpace(req.Transport),
Url: strings.TrimSpace(req.URL),
AuthType: strings.TrimSpace(req.AuthType),
OAuth2ClientID: strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2ClientID),
OAuth2ClientSecret: strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2ClientSecret),
OAuth2ClientSecretKeyID: sql.NullString{},
OAuth2AuthURL: strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2AuthURL),
OAuth2TokenURL: strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2TokenURL),
OAuth2Scopes: strings.TrimSpace(req.OAuth2Scopes),
APIKeyHeader: strings.TrimSpace(req.APIKeyHeader),
APIKeyValue: strings.TrimSpace(req.APIKeyValue),
APIKeyValueKeyID: sql.NullString{},
CustomHeaders: customHeadersJSON,
CustomHeadersKeyID: sql.NullString{},
ToolAllowList: coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(req.ToolAllowList)),
ToolDenyList: coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(req.ToolDenyList)),
Availability: strings.TrimSpace(req.Availability),
Enabled: req.Enabled,
ModelIntent: req.ModelIntent,
AllowInPlanMode: req.AllowInPlanMode,
CreatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
UpdatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
})
if err != nil {
switch {
case database.IsUniqueViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusConflict, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server config already exists.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
case database.IsCheckViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
default:
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to create MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusCreated, convertMCPServerConfig(inserted))
}
// @Summary Get MCP server config
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) getMCPServerConfig(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
isAdmin := api.Authorize(r, policy.ActionRead, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig)
var config database.MCPServerConfig
var err error
if isAdmin {
config, err = api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigByID(ctx, mcpServerID)
} else {
//nolint:gocritic // All authenticated users can view enabled MCP server configs.
config, err = api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigByID(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), mcpServerID)
if err == nil && !config.Enabled {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
}
if err != nil {
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
var sdkConfig codersdk.MCPServerConfig
if isAdmin {
sdkConfig = convertMCPServerConfig(config)
} else {
sdkConfig = convertMCPServerConfigRedacted(config)
}
// Populate AuthConnected for the calling user. Attempt to
// refresh the token so the status is accurate.
if config.AuthType == "oauth2" {
//nolint:gocritic // Need to check user token for this server.
userTokens, err := api.Database.GetMCPServerUserTokensByUserID(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), apiKey.UserID)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get user tokens.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
for _, tok := range userTokens {
if tok.MCPServerConfigID == config.ID {
sdkConfig.AuthConnected = api.refreshMCPUserToken(ctx, config, tok, apiKey.UserID)
break
}
}
} else {
sdkConfig.AuthConnected = true
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, sdkConfig)
}
// @Summary Update MCP server config
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) updateMCPServerConfig(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
if !api.Authorize(r, policy.ActionUpdate, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig) {
httpapi.Forbidden(rw)
return
}
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
var req codersdk.UpdateMCPServerConfigRequest
if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
return
}
// Pre-validate custom headers before entering the transaction.
var customHeadersJSON string
if req.CustomHeaders != nil {
var chErr error
customHeadersJSON, chErr = marshalCustomHeaders(*req.CustomHeaders)
if chErr != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid custom headers.",
Detail: chErr.Error(),
})
return
}
}
var updated database.MCPServerConfig
err := api.Database.InTx(func(tx database.Store) error {
existing, err := tx.GetMCPServerConfigByID(ctx, mcpServerID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
displayName := existing.DisplayName
if req.DisplayName != nil {
displayName = strings.TrimSpace(*req.DisplayName)
}
slug := existing.Slug
if req.Slug != nil {
slug = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Slug)
}
description := existing.Description
if req.Description != nil {
description = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Description)
}
iconURL := existing.IconURL
if req.IconURL != nil {
iconURL = strings.TrimSpace(*req.IconURL)
}
transport := existing.Transport
if req.Transport != nil {
transport = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Transport)
}
serverURL := existing.Url
if req.URL != nil {
serverURL = strings.TrimSpace(*req.URL)
}
authType := existing.AuthType
if req.AuthType != nil {
authType = strings.TrimSpace(*req.AuthType)
}
oauth2ClientID := existing.OAuth2ClientID
if req.OAuth2ClientID != nil {
oauth2ClientID = strings.TrimSpace(*req.OAuth2ClientID)
}
oauth2ClientSecret := existing.OAuth2ClientSecret
oauth2ClientSecretKeyID := existing.OAuth2ClientSecretKeyID
if req.OAuth2ClientSecret != nil {
oauth2ClientSecret = strings.TrimSpace(*req.OAuth2ClientSecret)
// Clear the key ID when the secret is explicitly updated.
oauth2ClientSecretKeyID = sql.NullString{}
}
oauth2AuthURL := existing.OAuth2AuthURL
if req.OAuth2AuthURL != nil {
oauth2AuthURL = strings.TrimSpace(*req.OAuth2AuthURL)
}
oauth2TokenURL := existing.OAuth2TokenURL
if req.OAuth2TokenURL != nil {
oauth2TokenURL = strings.TrimSpace(*req.OAuth2TokenURL)
}
oauth2Scopes := existing.OAuth2Scopes
if req.OAuth2Scopes != nil {
oauth2Scopes = strings.TrimSpace(*req.OAuth2Scopes)
}
apiKeyHeader := existing.APIKeyHeader
if req.APIKeyHeader != nil {
apiKeyHeader = strings.TrimSpace(*req.APIKeyHeader)
}
apiKeyValue := existing.APIKeyValue
apiKeyValueKeyID := existing.APIKeyValueKeyID
if req.APIKeyValue != nil {
apiKeyValue = strings.TrimSpace(*req.APIKeyValue)
// Clear the key ID when the value is explicitly updated.
apiKeyValueKeyID = sql.NullString{}
}
customHeaders := existing.CustomHeaders
customHeadersKeyID := existing.CustomHeadersKeyID
if req.CustomHeaders != nil {
customHeaders = customHeadersJSON
// Clear the key ID when headers are explicitly updated.
customHeadersKeyID = sql.NullString{}
}
toolAllowList := existing.ToolAllowList
if req.ToolAllowList != nil {
toolAllowList = coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(*req.ToolAllowList))
}
toolDenyList := existing.ToolDenyList
if req.ToolDenyList != nil {
toolDenyList = coalesceStringSlice(trimStringSlice(*req.ToolDenyList))
}
availability := existing.Availability
if req.Availability != nil {
availability = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Availability)
}
enabled := existing.Enabled
if req.Enabled != nil {
enabled = *req.Enabled
}
modelIntent := existing.ModelIntent
if req.ModelIntent != nil {
modelIntent = *req.ModelIntent
}
allowInPlanMode := existing.AllowInPlanMode
if req.AllowInPlanMode != nil {
allowInPlanMode = *req.AllowInPlanMode
}
// When auth_type changes, clear fields belonging to the
// previous auth type so stale secrets don't persist.
if authType != existing.AuthType {
switch authType {
case "none":
oauth2ClientID = ""
oauth2ClientSecret = ""
oauth2ClientSecretKeyID = sql.NullString{}
oauth2AuthURL = ""
oauth2TokenURL = ""
oauth2Scopes = ""
apiKeyHeader = ""
apiKeyValue = ""
apiKeyValueKeyID = sql.NullString{}
customHeaders = "{}"
customHeadersKeyID = sql.NullString{}
case "oauth2":
apiKeyHeader = ""
apiKeyValue = ""
apiKeyValueKeyID = sql.NullString{}
customHeaders = "{}"
customHeadersKeyID = sql.NullString{}
case "api_key":
oauth2ClientID = ""
oauth2ClientSecret = ""
oauth2ClientSecretKeyID = sql.NullString{}
oauth2AuthURL = ""
oauth2TokenURL = ""
oauth2Scopes = ""
customHeaders = "{}"
customHeadersKeyID = sql.NullString{}
case "custom_headers":
oauth2ClientID = ""
oauth2ClientSecret = ""
oauth2ClientSecretKeyID = sql.NullString{}
oauth2AuthURL = ""
oauth2TokenURL = ""
oauth2Scopes = ""
apiKeyHeader = ""
apiKeyValue = ""
apiKeyValueKeyID = sql.NullString{}
}
}
updated, err = tx.UpdateMCPServerConfig(ctx, database.UpdateMCPServerConfigParams{
DisplayName: displayName,
Slug: slug,
Description: description,
IconURL: iconURL,
Transport: transport,
Url: serverURL,
AuthType: authType,
OAuth2ClientID: oauth2ClientID,
OAuth2ClientSecret: oauth2ClientSecret,
OAuth2ClientSecretKeyID: oauth2ClientSecretKeyID,
OAuth2AuthURL: oauth2AuthURL,
OAuth2TokenURL: oauth2TokenURL,
OAuth2Scopes: oauth2Scopes,
APIKeyHeader: apiKeyHeader,
APIKeyValue: apiKeyValue,
APIKeyValueKeyID: apiKeyValueKeyID,
CustomHeaders: customHeaders,
CustomHeadersKeyID: customHeadersKeyID,
ToolAllowList: toolAllowList,
ToolDenyList: toolDenyList,
Availability: availability,
Enabled: enabled,
ModelIntent: modelIntent,
AllowInPlanMode: allowInPlanMode,
UpdatedBy: apiKey.UserID,
ID: existing.ID,
})
return err
}, nil)
if err != nil {
switch {
case httpapi.Is404Error(err):
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
case database.IsUniqueViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusConflict, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server config slug already exists.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
case database.IsCheckViolation(err):
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
default:
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to update MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, convertMCPServerConfig(updated))
}
// @Summary Delete MCP server config
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
func (api *API) deleteMCPServerConfig(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
if !api.Authorize(r, policy.ActionUpdate, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig) {
httpapi.Forbidden(rw)
return
}
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if _, err := api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigByID(ctx, mcpServerID); err != nil {
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if err := api.Database.DeleteMCPServerConfigByID(ctx, mcpServerID); err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to delete MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// @Summary Initiate MCP server OAuth2 connect
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
// Redirects the user to the MCP server's OAuth2 authorization URL.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) mcpServerOAuth2Connect(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
//nolint:gocritic // Any authenticated user can initiate OAuth2 for an enabled MCP server.
config, err := api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigByID(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), mcpServerID)
if err != nil {
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if !config.Enabled {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server is not enabled.",
})
return
}
if config.AuthType != "oauth2" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server does not use OAuth2 authentication.",
})
return
}
if config.OAuth2AuthURL == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server OAuth2 authorization URL is not configured.",
})
return
}
// Build the authorization URL. The frontend opens this in a popup.
// The callback URL is on our server; after the exchange we store
// the token and close the popup.
state := uuid.New().String()
callbackPath := fmt.Sprintf("/api/experimental/mcp/servers/%s/oauth2/callback", config.ID)
http.SetCookie(rw, api.DeploymentValues.HTTPCookies.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: "mcp_oauth2_state_" + config.ID.String(),
Value: state,
Path: callbackPath,
MaxAge: 600, // 10 minutes
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}))
// PKCE (RFC 7636) is required by many OAuth2 providers (e.g.
// Linear). We always send it because it is harmless when the
// server ignores it and essential when it does not.
verifier := oauth2.GenerateVerifier()
http.SetCookie(rw, api.DeploymentValues.HTTPCookies.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: "mcp_oauth2_verifier_" + config.ID.String(),
Value: verifier,
Path: callbackPath,
MaxAge: 600, // 10 minutes
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}))
oauth2Config := &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: config.OAuth2ClientID,
ClientSecret: config.OAuth2ClientSecret,
Endpoint: oauth2.Endpoint{
AuthURL: config.OAuth2AuthURL,
TokenURL: config.OAuth2TokenURL,
},
RedirectURL: fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", api.AccessURL.String(), callbackPath),
}
var scopes []string
if config.OAuth2Scopes != "" {
scopes = strings.Split(config.OAuth2Scopes, " ")
}
oauth2Config.Scopes = scopes
authURL := oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state, oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(verifier))
http.Redirect(rw, r, authURL, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}
// @Summary Handle MCP server OAuth2 callback
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
// Exchanges the authorization code for tokens and stores them.
//
//nolint:revive // HTTP handler writes to ResponseWriter.
func (api *API) mcpServerOAuth2Callback(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
//nolint:gocritic // Any authenticated user can complete OAuth2 for an enabled MCP server.
config, err := api.Database.GetMCPServerConfigByID(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), mcpServerID)
if err != nil {
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to get MCP server config.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if !config.Enabled {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server is not enabled.",
})
return
}
if config.AuthType != "oauth2" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "MCP server does not use OAuth2 authentication.",
})
return
}
// Check if the OAuth2 provider returned an error (e.g., user
// denied consent).
if oauthError := r.URL.Query().Get("error"); oauthError != "" {
desc := r.URL.Query().Get("error_description")
if desc == "" {
desc = oauthError
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OAuth2 provider returned an error.",
Detail: desc,
})
return
}
code := r.URL.Query().Get("code")
if code == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Missing authorization code.",
})
return
}
// Validate the state parameter for CSRF protection.
expectedState := ""
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("mcp_oauth2_state_" + config.ID.String()); err == nil {
expectedState = cookie.Value
}
actualState := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
if expectedState == "" || actualState != expectedState {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid or missing OAuth2 state parameter.",
})
return
}
// Clear the state cookie.
callbackPath := fmt.Sprintf("/api/experimental/mcp/servers/%s/oauth2/callback", config.ID)
http.SetCookie(rw, api.DeploymentValues.HTTPCookies.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: "mcp_oauth2_state_" + config.ID.String(),
Value: "",
Path: callbackPath,
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}))
// Recover the PKCE code_verifier set during the connect step.
var exchangeOpts []oauth2.AuthCodeOption
if verifierCookie, err := r.Cookie("mcp_oauth2_verifier_" + config.ID.String()); err == nil {
exchangeOpts = append(exchangeOpts, oauth2.VerifierOption(verifierCookie.Value))
}
// Clear the verifier cookie regardless of whether it was present.
http.SetCookie(rw, api.DeploymentValues.HTTPCookies.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: "mcp_oauth2_verifier_" + config.ID.String(),
Value: "",
Path: callbackPath,
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
}))
// Exchange the authorization code for tokens.
oauth2Config := &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: config.OAuth2ClientID,
ClientSecret: config.OAuth2ClientSecret,
Endpoint: oauth2.Endpoint{
AuthURL: config.OAuth2AuthURL,
TokenURL: config.OAuth2TokenURL,
},
RedirectURL: fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", api.AccessURL.String(), callbackPath),
}
var scopes []string
if config.OAuth2Scopes != "" {
scopes = strings.Split(config.OAuth2Scopes, " ")
}
oauth2Config.Scopes = scopes
// Use the deployment's HTTP client for the token exchange to
// respect proxy settings and avoid using http.DefaultClient.
// Guard against nil so the oauth2 library falls back to the
// default client instead of panicking.
exchangeCtx := ctx
if api.HTTPClient != nil {
exchangeCtx = context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, api.HTTPClient)
}
token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(exchangeCtx, code, exchangeOpts...)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadGateway, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to exchange authorization code for token.",
Detail: "The OAuth2 token exchange with the upstream provider failed.",
})
return
}
// Store the token for the user.
refreshToken := ""
if token.RefreshToken != "" {
refreshToken = token.RefreshToken
}
var expiry sql.NullTime
if !token.Expiry.IsZero() {
expiry = sql.NullTime{Time: token.Expiry, Valid: true}
}
//nolint:gocritic // Users store their own tokens.
_, err = api.Database.UpsertMCPServerUserToken(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), database.UpsertMCPServerUserTokenParams{
MCPServerConfigID: mcpServerID,
UserID: apiKey.UserID,
AccessToken: token.AccessToken,
AccessTokenKeyID: sql.NullString{},
RefreshToken: refreshToken,
RefreshTokenKeyID: sql.NullString{},
TokenType: token.TokenType,
Expiry: expiry,
})
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to store OAuth2 token.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// Respond with a simple HTML page that closes the popup window.
rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'")
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = rw.Write([]byte(`<!DOCTYPE html><html><body><script>
if (window.opener) {
window.opener.postMessage({type: "mcp-oauth2-complete", serverID: "` + config.ID.String() + `"}, "` + api.AccessURL.String() + `");
window.close();
} else {
document.body.innerText = "Authentication successful. You may close this window.";
}
</script></body></html>`))
}
// @Summary Disconnect MCP server OAuth2 token
// @x-apidocgen {"skip": true}
// EXPERIMENTAL: this endpoint is experimental and is subject to change.
// Removes the user's stored OAuth2 token for an MCP server.
func (api *API) mcpServerOAuth2Disconnect(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
apiKey := httpmw.APIKey(r)
mcpServerID, ok := parseMCPServerConfigID(rw, r)
if !ok {
return
}
//nolint:gocritic // Users manage their own tokens.
err := api.Database.DeleteMCPServerUserToken(dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx), database.DeleteMCPServerUserTokenParams{
MCPServerConfigID: mcpServerID,
UserID: apiKey.UserID,
})
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed to disconnect OAuth2 token.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// parseMCPServerConfigID extracts the MCP server config UUID from the
// "mcpServer" path parameter.
// refreshMCPUserToken attempts to refresh an expired OAuth2 token
// for the given MCP server config. Returns true when the token is
// valid (either still fresh or successfully refreshed), false when
// the token is expired and cannot be refreshed.
func (api *API) refreshMCPUserToken(
ctx context.Context,
cfg database.MCPServerConfig,
tok database.MCPServerUserToken,
userID uuid.UUID,
) bool {
if cfg.AuthType != "oauth2" {
return true
}
if tok.RefreshToken == "" {
// No refresh token — consider connected only if not
// expired (or no expiry set).
return !tok.Expiry.Valid || tok.Expiry.Time.After(time.Now())
}
result, err := mcpclient.RefreshOAuth2Token(ctx, cfg, tok)
if err != nil {
api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to refresh MCP oauth2 token",
slog.F("server_slug", cfg.Slug),
slog.Error(err),
)
// Refresh failed — token is dead.
return false
}
if result.Refreshed {
var expiry sql.NullTime
if !result.Expiry.IsZero() {
expiry = sql.NullTime{Time: result.Expiry, Valid: true}
}
//nolint:gocritic // Need system-level write access to
// persist the refreshed OAuth2 token.
_, err = api.Database.UpsertMCPServerUserToken(
dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted(ctx),
database.UpsertMCPServerUserTokenParams{
MCPServerConfigID: tok.MCPServerConfigID,
UserID: userID,
AccessToken: result.AccessToken,
AccessTokenKeyID: sql.NullString{},
RefreshToken: result.RefreshToken,
RefreshTokenKeyID: sql.NullString{},
TokenType: result.TokenType,
Expiry: expiry,
},
)
if err != nil {
api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to persist refreshed MCP oauth2 token",
slog.F("server_slug", cfg.Slug),
slog.Error(err),
)
}
}
return true
}
func parseMCPServerConfigID(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (uuid.UUID, bool) {
mcpServerID, err := uuid.Parse(chi.URLParam(r, "mcpServer"))
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(r.Context(), rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid MCP server config ID.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return uuid.Nil, false
}
return mcpServerID, true
}
// convertMCPServerConfig converts a database MCP server config to the
// SDK type. Secrets are never returned; only has_* booleans are set.
// Admin-only fields (OAuth2 client ID, auth URLs, etc.) are included.
func convertMCPServerConfig(config database.MCPServerConfig) codersdk.MCPServerConfig {
return codersdk.MCPServerConfig{
ID: config.ID,
DisplayName: config.DisplayName,
Slug: config.Slug,
Description: config.Description,
IconURL: config.IconURL,
Transport: config.Transport,
URL: config.Url,
AuthType: config.AuthType,
OAuth2ClientID: config.OAuth2ClientID,
HasOAuth2Secret: config.OAuth2ClientSecret != "",
OAuth2AuthURL: config.OAuth2AuthURL,
OAuth2TokenURL: config.OAuth2TokenURL,
OAuth2Scopes: config.OAuth2Scopes,
APIKeyHeader: config.APIKeyHeader,
HasAPIKey: config.APIKeyValue != "",
HasCustomHeaders: len(config.CustomHeaders) > 0 && config.CustomHeaders != "{}",
ToolAllowList: coalesceStringSlice(config.ToolAllowList),
ToolDenyList: coalesceStringSlice(config.ToolDenyList),
Availability: config.Availability,
Enabled: config.Enabled,
ModelIntent: config.ModelIntent,
AllowInPlanMode: config.AllowInPlanMode,
CreatedAt: config.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: config.UpdatedAt,
}
}
// convertMCPServerConfigRedacted is the same as convertMCPServerConfig
// but strips admin-only fields (OAuth2 details, API key header) for
// non-admin callers.
func convertMCPServerConfigRedacted(config database.MCPServerConfig) codersdk.MCPServerConfig {
c := convertMCPServerConfig(config)
c.URL = ""
c.Transport = ""
c.OAuth2ClientID = ""
c.OAuth2AuthURL = ""
c.OAuth2TokenURL = ""
c.OAuth2Scopes = ""
c.APIKeyHeader = ""
return c
}
// marshalCustomHeaders encodes a map of custom headers to JSON for
// database storage. A nil map produces an empty JSON object.
func marshalCustomHeaders(headers map[string]string) (string, error) {
if headers == nil {
return "{}", nil
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(headers)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(encoded), nil
}
// trimStringSlice trims whitespace from each element and drops empty
// strings.
func trimStringSlice(ss []string) []string {
if ss == nil {
return nil
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(ss))
for _, s := range ss {
if trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(s); trimmed != "" {
out = append(out, trimmed)
}
}
return out
}
// coalesceStringSlice returns ss if non-nil, otherwise an empty
// non-nil slice. This prevents pq.Array from sending NULL for
// NOT NULL text[] columns.
func coalesceStringSlice(ss []string) []string {
if ss == nil {
return []string{}
}
return ss
}
// mcpOAuth2Discovery holds the result of MCP OAuth2 auto-discovery
// and Dynamic Client Registration.
type mcpOAuth2Discovery struct {
clientID string
clientSecret string
authURL string
tokenURL string
scopes string // space-separated
}
// protectedResourceMetadata represents the response from a
// Protected Resource Metadata endpoint per RFC 9728 §2.
type protectedResourceMetadata struct {
Resource string `json:"resource"`
AuthorizationServers []string `json:"authorization_servers"`
ScopesSupported []string `json:"scopes_supported,omitempty"`
}
// authServerMetadata represents the response from an Authorization
// Server Metadata endpoint per RFC 8414 §2.
type authServerMetadata struct {
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
AuthorizationEndpoint string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
TokenEndpoint string `json:"token_endpoint"`
RegistrationEndpoint string `json:"registration_endpoint,omitempty"`
ScopesSupported []string `json:"scopes_supported,omitempty"`
}
// fetchJSON performs a GET request to the given URL with the
// standard MCP OAuth2 discovery headers and decodes the JSON
// response into dest. It returns nil on success or an error
// if the request fails or the server returns a non-200 status.
func fetchJSON(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, rawURL string, dest any) error {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil,
)
if err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("create request for %s: %w", rawURL, err)
}
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("MCP-Protocol-Version", mcp.LATEST_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("GET %s: %w", rawURL, err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return xerrors.Errorf(
"GET %s returned HTTP %d", rawURL, resp.StatusCode,
)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf(
"read response from %s: %w", rawURL, err,
)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, dest); err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf(
"decode JSON from %s: %w", rawURL, err,
)
}
return nil
}
// discoverProtectedResource discovers the Protected Resource
// Metadata for the given MCP server per RFC 9728 §3.1. It
// tries the path-aware well-known URL first, then falls back
// to the root-level URL.
//
// Path-aware: GET {origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{path}
// Root: GET {origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
func discoverProtectedResource(
ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, origin, path string,
) (*protectedResourceMetadata, error) {
var urls []string
// Per RFC 9728 §3.1, when the resource URL contains a
// path component, the well-known URI is constructed by
// inserting the well-known prefix before the path.
if path != "" && path != "/" {
urls = append(
urls,
origin+"/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"+path,
)
}
// Always try the root-level URL as a fallback.
urls = append(
urls, origin+"/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource",
)
var lastErr error
for _, u := range urls {
var meta protectedResourceMetadata
if err := fetchJSON(ctx, httpClient, u, &meta); err != nil {
lastErr = err
continue
}
if len(meta.AuthorizationServers) == 0 {
lastErr = xerrors.Errorf(
"protected resource metadata at %s "+
"has no authorization_servers", u,
)
continue
}
return &meta, nil
}
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"discover protected resource metadata: %w", lastErr,
)
}
// discoverAuthServerMetadata discovers the Authorization Server
// Metadata per RFC 8414 §3.1. When the authorization server
// issuer URL has a path component, the metadata URL is
// path-aware. Falls back to root-level and OpenID Connect
// discovery as a last resort.
//
// Path-aware: {origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server{path}
// Root: {origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
// OpenID: {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration
func discoverAuthServerMetadata(
ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, authServerURL string,
) (*authServerMetadata, error) {
parsed, err := url.Parse(authServerURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"parse auth server URL: %w", err,
)
}
asOrigin := fmt.Sprintf(
"%s://%s", parsed.Scheme, parsed.Host,
)
asPath := parsed.Path
var urls []string
// Per RFC 8414 §3.1, if the issuer URL has a path,
// insert the well-known prefix before the path.
if asPath != "" && asPath != "/" {
urls = append(
urls,
asOrigin+"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"+asPath,
)
}
// Root-level fallback.
urls = append(
urls,
asOrigin+"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
)
// OpenID Connect discovery as a last resort. Note: this is
// tried after RFC 8414 (unlike the previous mcp-go code that
// tried OIDC first) because RFC 8414 is the MCP spec's
// recommended discovery mechanism.
// Per OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 §4, the well-known URL
// is formed by appending to the full issuer (including
// path), not just the origin.
urls = append(
urls,
strings.TrimRight(authServerURL, "/")+
"/.well-known/openid-configuration",
)
var lastErr error
for _, u := range urls {
var meta authServerMetadata
if err := fetchJSON(ctx, httpClient, u, &meta); err != nil {
lastErr = err
continue
}
if meta.AuthorizationEndpoint == "" || meta.TokenEndpoint == "" {
lastErr = xerrors.Errorf(
"auth server metadata at %s missing required "+
"endpoints", u,
)
continue
}
return &meta, nil
}
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"discover auth server metadata: %w", lastErr,
)
}
// registerOAuth2Client performs Dynamic Client Registration per
// RFC 7591 by POSTing client metadata to the registration
// endpoint and returning the assigned client_id and optional
// client_secret.
func registerOAuth2Client(
ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client,
registrationEndpoint, callbackURL, clientName string,
) (clientID string, clientSecret string, err error) {
payload := map[string]any{
"client_name": clientName,
"redirect_uris": []string{callbackURL},
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none",
"grant_types": []string{"authorization_code", "refresh_token"},
"response_types": []string{"code"},
}
body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"marshal registration request: %w", err,
)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
ctx, http.MethodPost,
registrationEndpoint, bytes.NewReader(body),
)
if err != nil {
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"create registration request: %w", err,
)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"POST %s: %w", registrationEndpoint, err,
)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
respBody, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"read registration response: %w", err,
)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK &&
resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
// Truncate to avoid leaking verbose upstream errors
// through the API.
const maxErrBody = 512
errMsg := string(respBody)
if len(errMsg) > maxErrBody {
errMsg = errMsg[:maxErrBody] + "..."
}
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"registration endpoint returned HTTP %d: %s",
resp.StatusCode, errMsg,
)
}
var result struct {
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &result); err != nil {
return "", "", xerrors.Errorf(
"decode registration response: %w", err,
)
}
if result.ClientID == "" {
return "", "", xerrors.New(
"registration response missing client_id",
)
}
return result.ClientID, result.ClientSecret, nil
}
// discoverAndRegisterMCPOAuth2 performs the full MCP OAuth2
// discovery and Dynamic Client Registration flow:
//
// 1. Discover the authorization server via Protected Resource
// Metadata (RFC 9728).
// 2. Fetch Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414).
// 3. Register a client via Dynamic Client Registration
// (RFC 7591).
// 4. Return the discovered endpoints and credentials.
//
// Unlike a root-only approach, this implementation follows the
// path-aware well-known URI construction rules from RFC 9728
// §3.1 and RFC 8414 §3.1, which is required for servers that
// serve metadata at path-specific URLs (e.g.
// https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/).
func discoverAndRegisterMCPOAuth2(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, mcpServerURL, callbackURL string) (*mcpOAuth2Discovery, error) {
// Parse the MCP server URL into origin and path.
parsed, err := url.Parse(mcpServerURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"parse MCP server URL: %w", err,
)
}
origin := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", parsed.Scheme, parsed.Host)
path := parsed.Path
// Step 1: Discover the Protected Resource Metadata
// (RFC 9728) to find the authorization server.
prm, err := discoverProtectedResource(ctx, httpClient, origin, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"protected resource discovery: %w", err,
)
}
// Step 2: Fetch Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414)
// from the first advertised authorization server.
asMeta, err := discoverAuthServerMetadata(
ctx, httpClient, prm.AuthorizationServers[0],
)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"auth server metadata discovery: %w", err,
)
}
// Only RegistrationEndpoint needs checking here;
// discoverAuthServerMetadata already validates that
// AuthorizationEndpoint and TokenEndpoint are present.
if asMeta.RegistrationEndpoint == "" {
return nil, xerrors.New(
"authorization server does not advertise a " +
"registration_endpoint (dynamic client " +
"registration may not be supported)",
)
}
// Step 3: Register via Dynamic Client Registration
// (RFC 7591).
clientID, clientSecret, err := registerOAuth2Client(
ctx, httpClient, asMeta.RegistrationEndpoint, callbackURL, "Coder",
)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf(
"dynamic client registration: %w", err,
)
}
scopes := strings.Join(asMeta.ScopesSupported, " ")
return &mcpOAuth2Discovery{
clientID: clientID,
clientSecret: clientSecret,
authURL: asMeta.AuthorizationEndpoint,
tokenURL: asMeta.TokenEndpoint,
scopes: scopes,
}, nil
}