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coder/coderd/database
Danny Kopping dba9f68b11 chore!: remove members' ability to read their own interceptions; rationalize RBAC requirements (#23320)
_Disclaimer:_ _produced_ _by_ _Claude_ _Opus_ _4\.6,_ _reviewed_ _by_ _me._

**This is a breaking change.** Users who are not have `owner` or sitewide `auditor` roles will no longer be able to view interceptions.  
Regular users should not need to view this information; in fact, it could be used by a malicious insider to see what information we track and don't track to exfiltrate data or perform actions unobserved.

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Changed authorization for AI Bridge interception-related operations from system-level permissions to resource-specific permissions. The following functions now authorize against `rbac.ResourceAibridgeInterception` instead of `rbac.ResourceSystem`:

- `ListAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionIDs`
- `ListAIBridgeToolUsagesByInterceptionIDs`
- `ListAIBridgeUserPromptsByInterceptionIDs`

Updated RBAC roles to grant AI Bridge interception permissions:

- **User/Member roles**: Can create and update AI Bridge interceptions but cannot read them back
- **Service accounts**: Same create/update permissions without read access
- **Owners/Auditors**: Retain full read access to all interceptions

Removed system-level authorization bypass in `populatedAndConvertAIBridgeInterceptions` function, allowing proper resource-level authorization checks.

Updated tests to reflect the new permission model where members cannot view AI Bridge interceptions, even their own, while owners and auditors maintain full visibility.
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