fix(coderd): harden OAuth2 provider security (#22194)

## Summary

Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing
`coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1
compliance.

### Security Fixes

| Fix | Description | Commits |
|-----|-------------|---------|
| **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the
authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e`
|
| **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from
being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` +
`X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` |
| **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full
string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` |
| **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code
in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) |
`50569b9`, `d7ca315` |
| **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for
`response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at
token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` |
| **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns
`unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow)
| `d7ca315`, `91b8863` |

### Changes by File

**`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce
CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent
form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code
theft.

**`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors
'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage`
(consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI
tasks).

**`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix
matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact
matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path,
and query.

**`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement:
`code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a
conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can
reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates
`response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for
unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri`
with the auth code when explicitly provided.

**`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now
unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If
the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it
matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`.
Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`.

**`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant
and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse
`response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error rather than failing at parameter validation.

**`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text`
column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`.

### Design Decisions

**`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required
`state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to
avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored
when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in.

**`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()`
would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the
authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow.

**CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set
only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global
CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks
([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does
not regress that.

### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs)

- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting on dynamic client registration


---

<details>
<summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary>

# Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance

## Context & Why

Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover
via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security
fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements.
The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps.

## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`)

| Fix | Status | Commits |
|-----|--------|---------|
| Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` |  Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` |
| CSRF token in consent form HTML |  Done | `b94a64e` |
| `state_hash` column + storage |  Done (hash stored, but state still
optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` |
| Tests for CSRF + state hash |  Done | `e4119b5` |

## Remaining Work

### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED)

> **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state`
parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via
`hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients
are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations
that omit state.

**Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in
`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`:

```go
// BEFORE (current on branch)
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge")

// AFTER
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```

No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily.

### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching

Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching:

```go
// CURRENT — prefix match
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
```

OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to:

```go
// AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1)
if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path {
```

**File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method**

Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must
exactly match".

**Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at
the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3):

1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add
`redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to
include `redirect_uri`
3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store
`params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code
4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from
DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored
value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals,
callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must
compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the
app's callback URL.

<details>
<summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary>

Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors
(attacker can't use a sub-path).
Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an
attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different
redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC
6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1.
</details>

### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page

The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is
the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent
framing.

**File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)**

Before writing the response, add:

```go
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
    rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
    // Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
    // clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
    rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
    rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
    ...
```

Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers,
X-Frame-Options for legacy).

### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE

Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during
authorization (`tokens.go:258`):

```go
// CURRENT — conditional check
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
    // verify PKCE
}
```

OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to:

**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"`
to required params:

```go
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```

**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE
verification unconditional:

```go
// AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1)
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
    // Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
    // with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in
    // depth.
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
```

**File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove
`OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly
in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the
handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should
either:
- (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with
`unsupported_response_type`, OR
- (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects
`response_type=token`

Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible:

```go
// In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params:
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
    httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
        codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
        "Only response_type=code is supported")
    return
}
```

### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings

`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query
parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used
internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before
removing.

**Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a
**separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document
the finding.

### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows

 **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code`
and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant
(`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section
above.

### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation

 **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a
refresh token is used.

## Migration Plan

All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the
branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add:
- `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes`

The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420.

## Implementation Order

1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps)
2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays
optional)
3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri
4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject
`response_type=token`
5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in
`authorize.go`
6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes
7. **`make gen`** after DB changes

## Out of Scope (separate PRs)

- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration

</details>

---
_Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Kosiewski
2026-02-23 12:18:44 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7825c02876
commit b776a14b46
22 changed files with 484 additions and 143 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -1373,6 +1373,8 @@ func OAuth2ProviderAppCode(t testing.TB, db database.Store, seed database.OAuth2
ResourceUri: seed.ResourceUri,
CodeChallenge: seed.CodeChallenge,
CodeChallengeMethod: seed.CodeChallengeMethod,
StateHash: seed.StateHash,
RedirectUri: seed.RedirectUri,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "insert oauth2 app code")
return code
+7 -1
View File
@@ -1471,7 +1471,9 @@ CREATE TABLE oauth2_provider_app_codes (
app_id uuid NOT NULL,
resource_uri text,
code_challenge text,
code_challenge_method text
code_challenge_method text,
state_hash text,
redirect_uri text
);
COMMENT ON TABLE oauth2_provider_app_codes IS 'Codes are meant to be exchanged for access tokens.';
@@ -1482,6 +1484,10 @@ COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.code_challenge IS 'PKCE code challen
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.code_challenge_method IS 'PKCE challenge method (S256)';
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.state_hash IS 'SHA-256 hash of the OAuth2 state parameter, stored to prevent state reflection attacks.';
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.redirect_uri IS 'The redirect_uri provided during authorization, to be verified during token exchange (RFC 6749 §4.1.3).';
CREATE TABLE oauth2_provider_app_secrets (
id uuid NOT NULL,
created_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
ALTER TABLE oauth2_provider_app_codes
DROP COLUMN state_hash,
DROP COLUMN redirect_uri;
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
ALTER TABLE oauth2_provider_app_codes
ADD COLUMN state_hash text,
ADD COLUMN redirect_uri text;
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.state_hash IS
'SHA-256 hash of the OAuth2 state parameter, stored to prevent state reflection attacks.';
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth2_provider_app_codes.redirect_uri IS
'The redirect_uri provided during authorization, to be verified during token exchange (RFC 6749 §4.1.3).';
+4
View File
@@ -4026,6 +4026,10 @@ type OAuth2ProviderAppCode struct {
CodeChallenge sql.NullString `db:"code_challenge" json:"code_challenge"`
// PKCE challenge method (S256)
CodeChallengeMethod sql.NullString `db:"code_challenge_method" json:"code_challenge_method"`
// SHA-256 hash of the OAuth2 state parameter, stored to prevent state reflection attacks.
StateHash sql.NullString `db:"state_hash" json:"state_hash"`
// The redirect_uri provided during authorization, to be verified during token exchange (RFC 6749 §4.1.3).
RedirectUri sql.NullString `db:"redirect_uri" json:"redirect_uri"`
}
type OAuth2ProviderAppSecret struct {
+19 -5
View File
@@ -6768,7 +6768,7 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) GetOAuth2ProviderAppByRegistrationToken(ctx context.Context
}
const getOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByID = `-- name: GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByID :one
SELECT id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method FROM oauth2_provider_app_codes WHERE id = $1
SELECT id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method, state_hash, redirect_uri FROM oauth2_provider_app_codes WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *sqlQuerier) GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByID(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) (OAuth2ProviderAppCode, error) {
@@ -6785,12 +6785,14 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByID(ctx context.Context, id uuid.U
&i.ResourceUri,
&i.CodeChallenge,
&i.CodeChallengeMethod,
&i.StateHash,
&i.RedirectUri,
)
return i, err
}
const getOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix = `-- name: GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix :one
SELECT id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method FROM oauth2_provider_app_codes WHERE secret_prefix = $1
SELECT id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method, state_hash, redirect_uri FROM oauth2_provider_app_codes WHERE secret_prefix = $1
`
func (q *sqlQuerier) GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix(ctx context.Context, secretPrefix []byte) (OAuth2ProviderAppCode, error) {
@@ -6807,6 +6809,8 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix(ctx context.Context, secre
&i.ResourceUri,
&i.CodeChallenge,
&i.CodeChallengeMethod,
&i.StateHash,
&i.RedirectUri,
)
return i, err
}
@@ -7210,7 +7214,9 @@ INSERT INTO oauth2_provider_app_codes (
user_id,
resource_uri,
code_challenge,
code_challenge_method
code_challenge_method,
state_hash,
redirect_uri
) VALUES(
$1,
$2,
@@ -7221,8 +7227,10 @@ INSERT INTO oauth2_provider_app_codes (
$7,
$8,
$9,
$10
) RETURNING id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method
$10,
$11,
$12
) RETURNING id, created_at, expires_at, secret_prefix, hashed_secret, user_id, app_id, resource_uri, code_challenge, code_challenge_method, state_hash, redirect_uri
`
type InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCodeParams struct {
@@ -7236,6 +7244,8 @@ type InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCodeParams struct {
ResourceUri sql.NullString `db:"resource_uri" json:"resource_uri"`
CodeChallenge sql.NullString `db:"code_challenge" json:"code_challenge"`
CodeChallengeMethod sql.NullString `db:"code_challenge_method" json:"code_challenge_method"`
StateHash sql.NullString `db:"state_hash" json:"state_hash"`
RedirectUri sql.NullString `db:"redirect_uri" json:"redirect_uri"`
}
func (q *sqlQuerier) InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode(ctx context.Context, arg InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCodeParams) (OAuth2ProviderAppCode, error) {
@@ -7250,6 +7260,8 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode(ctx context.Context, arg Insert
arg.ResourceUri,
arg.CodeChallenge,
arg.CodeChallengeMethod,
arg.StateHash,
arg.RedirectUri,
)
var i OAuth2ProviderAppCode
err := row.Scan(
@@ -7263,6 +7275,8 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode(ctx context.Context, arg Insert
&i.ResourceUri,
&i.CodeChallenge,
&i.CodeChallengeMethod,
&i.StateHash,
&i.RedirectUri,
)
return i, err
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -140,7 +140,9 @@ INSERT INTO oauth2_provider_app_codes (
user_id,
resource_uri,
code_challenge,
code_challenge_method
code_challenge_method,
state_hash,
redirect_uri
) VALUES(
$1,
$2,
@@ -151,7 +153,9 @@ INSERT INTO oauth2_provider_app_codes (
$7,
$8,
$9,
$10
$10,
$11,
$12
) RETURNING *;
-- name: DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByID :exec
+3 -4
View File
@@ -228,12 +228,11 @@ func (p *QueryParamParser) RedirectURL(vals url.Values, base *url.URL, queryPara
})
}
// It can be a sub-directory but not a sub-domain, as we have apps on
// sub-domains and that seems too dangerous.
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
// OAuth 2.1 requires exact redirect URI matching.
if v.String() != base.String() {
p.Errors = append(p.Errors, codersdk.ValidationError{
Field: queryParam,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Query param %q must be a subset of %s", queryParam, base),
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Query param %q must exactly match %s", queryParam, base),
})
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -62,8 +62,12 @@ func CSRF(cookieCfg codersdk.HTTPCookieConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Hand
mw.ExemptRegexp(regexp.MustCompile("/organizations/[^/]+/provisionerdaemons/*"))
mw.ExemptFunc(func(r *http.Request) bool {
// Only enforce CSRF on API routes.
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api") {
// Enforce CSRF on API routes and the OAuth2 authorize
// endpoint. The authorize endpoint serves a browser consent
// form whose POST must be CSRF-protected to prevent
// cross-site authorization code theft (coder/security#121).
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api") &&
!strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/oauth2/authorize") {
return true
}
+20
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,26 @@ func TestCSRFExemptList(t *testing.T) {
URL: "https://coder.com/api/v2/me",
Exempt: false,
},
{
Name: "OAuth2Authorize",
URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize",
Exempt: false,
},
{
Name: "OAuth2AuthorizeQuery",
URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize?client_id=test",
Exempt: false,
},
{
Name: "OAuth2Tokens",
URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/tokens",
Exempt: true,
},
{
Name: "OAuth2Register",
URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/register",
Exempt: true,
},
}
mw := httpmw.CSRF(codersdk.HTTPCookieConfig{})
+40 -22
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package mcp_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
mcpclient "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/client"
"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/client/transport"
"github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
@@ -24,6 +27,15 @@ import (
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/testutil"
)
// mcpGeneratePKCE creates a PKCE verifier and S256 challenge for MCP
// e2e tests.
func mcpGeneratePKCE() (verifier, challenge string) {
verifier = uuid.NewString() + uuid.NewString()
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
challenge = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
return verifier, challenge
}
func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_ClientIntegration(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -553,31 +565,32 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
// In a real flow, this would be done through the browser consent page
// For testing, we'll create the code directly using the internal API
// First, we need to authorize the app (simulating user consent)
authURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/oauth2/authorize?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&state=test_state",
api.AccessURL.String(), app.ID, "http://localhost:3000/callback")
// First, we need to authorize the app (simulating user consent).
staticVerifier, staticChallenge := mcpGeneratePKCE()
authURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/oauth2/authorize?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&state=test_state&code_challenge=%s&code_challenge_method=S256",
api.AccessURL.String(), app.ID, "http://localhost:3000/callback", staticChallenge)
// Create an HTTP client that follows redirects but captures the final redirect
// Create an HTTP client that follows redirects but captures the final redirect.
client := &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse // Stop following redirects
},
}
// Make the authorization request (this would normally be done in a browser)
// Make the authorization request (this would normally be done in a browser).
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", authURL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Use RFC 6750 Bearer token for authentication
// Use RFC 6750 Bearer token for authentication.
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+coderClient.SessionToken())
resp, err := client.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer resp.Body.Close()
// The response should be a redirect to the consent page or directly to callback
// For testing purposes, let's simulate the POST consent approval
// The response should be a redirect to the consent page or directly to callback.
// For testing purposes, let's simulate the POST consent approval.
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
// This means we got the consent page, now we need to POST consent
// This means we got the consent page, now we need to POST consent.
consentReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", authURL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
consentReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+coderClient.SessionToken())
@@ -588,7 +601,7 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
defer resp.Body.Close()
}
// Extract authorization code from redirect URL
// Extract authorization code from redirect URL.
require.True(t, resp.StatusCode >= 300 && resp.StatusCode < 400, "Expected redirect response")
location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
require.NotEmpty(t, location, "Expected Location header in redirect")
@@ -600,13 +613,14 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("Successfully obtained authorization code: %s", authCode[:10]+"...")
// Step 2: Exchange authorization code for access token and refresh token
// Step 2: Exchange authorization code for access token and refresh token.
tokenRequestBody := url.Values{
"grant_type": {"authorization_code"},
"client_id": {app.ID.String()},
"client_secret": {secret.ClientSecretFull},
"code": {authCode},
"redirect_uri": {"http://localhost:3000/callback"},
"code_verifier": {staticVerifier},
}
tokenReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", api.AccessURL.String()+"/oauth2/tokens",
@@ -868,41 +882,44 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("Successfully registered dynamic client: %s", clientID)
// Step 3: Perform OAuth2 authorization code flow with dynamically registered client
authURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/oauth2/authorize?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&state=dynamic_state",
api.AccessURL.String(), clientID, "http://localhost:3000/callback")
// Step 3: Perform OAuth2 authorization code flow with dynamically registered client.
dynamicVerifier, dynamicChallenge := mcpGeneratePKCE()
authURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/oauth2/authorize?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&state=dynamic_state&code_challenge=%s&code_challenge_method=S256",
api.AccessURL.String(), clientID, "http://localhost:3000/callback", dynamicChallenge)
// Create an HTTP client that captures redirects
// Create an HTTP client that captures redirects.
authClient := &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse // Stop following redirects
},
}
// Make the authorization request with authentication
// Make the authorization request with authentication.
authReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", authURL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
authReq.Header.Set("Cookie", fmt.Sprintf("coder_session_token=%s", coderClient.SessionToken()))
authReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+coderClient.SessionToken())
authResp, err := authClient.Do(authReq)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer authResp.Body.Close()
// Handle the response - check for error first
// Handle the response - check for error first.
if authResp.StatusCode == http.StatusBadRequest {
// Read error response for debugging
// Read error response for debugging.
bodyBytes, err := io.ReadAll(authResp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Logf("OAuth2 authorization error: %s", string(bodyBytes))
t.FailNow()
}
// Handle consent flow if needed
// Handle consent flow if needed.
if authResp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
// This means we got the consent page, now we need to POST consent
// This means we got the consent page, now we need to POST consent.
consentReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", authURL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
consentReq.Header.Set("Cookie", fmt.Sprintf("coder_session_token=%s", coderClient.SessionToken()))
consentReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+coderClient.SessionToken())
consentReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
authResp, err = authClient.Do(consentReq)
@@ -910,7 +927,7 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
defer authResp.Body.Close()
}
// Extract authorization code from redirect
// Extract authorization code from redirect.
require.True(t, authResp.StatusCode >= 300 && authResp.StatusCode < 400,
"Expected redirect response, got %d", authResp.StatusCode)
location := authResp.Header.Get("Location")
@@ -923,13 +940,14 @@ func TestMCPHTTP_E2E_OAuth2_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("Successfully obtained authorization code: %s", authCode[:10]+"...")
// Step 4: Exchange authorization code for access token
// Step 4: Exchange authorization code for access token.
tokenRequestBody := url.Values{
"grant_type": {"authorization_code"},
"client_id": {clientID},
"client_secret": {clientSecret},
"code": {authCode},
"redirect_uri": {"http://localhost:3000/callback"},
"code_verifier": {dynamicVerifier},
}
tokenReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", api.AccessURL.String()+"/oauth2/tokens",
+93 -42
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package coderd_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
@@ -289,7 +291,6 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenExchange(t *testing.T) {
authError: "Invalid query params:",
},
{
// TODO: This is valid for now, but should it be?
name: "DifferentProtocol",
app: apps.Default,
preAuth: func(valid *oauth2.Config) {
@@ -297,6 +298,7 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenExchange(t *testing.T) {
newURL.Scheme = "https"
valid.RedirectURL = newURL.String()
},
authError: "Invalid query params:",
},
{
name: "NestedPath",
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenExchange(t *testing.T) {
newURL.Path = path.Join(newURL.Path, "nested")
valid.RedirectURL = newURL.String()
},
authError: "Invalid query params:",
},
{
// Some oauth implementations allow this, but our users can host
@@ -481,11 +484,12 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenExchange(t *testing.T) {
}
var code string
var verifier string
if test.defaultCode != nil {
code = *test.defaultCode
} else {
var err error
code, err = authorizationFlow(ctx, userClient, valid)
code, verifier, err = authorizationFlow(ctx, userClient, valid)
if test.authError != "" {
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, test.authError)
@@ -500,8 +504,12 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenExchange(t *testing.T) {
test.preToken(valid)
}
// Do the actual exchange.
token, err := valid.Exchange(ctx, code, test.exchangeMutate...)
// Do the actual exchange. Include PKCE code_verifier when
// we obtained a code through the authorization flow.
exchangeOpts := append([]oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier),
}, test.exchangeMutate...)
token, err := valid.Exchange(ctx, code, exchangeOpts...)
if test.tokenError != "" {
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, test.tokenError)
@@ -683,10 +691,11 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderTokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
}
type exchangeSetup struct {
cfg *oauth2.Config
app codersdk.OAuth2ProviderApp
secret codersdk.OAuth2ProviderAppSecretFull
code string
cfg *oauth2.Config
app codersdk.OAuth2ProviderApp
secret codersdk.OAuth2ProviderAppSecretFull
code string
verifier string
}
func TestOAuth2ProviderRevoke(t *testing.T) {
@@ -730,11 +739,13 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderRevoke(t *testing.T) {
name: "OverrideCodeAndToken",
fn: func(ctx context.Context, client *codersdk.Client, s exchangeSetup) {
// Generating a new code should wipe out the old code.
code, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, client, s.cfg)
code, verifier, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, client, s.cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Generating a new token should wipe out the old token.
_, err = s.cfg.Exchange(ctx, code)
_, err = s.cfg.Exchange(ctx, code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
},
replacesToken: true,
@@ -770,14 +781,15 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderRevoke(t *testing.T) {
}
// Go through the auth flow to get a code.
code, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, testClient, cfg)
code, verifier, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, testClient, cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
return exchangeSetup{
cfg: cfg,
app: app,
secret: secret,
code: code,
cfg: cfg,
app: app,
secret: secret,
code: code,
verifier: verifier,
}
}
@@ -794,12 +806,16 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderRevoke(t *testing.T) {
test.fn(ctx, testClient, testEntities)
// Exchange should fail because the code should be gone.
_, err := testEntities.cfg.Exchange(ctx, testEntities.code)
_, err := testEntities.cfg.Exchange(ctx, testEntities.code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", testEntities.verifier),
)
require.Error(t, err)
// Try again, this time letting the exchange complete first.
testEntities = setup(ctx, testClient, test.name+"-2")
token, err := testEntities.cfg.Exchange(ctx, testEntities.code)
token, err := testEntities.cfg.Exchange(ctx, testEntities.code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", testEntities.verifier),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Validate the returned access token and that the app is listed.
@@ -872,25 +888,38 @@ func generateApps(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, client *codersdk.Client, su
}
}
func authorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, client *codersdk.Client, cfg *oauth2.Config) (string, error) {
state := uuid.NewString()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state)
// generatePKCE creates a PKCE verifier and S256 challenge for testing.
func generatePKCE() (verifier, challenge string) {
verifier = uuid.NewString() + uuid.NewString()
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
challenge = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
return verifier, challenge
}
// Make a POST request to simulate clicking "Allow" on the authorization page
// This bypasses the HTML consent page and directly processes the authorization
return oidctest.OAuth2GetCode(
func authorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, client *codersdk.Client, cfg *oauth2.Config) (code, codeVerifier string, err error) {
state := uuid.NewString()
codeVerifier, challenge := generatePKCE()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", challenge),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
)
// Make a POST request to simulate clicking "Allow" on the authorization page.
// This bypasses the HTML consent page and directly processes the authorization.
code, err = oidctest.OAuth2GetCode(
authURL,
func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
// Change to POST to simulate the form submission
// Change to POST to simulate the form submission.
req.Method = http.MethodPost
// Prevent automatic redirect following
// Prevent automatic redirect following.
client.HTTPClient.CheckRedirect = func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
return client.Request(ctx, req.Method, req.URL.String(), nil)
},
)
return code, codeVerifier, err
}
func must[T any](value T, err error) T {
@@ -997,11 +1026,15 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderResourceIndicators(t *testing.T) {
Scopes: []string{},
}
// Step 1: Authorization with resource parameter
// Step 1: Authorization with resource parameter and PKCE.
state := uuid.NewString()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state)
verifier, challenge := generatePKCE()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", challenge),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
)
if test.authResource != "" {
// Add resource parameter to auth URL
// Add resource parameter to auth URL.
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(authURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
query := parsedURL.Query()
@@ -1030,7 +1063,7 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderResourceIndicators(t *testing.T) {
// Step 2: Token exchange with resource parameter
// Use custom token exchange since golang.org/x/oauth2 doesn't support resource parameter in token requests
token, err := customTokenExchange(ctx, ownerClient.URL.String(), apps.Default.ID.String(), secret.ClientSecretFull, code, apps.Default.CallbackURL, test.tokenResource)
token, err := customTokenExchange(ctx, ownerClient.URL.String(), apps.Default.ID.String(), secret.ClientSecretFull, code, apps.Default.CallbackURL, test.tokenResource, verifier)
if test.expectTokenError {
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid_target")
@@ -1127,9 +1160,13 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderCrossResourceAudienceValidation(t *testing.T) {
Scopes: []string{},
}
// Authorization with resource parameter for server1
// Authorization with resource parameter for server1 and PKCE.
state := uuid.NewString()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state)
verifier, challenge := generatePKCE()
authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", challenge),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
)
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(authURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
query := parsedURL.Query()
@@ -1149,8 +1186,11 @@ func TestOAuth2ProviderCrossResourceAudienceValidation(t *testing.T) {
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Exchange code for token with resource parameter
token, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code, oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("resource", resource1))
// Exchange code for token with resource parameter and PKCE verifier.
token, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("resource", resource1),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, token.AccessToken)
@@ -1226,9 +1266,11 @@ func TestOAuth2RefreshExpiryOutlivesAccess(t *testing.T) {
}
// Authorization and token exchange
code, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, ownerClient, cfg)
code, verifier, err := authorizationFlow(ctx, ownerClient, cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
tok, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code)
tok, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, tok.AccessToken)
require.NotEmpty(t, tok.RefreshToken)
@@ -1253,7 +1295,7 @@ func TestOAuth2RefreshExpiryOutlivesAccess(t *testing.T) {
// customTokenExchange performs a custom OAuth2 token exchange with support for resource parameter
// This is needed because golang.org/x/oauth2 doesn't support custom parameters in token requests
func customTokenExchange(ctx context.Context, baseURL, clientID, clientSecret, code, redirectURI, resource string) (*oauth2.Token, error) {
func customTokenExchange(ctx context.Context, baseURL, clientID, clientSecret, code, redirectURI, resource, codeVerifier string) (*oauth2.Token, error) {
data := url.Values{}
data.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
data.Set("code", code)
@@ -1263,6 +1305,9 @@ func customTokenExchange(ctx context.Context, baseURL, clientID, clientSecret, c
if resource != "" {
data.Set("resource", resource)
}
if codeVerifier != "" {
data.Set("code_verifier", codeVerifier)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", baseURL+"/oauth2/tokens", strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
if err != nil {
@@ -1637,17 +1682,21 @@ func TestOAuth2CoderClient(t *testing.T) {
// Make a new user
client, user := coderdtest.CreateAnotherUser(t, owner, first.OrganizationID)
// Do an OAuth2 token exchange and get a new client with an oauth token
// Do an OAuth2 token exchange and get a new client with an oauth token.
state := uuid.NewString()
verifier, challenge := generatePKCE()
// Get an OAuth2 code for a token exchange
// Get an OAuth2 code for a token exchange.
code, err := oidctest.OAuth2GetCode(
cfg.AuthCodeURL(state),
cfg.AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", challenge),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
),
func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
// Change to POST to simulate the form submission
// Change to POST to simulate the form submission.
req.Method = http.MethodPost
// Prevent automatic redirect following
// Prevent automatic redirect following.
client.HTTPClient.CheckRedirect = func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
}
@@ -1656,7 +1705,9 @@ func TestOAuth2CoderClient(t *testing.T) {
)
require.NoError(t, err)
token, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code)
token, err := cfg.Exchange(ctx, code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", verifier),
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Use the oauth client's authentication
+64 -10
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package oauth2provider
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/url"
@@ -9,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database"
@@ -22,6 +25,7 @@ import (
type authorizeParams struct {
clientID string
redirectURL *url.URL
redirectURIProvided bool
responseType codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseType
scope []string
state string
@@ -34,11 +38,13 @@ func extractAuthorizeParams(r *http.Request, callbackURL *url.URL) (authorizePar
p := httpapi.NewQueryParamParser()
vals := r.URL.Query()
// response_type and client_id are always required.
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id")
params := authorizeParams{
clientID: p.String(vals, "", "client_id"),
redirectURL: p.RedirectURL(vals, callbackURL, "redirect_uri"),
redirectURIProvided: vals.Get("redirect_uri") != "",
responseType: httpapi.ParseCustom(p, vals, "", "response_type", httpapi.ParseEnum[codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseType]),
scope: strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(p.String(vals, "", "scope"))),
state: p.String(vals, "", "state"),
@@ -46,6 +52,15 @@ func extractAuthorizeParams(r *http.Request, callbackURL *url.URL) (authorizePar
codeChallenge: p.String(vals, "", "code_challenge"),
codeChallengeMethod: p.String(vals, "", "code_challenge_method"),
}
// PKCE is required for authorization code flow requests.
if params.responseType == codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode && params.codeChallenge == "" {
p.Errors = append(p.Errors, codersdk.ValidationError{
Field: "code_challenge",
Detail: `Query param "code_challenge" is required and cannot be empty`,
})
}
// Validate resource indicator syntax (RFC 8707): must be absolute URI without fragment
if err := validateResourceParameter(params.resource); err != nil {
p.Errors = append(p.Errors, codersdk.ValidationError{
@@ -112,6 +127,22 @@ func ShowAuthorizePage(accessURL *url.URL) http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
site.RenderStaticErrorPage(rw, r, site.ErrorPageData{
Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
HideStatus: false,
Title: "Unsupported Response Type",
Description: "Only response_type=code is supported.",
Actions: []site.Action{
{
URL: accessURL.String(),
Text: "Back to site",
},
},
})
return
}
cancel := params.redirectURL
cancelQuery := params.redirectURL.Query()
cancelQuery.Add("error", "access_denied")
@@ -122,6 +153,7 @@ func ShowAuthorizePage(accessURL *url.URL) http.HandlerFunc {
AppName: app.Name,
CancelURI: cancel.String(),
RedirectURI: r.URL.String(),
CSRFToken: nosurf.Token(r),
Username: ua.FriendlyName,
})
}
@@ -147,16 +179,23 @@ func ProcessAuthorize(db database.Store) http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Validate PKCE for public clients (MCP requirement)
if params.codeChallenge != "" {
// If code_challenge is provided but method is not, default to S256
if params.codeChallengeMethod == "" {
params.codeChallengeMethod = string(codersdk.OAuth2PKCECodeChallengeMethodS256)
}
if err := codersdk.ValidatePKCECodeChallengeMethod(params.codeChallengeMethod); err != nil {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidRequest, err.Error())
return
}
// OAuth 2.1 removes the implicit grant. Only
// authorization code flow is supported.
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
"Only response_type=code is supported")
return
}
// code_challenge is required (enforced by RequiredNotEmpty above),
// but default the method to S256 if omitted.
if params.codeChallengeMethod == "" {
params.codeChallengeMethod = string(codersdk.OAuth2PKCECodeChallengeMethodS256)
}
if err := codersdk.ValidatePKCECodeChallengeMethod(params.codeChallengeMethod); err != nil {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidRequest, err.Error())
return
}
// TODO: Ignoring scope for now, but should look into implementing.
@@ -194,6 +233,8 @@ func ProcessAuthorize(db database.Store) http.HandlerFunc {
ResourceUri: sql.NullString{String: params.resource, Valid: params.resource != ""},
CodeChallenge: sql.NullString{String: params.codeChallenge, Valid: params.codeChallenge != ""},
CodeChallengeMethod: sql.NullString{String: params.codeChallengeMethod, Valid: params.codeChallengeMethod != ""},
StateHash: hashOAuth2State(params.state),
RedirectUri: sql.NullString{String: params.redirectURL.String(), Valid: params.redirectURIProvided},
})
if err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("insert oauth2 authorization code: %w", err)
@@ -218,3 +259,16 @@ func ProcessAuthorize(db database.Store) http.HandlerFunc {
http.Redirect(rw, r, params.redirectURL.String(), http.StatusFound)
}
}
// hashOAuth2State returns a SHA-256 hash of the OAuth2 state parameter. If
// the state is empty, it returns a null string.
func hashOAuth2State(state string) sql.NullString {
if state == "" {
return sql.NullString{}
}
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(state))
return sql.NullString{
String: hex.EncodeToString(hash[:]),
Valid: true,
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
//nolint:testpackage // Internal test for unexported hashOAuth2State helper.
package oauth2provider
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestHashOAuth2State(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
t.Run("EmptyState", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
result := hashOAuth2State("")
assert.False(t, result.Valid, "empty state should return invalid NullString")
assert.Empty(t, result.String, "empty state should return empty string")
})
t.Run("NonEmptyState", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
state := "test-state-value"
result := hashOAuth2State(state)
require.True(t, result.Valid, "non-empty state should return valid NullString")
// Verify it's a proper SHA-256 hash.
expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(state))
assert.Equal(t, hex.EncodeToString(expected[:]), result.String,
"state hash should be SHA-256 hex digest")
})
t.Run("DifferentStatesProduceDifferentHashes", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash1 := hashOAuth2State("state-a")
hash2 := hashOAuth2State("state-b")
require.True(t, hash1.Valid)
require.True(t, hash2.Valid)
assert.NotEqual(t, hash1.String, hash2.String,
"different states should produce different hashes")
})
t.Run("SameStateProducesSameHash", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
hash1 := hashOAuth2State("deterministic")
hash2 := hashOAuth2State("deterministic")
require.True(t, hash1.Valid)
assert.Equal(t, hash1.String, hash2.String,
"same state should produce identical hash")
})
}
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
package oauth2provider_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/site"
)
func TestOAuthConsentFormIncludesCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const csrfFieldValue = "csrf-field-value"
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
site.RenderOAuthAllowPage(rec, req, site.RenderOAuthAllowData{
AppName: "Test OAuth App",
CancelURI: "https://coder.com/cancel",
RedirectURI: "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize?client_id=test",
CSRFToken: csrfFieldValue,
Username: "test-user",
})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Result().StatusCode)
assert.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), `name="csrf_token"`)
assert.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), `value="`+csrfFieldValue+`"`)
}
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ func TestOAuth2InvalidPKCE(t *testing.T) {
)
}
func TestOAuth2WithoutPKCE(t *testing.T) {
// TestOAuth2WithoutPKCEIsRejected verifies that authorization requests without
// a code_challenge are rejected now that PKCE is mandatory.
func TestOAuth2WithoutPKCEIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client := coderdtest.New(t, &coderdtest.Options{
@@ -166,15 +168,15 @@ func TestOAuth2WithoutPKCE(t *testing.T) {
})
_ = coderdtest.CreateFirstUser(t, client)
// Create OAuth2 app
app, clientSecret := oauth2providertest.CreateTestOAuth2App(t, client)
// Create OAuth2 app.
app, _ := oauth2providertest.CreateTestOAuth2App(t, client)
t.Cleanup(func() {
oauth2providertest.CleanupOAuth2App(t, client, app.ID)
})
state := oauth2providertest.GenerateState(t)
// Perform authorization without PKCE
// Authorization without code_challenge should be rejected.
authParams := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeParams{
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
@@ -182,21 +184,9 @@ func TestOAuth2WithoutPKCE(t *testing.T) {
State: state,
}
code := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2App(t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams)
require.NotEmpty(t, code, "should receive authorization code")
// Exchange code for token without PKCE
tokenParams := oauth2providertest.TokenExchangeParams{
GrantType: "authorization_code",
Code: code,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
}
token := oauth2providertest.ExchangeCodeForToken(t, client.URL.String(), tokenParams)
require.NotEmpty(t, token.AccessToken, "should receive access token")
require.NotEmpty(t, token.RefreshToken, "should receive refresh token")
oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2AppExpectingError(
t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams, http.StatusBadRequest,
)
}
func TestOAuth2TokenExchangeClientSecretBasic(t *testing.T) {
@@ -212,13 +202,16 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenExchangeClientSecretBasic(t *testing.T) {
oauth2providertest.CleanupOAuth2App(t, client, app.ID)
})
codeVerifier, codeChallenge := oauth2providertest.GeneratePKCE(t)
state := oauth2providertest.GenerateState(t)
authParams := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeParams{
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
CodeChallenge: codeChallenge,
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
}
code := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2App(t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams)
@@ -229,6 +222,7 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenExchangeClientSecretBasic(t *testing.T) {
data.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
data.Set("code", code)
data.Set("redirect_uri", oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI)
data.Set("code_verifier", codeVerifier)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", client.URL.String()+"/oauth2/tokens", strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to create token request")
@@ -265,13 +259,16 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenExchangeClientSecretBasicInvalidSecret(t *testing.T) {
oauth2providertest.CleanupOAuth2App(t, client, app.ID)
})
codeVerifier, codeChallenge := oauth2providertest.GeneratePKCE(t)
state := oauth2providertest.GenerateState(t)
authParams := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeParams{
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
CodeChallenge: codeChallenge,
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
}
code := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2App(t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams)
@@ -282,6 +279,7 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenExchangeClientSecretBasicInvalidSecret(t *testing.T) {
data.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
data.Set("code", code)
data.Set("redirect_uri", oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI)
data.Set("code_verifier", codeVerifier)
wrongSecret := clientSecret + "x"
@@ -349,26 +347,30 @@ func TestOAuth2ResourceParameter(t *testing.T) {
})
state := oauth2providertest.GenerateState(t)
codeVerifier, codeChallenge := oauth2providertest.GeneratePKCE(t)
// Perform authorization with resource parameter
// Perform authorization with resource parameter.
authParams := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeParams{
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
Resource: oauth2providertest.TestResourceURI,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
CodeChallenge: codeChallenge,
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
Resource: oauth2providertest.TestResourceURI,
}
code := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2App(t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams)
require.NotEmpty(t, code, "should receive authorization code")
// Exchange code for token with resource parameter
// Exchange code for token with resource parameter.
tokenParams := oauth2providertest.TokenExchangeParams{
GrantType: "authorization_code",
Code: code,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
CodeVerifier: codeVerifier,
Resource: oauth2providertest.TestResourceURI,
}
@@ -392,13 +394,16 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
})
state := oauth2providertest.GenerateState(t)
codeVerifier, codeChallenge := oauth2providertest.GeneratePKCE(t)
// Get initial token
// Get initial token.
authParams := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeParams{
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ResponseType: "code",
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
State: state,
CodeChallenge: codeChallenge,
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
}
code := oauth2providertest.AuthorizeOAuth2App(t, client, client.URL.String(), authParams)
@@ -409,6 +414,7 @@ func TestOAuth2TokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
ClientID: app.ID.String(),
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
RedirectURI: oauth2providertest.TestRedirectURI,
CodeVerifier: codeVerifier,
}
initialToken := oauth2providertest.ExchangeCodeForToken(t, client.URL.String(), tokenParams)
+20 -7
View File
@@ -254,16 +254,29 @@ func authorizationCodeGrant(ctx context.Context, db database.Store, app database
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errBadCode
}
// Verify PKCE challenge if present
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
// Verify redirect_uri matches the one used during authorization
// (RFC 6749 §4.1.3).
if dbCode.RedirectUri.Valid && dbCode.RedirectUri.String != "" {
if req.RedirectURI != dbCode.RedirectUri.String {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errBadCode
}
}
// PKCE is mandatory for all authorization code flows
// (OAuth 2.1). Verify the code verifier against the stored
// challenge.
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
// Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
// with authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in depth.
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
// Verify resource parameter consistency (RFC 8707)
if dbCode.ResourceUri.Valid && dbCode.ResourceUri.String != "" {
// Resource was specified during authorization - it must match in token request
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ func TestExtractAuthorizeParams_Scopes(t *testing.T) {
query.Set("response_type", "code")
query.Set("client_id", "test-client")
query.Set("redirect_uri", "http://localhost:3000/callback")
query.Set("code_challenge", "test-challenge")
if tc.scopeParam != "" {
query.Set("scope", tc.scopeParam)
}
@@ -341,6 +342,34 @@ func TestExtractAuthorizeParams_Scopes(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestExtractAuthorizeParams_TokenResponseTypeDoesNotRequirePKCE ensures
// response_type=token is parsed without requiring PKCE fields so callers can
// return unsupported_response_type instead of invalid_request.
func TestExtractAuthorizeParams_TokenResponseTypeDoesNotRequirePKCE(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
callbackURL, err := url.Parse("http://localhost:3000/callback")
require.NoError(t, err)
query := url.Values{}
query.Set("response_type", string(codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken))
query.Set("client_id", "test-client")
query.Set("redirect_uri", "http://localhost:3000/callback")
reqURL, err := url.Parse("http://localhost:8080/oauth2/authorize?" + query.Encode())
require.NoError(t, err)
req := &http.Request{
Method: http.MethodGet,
URL: reqURL,
}
params, validationErrs, err := extractAuthorizeParams(req, callbackURL)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, validationErrs)
require.Equal(t, codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken, params.responseType)
}
// TestRefreshTokenGrant_Scopes tests that scopes can be requested during refresh
func TestRefreshTokenGrant_Scopes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+1 -5
View File
@@ -217,11 +217,7 @@ const (
)
func (e OAuth2ProviderResponseType) Valid() bool {
switch e {
case OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode, OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken:
return true
}
return false
return e == OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode || e == OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken
}
type OAuth2TokenEndpointAuthMethod string
+21 -4
View File
@@ -128,9 +128,16 @@ If client authentication fails, the token endpoint returns **HTTP 401** with an
"$CODER_URL/api/v2/users/me"
```
### PKCE Flow (Recommended)
> [!NOTE]
> The PKCE flow below is the **required** integration path. The example
> above is shown for reference but omits the mandatory `code_challenge`
> parameter. See [PKCE Flow](#pkce-flow-required) for the complete flow.
Use PKCE for enhanced security (recommended for both public and confidential clients):
### PKCE Flow (Required)
PKCE is **required** for all OAuth2 authorization code flows. Coder enforces
PKCE in compliance with the OAuth 2.1 specification. Both public and
confidential clients must include PKCE parameters:
1. Generate a code verifier and challenge:
@@ -251,7 +258,8 @@ Verify that the `code_verifier` used in the token request matches the one used t
## Security Considerations
- **Use HTTPS**: Always use HTTPS in production to protect tokens in transit
- **Implement PKCE**: Use PKCE for all public clients (mobile apps, SPAs)
- **Implement PKCE**: PKCE is mandatory for all authorization code clients
(public and confidential)
- **Validate redirect URLs**: Only register trusted redirect URIs for your applications
- **Rotate secrets**: Periodically rotate client secrets using the management API
@@ -261,11 +269,20 @@ As an experimental feature, the current implementation has limitations:
- No scope system - all tokens have full API access
- No client credentials grant support
- Implicit grant (`response_type=token`) is not supported; OAuth 2.1
deprecated this flow due to token leakage risks, and requests return
`unsupported_response_type`
- Limited to opaque access tokens (no JWT support)
## Standards Compliance
This implementation follows established OAuth2 standards including [RFC 6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749) (OAuth2 core), [RFC 7636](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636) (PKCE), and related specifications for discovery and client registration.
This implementation follows established OAuth2 standards including
[RFC 6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749) (OAuth2 core),
[RFC 7636](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636) (PKCE), and the
[OAuth 2.1 draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-12).
Coder enforces OAuth 2.1 requirements including mandatory PKCE for all
authorization code grants, exact redirect URI string matching, rejection
of the implicit grant, and CSRF protections on consent pages.
## Next Steps
+6
View File
@@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ type RenderOAuthAllowData struct {
AppName string
CancelURI string
RedirectURI string
CSRFToken string
Username string
}
@@ -731,6 +732,11 @@ type RenderOAuthAllowData struct {
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
// Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
// clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
err := oauthTemplate.Execute(rw, data)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(r.Context(), rw, http.StatusOK, codersdk.Response{
+1
View File
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ links */}}
</p>
<div class="button-group">
<form method="POST" style="display: inline;">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ .CSRFToken }}" />
<button type="submit" class="primary-button">Allow</button>
</form>
<a href="{{ .CancelURI }}">Cancel</a>