The pause/resume endpoints were only registered under /api/experimental
but the frontend and Go SDK were calling /api/v2, resulting in 404s.
Register the routes in the v2 group, update the SDK client paths, and
fix swagger annotations (Accept → Produce) since these POST endpoints
have no request body.
(cherry picked from commit 9d2aed88c4)
Fixes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/22375
Updates `stringutil.Truncate` to properly handle multi-byte UTF-8
characters.
Adds tests for multi-byte truncation with word boundary.
Created by Mux using Opus 4.6
(cherry picked from commit 0cfa03718e)
Relates to https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1259
Adds new database queries and telemetry collection functions to gather
task lifecycle events (pause/resume cycles, idle time) for analytics.
Task events track pause/resume activity, idle duration before pausing,
paused duration, and time from resume to first app status, filtered to
recent activity based on the telemetry snapshot interval.
🤖 Created with Mux (Opus 4.6).
## Summary
Moves expired token filtering from client-side to server-side by adding
an `include_expired` parameter to the `GetAPIKeysByLoginType` and
`GetAPIKeysByUserID` database queries. This is more efficient for large
deployments with many expired/short-lived tokens.
## Changes
- Add `include_expired` parameter to SQL queries using `OR`
short-circuit
- Add `include_expired` query parameter to `GET
/users/{user}/keys/tokens`
- Add `IncludeExpired` field to `codersdk.TokensFilter`
- Remove client-side filtering from CLI `tokens list` command
- Add `TestTokensFilterExpired` test
Fixescoder/internal#1357
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part of https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/21335
This moves updating app status (used by Tasks) into the workspace agent
API over dRPC. This will allow us to update the status without having to
re-authenticate each time, like we would with an HTTP PATCH request.
Further PRs in this stack will pipe these requests thru from the CLI MCP
server to the agentsock and finally to this dRPC call to coderd.
The provisioner state for a workspace build was being loaded for every
long-lived agent rpc connection. Since this state can be anywhere from
kilobytes to megabytes this can gradually cause the `coderd` memory
footprint to grow over time. It's also a lot of unnecessary allocations
for every query that fetches a workspace build since only a few callers
ever actually reference the provisioner state.
This PR removes it from the returned workspace build and adds a query to
fetch the provisioner state explicitly.
## Summary
Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing
`coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1
compliance.
### Security Fixes
| Fix | Description | Commits |
|-----|-------------|---------|
| **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the
authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e`
|
| **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from
being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` +
`X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` |
| **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full
string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` |
| **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code
in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) |
`50569b9`, `d7ca315` |
| **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for
`response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at
token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` |
| **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns
`unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow)
| `d7ca315`, `91b8863` |
### Changes by File
**`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce
CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent
form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code
theft.
**`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors
'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage`
(consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI
tasks).
**`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix
matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact
matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path,
and query.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement:
`code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a
conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can
reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates
`response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for
unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri`
with the auth code when explicitly provided.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now
unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If
the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it
matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`.
Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`.
**`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant
and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse
`response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error rather than failing at parameter validation.
**`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text`
column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`.
### Design Decisions
**`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required
`state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to
avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored
when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in.
**`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()`
would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the
authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow.
**CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set
only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global
CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks
([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does
not regress that.
### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting on dynamic client registration
---
<details>
<summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary>
# Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance
## Context & Why
Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover
via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security
fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements.
The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps.
## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`)
| Fix | Status | Commits |
|-----|--------|---------|
| Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` | ✅ Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` |
| CSRF token in consent form HTML | ✅ Done | `b94a64e` |
| `state_hash` column + storage | ✅ Done (hash stored, but state still
optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` |
| Tests for CSRF + state hash | ✅ Done | `e4119b5` |
## Remaining Work
### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED)
> **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state`
parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via
`hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients
are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations
that omit state.
**Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in
`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`:
```go
// BEFORE (current on branch)
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge")
// AFTER
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily.
### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching
Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching:
```go
// CURRENT — prefix match
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
```
OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to:
```go
// AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1)
if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path {
```
**File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method**
Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must
exactly match".
**Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at
the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3):
1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add
`redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to
include `redirect_uri`
3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store
`params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code
4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from
DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored
value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals,
callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must
compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the
app's callback URL.
<details>
<summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary>
Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors
(attacker can't use a sub-path).
Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an
attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different
redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC
6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1.
</details>
### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page
The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is
the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent
framing.
**File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)**
Before writing the response, add:
```go
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
// Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
// clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
...
```
Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers,
X-Frame-Options for legacy).
### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE
Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during
authorization (`tokens.go:258`):
```go
// CURRENT — conditional check
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
// verify PKCE
}
```
OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to:
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"`
to required params:
```go
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE
verification unconditional:
```go
// AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1)
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
// Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
// with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in
// depth.
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
```
**File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove
`OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly
in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the
handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should
either:
- (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with
`unsupported_response_type`, OR
- (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects
`response_type=token`
Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible:
```go
// In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params:
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
"Only response_type=code is supported")
return
}
```
### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings
`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query
parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used
internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before
removing.
**Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a
**separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document
the finding.
### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code`
and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant
(`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section
above.
### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a
refresh token is used.
## Migration Plan
All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the
branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add:
- `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420.
## Implementation Order
1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps)
2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays
optional)
3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri
4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject
`response_type=token`
5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in
`authorize.go`
6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes
7. **`make gen`** after DB changes
## Out of Scope (separate PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration
</details>
---
_Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
After a PostgreSQL round-trip, job timestamps lose their monotonic
clock component, making the subtraction susceptible to wall-clock
adjustments producing a small negative delta. Floor at 1ms since
a zero or negative queue wait is meaningless. Fixes TestProvisionerJobQueueWaitMetric
flakes where small negative values (~ -2ms) are observed.
`--secure-auth-cookie` now automatically sources it's default value from `--access-url`
If the access url uses HTTPS, secure is set to `true`.
To revert to old behavior, set the value explicitly to `false`
If a deployment has 2 domains, overriding the oidc url allows the oidc
redirect to differ from the access_url
response to https://github.com/coder/coder/discussions/21500
**This config setting is hidden by default**
In relation to
[`internal#1281`](https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1281)
Remove the `soft_limit` field from the `Feature` type and simplify
license limit handling. This change:
- Removes the `soft_limit` field from the API and SDK
- Uses the soft limit value as the single `limit` value in the UI and
API
- Simplifies warning logic to only show warnings when the limit is
exceeded
- Updates tests to reflect the new behavior
- Updates the UI to use the single limit value for display
## Summary
Custom roles that can create workspaces on behalf of other users need to
be able to list users to populate the owner dropdown in the workspace
creation UI. Previously, this required a separate `user:read`
permission, causing the dropdown to fail for custom roles.
## Changes
- Modified `GetUsers` in `dbauthz` to check if the user can create
workspaces for any owner (`workspace:create` with `owner_id: *`)
- If the user has this permission, they can list all users without
needing explicit `user:read` permission
- Added tests to verify the new behavior
## Testing
- Updated mock tests to assert the new authorization check
- Added integration tests for both positive and negative cases
Fixes#18203
Parent agents were re-using AuthInstanceID when spawning child agents.
This caused GetWorkspaceAgentByInstanceID to return the most recently
created sub agent instead of the parent when the parent tried to refetch
its own manifest.
Fix by not reusing AuthInstanceID for sub agents, and updating
GetWorkspaceAgentByInstanceID to filter them out entirely.
Since Go 1.22, the loop variable capture issue is resolved. Variables
declared by for loops are now per-iteration rather than per-loop, making
the 'v := v' pattern unnecessary.
## Summary
coder-logstream-kube and other tools that use the agent token to connect
to the RPC endpoint were incorrectly triggering connection monitoring,
causing false connected/disconnected timestamps on the agent. This led
to VSCode/JetBrains disconnections and incorrect dashboard status.
## Changes
Add a `role` query parameter to `/api/v2/workspaceagents/me/rpc`:
- `role=agent`: triggers connection monitoring (default for the agent
SDK)
- any other value (e.g. `logstream-kube`): skips connection monitoring
- omitted: triggers monitoring for backward compatibility with older
agents
The agent SDK now sends `role=agent` by default. A new `Role` field on
the `agentsdk.Client` allows non-agent callers to specify a different
role.
## Required follow-up
coder-logstream-kube needs to set `client.Role = "logstream-kube"`
before calling `ConnectRPC20()`. Without that change, it will still send
`role=agent` and trigger monitoring.
Fixes#21625
Relates to https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1252
When a workspace with a TaskID hits its deadline, use
BuildReasonTaskAutoPause instead of BuildReasonAutostop. This allows
downstream systems to distinguish between regular autostop and task
workspace pauses.
Created by Mux using Opus 4.5.
## Summary
> NOTE: Calling this out as a breaking change in case existing consumers
of the CLI depend on being able to see expired tokens OR being able to
delete tokens immediately.
Updates the `coder tokens rm` command to immediately expire a token by
ID, preserving the token record for audit trail purposes. Tokens can
still be deleted by passing `--delete`.
## Problem
During an incident on dev.coder.com, operators needed to urgently expire
an API key that was stuck in a hot loop. The only way to do this was via
direct database access:
```sql
UPDATE api_keys SET expires_at = NOW() WHERE id = '...';
```
This is not ideal for operators who may not have direct DB access or
want to avoid manual SQL.
## Solution
This PR adds:
- **API endpoint**: `PUT /api/v2/users/{user}/keys/{keyid}/expire` -
Sets the token's `expires_at` to now
- **SDK method**: `ExpireAPIKey(ctx, userID, keyID)`
- **Updates CLI**: `coder tokens rm <name|id|token>` now _expires_ by
default. You can still delete by passing the `--delete` flag. The `coder
tokens list` command now also hides expired tokens by default. You can
`--include-expired` if needed to include them.
- **Audit logging**: The expire action is logged with old and new key
states
## Test plan
- Tests cover: owner expiring own token, admin expiring other user's
token, non-admin cannot expire other's token, 404 for non-existent token
Closes#21782🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
**Background**
Reported in #17417, there is a `deleted` query parameter supported by
/api/v2/templates, but we do not respect this field on the client,
showing the "Create Workspace" button for deleted templates.
**Expected Behavior**
Don't show the "Create Workspace" button for deleted templates.
**Notes**
This PR adds a new `deleted` field to the templates API response.
Co-authored-by: Danielle Maywood <danielle@themaywoods.com>
This PR adds some metrics to help identify job enqueue rates and
latencies. This work was initiated as a way to help reduce the cost of
the observation/measurement itself for autostart scaletests, which
impacts our ability to identify/reason about the load caused by
autostart. See: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1209
I've extended the metrics here to account for regular user initiated
builds, prebuilds, autostarts, etc. IMO there is still the question here
of whether we want to include or need the `transition` label, which is
only present on workspace builds. Including it does lead to an increase
in cardinality, and in the case of the histogram (when not using native
histograms) that's at least a few extra series for every bucket. We
could remove the transition label there but keep it on the counter.
Additionally, the histogram is currently observing latencies for other
jobs, such as template builds/version imports, those do not have a
transition type associated with them.
Tested briefly in a workspace, can see metric values like the following:
-
`coderd_workspace_builds_enqueued_total{build_reason="autostart",provisioner_type="terraform",status="success",transition="start"}
1`
-
`coderd_provisioner_job_queue_wait_seconds_bucket{build_reason="autostart",job_type="workspace_build",provisioner_type="terraform",transition="start",le="0.025"}
1`
---------
Signed-off-by: Callum Styan <callumstyan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This PR fixes a workspace app authentication bug where requests that
include an `Authorization` header (intended for the upstream app) can
cause Coder to ignore the workspace app session cookie
(`coder_subdomain_app_session_token_*` /
`coder_path_app_session_token`). When that happens, Coder fails to mint
or renew `coder_signed_app_token` and redirects to
`/api/v2/applications/auth-redirect` instead of proxying the request to
the workspace.
This commonly shows up when users run a frontend and backend in the same
workspace and the backend requires `Authorization` (for example, `curl
-H "Authorization: bearer ..."` or browser `fetch()` calls).
Related issues / context:
* Primary bug report and repro:
[https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/21467](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/21467)
* Related symptoms reported as CORS / redirect failures for workspace
apps:
*
[https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20667](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20667)
*
[https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/19728](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/19728)
## Root Cause
In `coderd/workspaceapps/cookies.go`, `AppCookies.TokenFromRequest`
checked `httpmw.APITokenFromRequest(r)` first. That helper returns a
token from several places, including `Authorization: Bearer ...`.
As a result, when a request included an upstream `Authorization` header,
that header value was returned as the “session token” for the app proxy,
and `coder_subdomain_app_session_token_*` was never read. Authentication
then failed and the request was treated as signed out.
## Fix
Change the precedence in `AppCookies.TokenFromRequest`:
1. First check the access-method-specific cookie:
* subdomain apps: `coder_subdomain_app_session_token_{hash}`
* path apps: `coder_path_app_session_token`
2. If not present, fall back to `httpmw.APITokenFromRequest(r)` (so
non-browser clients can still authenticate via query, header, or bearer
tokens if they really want to).
This ensures that:
* Backend requests that require `Authorization` still reach the
workspace.
* `coder_signed_app_token` can be renewed from the app session cookie
even when `Authorization` is present.
* `Authorization` is still forwarded to the upstream app (the reverse
proxy code does not strip it).
Initially, I attempted workarounds
([https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20667#issuecomment-3868578388](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20667#issuecomment-3868578388),
[https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/19728#issuecomment-3868578093](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/19728#issuecomment-3868578093)),
but adding `/auth-redirect` to the permissive CORS paths and extending
the validity of workspace app auth tokens from 1 minute to 1 hour only
partially masked the issue. After workspace restarts and token expiry, I
no longer saw CORS errors, but the tokens were still not renewed.
After patching my local Nix-based setup on Coder v1.30.0 with this
change, I can no longer observe this behavior.
I was trying to figure out why `goleak` was complaining about a dangling
http2 connection goroutine in tests. Turns out that `taskname.Generate`
will call out to Anthropic if an API key is set, and we're calling it in
`dbgen`. Modified to use testutil method instead.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1261.
This pull request adds an endpoint to pause coder tasks by stopping the
underlying workspace.
* Instead of `POST /api/v2/tasks/{user}/{task}/pause`, the endpoint is
currently experimental.
* We do not currently set the build reason to `task_manual_pause`,
because build reasons are currently only used on stop transitions.
Adds coderd_template_workspace_build_duration_seconds histogram that
tracks the full duration from workspace build creation to agent ready.
This captures the complete user-perceived build time including
provisioning and agent startup.
The metric is emitted when the agent reports ready/error/timeout via the
lifecycle API, ensuring each build is counted exactly once per replica.
Previously, UpsertBoundaryUsageStats (INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE) and
GetAndResetBoundaryUsageSummary (DELETE...RETURNING) could race during
telemetry period cutover. Without serialization, an upsert concurrent with the
delete could lose data (deleted right after being written) or commit after the
delete (miscounted in the next period). Both operations now acquire
LockIDBoundaryUsageStats within a transaction to ensure a clean cutover.
Adds a Go wrapper (`scripts/apidocgen/swaginit/main.go`) that calls
swag's Go API with `Strict: true`. The `--strict` flag isn't available
in swag's CLI in any version, so the wrapper is the only way to enable
it.
Also upgrades swag from v1.16.2 to v1.16.6 (better generics support,
precise numeric formats, `x-enum-descriptions`, CVE-2024-45338 fix).
Previously we returned 400 Bad Request for all non-active states. This
was semantically incorrect for transitional and paused states where the
request is valid but conflicts with current state.
We now return 409 Conflict for pending/initializing/paused (resolvable
by waiting or resuming) and 400 for error/unknown (actual problems).
This enables client-side auto-resume orchestration per the task
lifecycle RFC.
Closescoder/internal#1265
Task snapshots were orphaned when tasks were soft-deleted. The
`task_snapshots` table has an `ON DELETE CASCADE` foreign key, but
that only fires on hard deletes.
Modified DeleteTask to use a CTE that atomically soft-deletes the
task and removes its snapshot in a single transaction. The query now
returns just the task UUID instead of the full row.
Closescoder/internal#1283
Relates to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/21922 /
https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1259
* Adds `dbfake.BuilderOption func(*WorkspaceBuildBuilder)`
* Adds `BuilderOption` methods for setting various provisioner job
related fields on `WorkspaceBuildBuilder`.
* Migrates a number of existing tests that previously dependeded on
provisioner job timing to use these updated methods in the following
packages:
* `coderd/jobreaper`
* `coderd/notifications/reports`
* `enterprise/coderd/schedule`
* `enterprise/coderd/prebuilds`
* `scripts/workspace-runtime-audit`
🤖 Created using Mux (Opus 4.5)
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Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
fixes: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1300
Adds brotli and zstd compression to the binary cache. Also refactors coderd's streaming encoding middleware to use the same standard set of compression algorithms, so we have them in one place.
Rowan Smith