Adds database columns and server-side logic to track interception lineage via tool call IDs. When an interception ends, the server resolves the correlating tool call ID to find the parent interception and links them via `parent_id`.
New `provider_tool_call_id` column on `aibridge_tool_usages` and `parent_id` column on `aibridge_interceptions`, with indexes for lookup. `findParentInterceptionID` queries by tool call ID and filters out the current interception to find the parent.
Adapted from the [coder/coder `dk/prompt_provenance_poc`](https://github.com/coder/coder/compare/main...dk/prompt_provenance_poc) branch.
Depends on [coder/aibridge#188](https://github.com/coder/aibridge/pull/188).
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1334
The provisioner state for a workspace build was being loaded for every
long-lived agent rpc connection. Since this state can be anywhere from
kilobytes to megabytes this can gradually cause the `coderd` memory
footprint to grow over time. It's also a lot of unnecessary allocations
for every query that fetches a workspace build since only a few callers
ever actually reference the provisioner state.
This PR removes it from the returned workspace build and adds a query to
fetch the provisioner state explicitly.
## Summary
Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing
`coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1
compliance.
### Security Fixes
| Fix | Description | Commits |
|-----|-------------|---------|
| **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the
authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e`
|
| **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from
being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` +
`X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` |
| **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full
string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` |
| **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code
in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) |
`50569b9`, `d7ca315` |
| **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for
`response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at
token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` |
| **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns
`unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow)
| `d7ca315`, `91b8863` |
### Changes by File
**`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce
CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent
form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code
theft.
**`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors
'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage`
(consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI
tasks).
**`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix
matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact
matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path,
and query.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement:
`code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a
conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can
reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates
`response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for
unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri`
with the auth code when explicitly provided.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now
unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If
the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it
matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`.
Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`.
**`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant
and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse
`response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error rather than failing at parameter validation.
**`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text`
column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`.
### Design Decisions
**`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required
`state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to
avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored
when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in.
**`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()`
would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the
authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow.
**CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set
only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global
CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks
([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does
not regress that.
### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting on dynamic client registration
---
<details>
<summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary>
# Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance
## Context & Why
Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover
via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security
fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements.
The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps.
## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`)
| Fix | Status | Commits |
|-----|--------|---------|
| Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` | ✅ Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` |
| CSRF token in consent form HTML | ✅ Done | `b94a64e` |
| `state_hash` column + storage | ✅ Done (hash stored, but state still
optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` |
| Tests for CSRF + state hash | ✅ Done | `e4119b5` |
## Remaining Work
### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED)
> **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state`
parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via
`hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients
are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations
that omit state.
**Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in
`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`:
```go
// BEFORE (current on branch)
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge")
// AFTER
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily.
### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching
Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching:
```go
// CURRENT — prefix match
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
```
OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to:
```go
// AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1)
if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path {
```
**File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method**
Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must
exactly match".
**Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at
the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3):
1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add
`redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to
include `redirect_uri`
3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store
`params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code
4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from
DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored
value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals,
callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must
compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the
app's callback URL.
<details>
<summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary>
Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors
(attacker can't use a sub-path).
Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an
attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different
redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC
6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1.
</details>
### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page
The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is
the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent
framing.
**File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)**
Before writing the response, add:
```go
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
// Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
// clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
...
```
Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers,
X-Frame-Options for legacy).
### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE
Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during
authorization (`tokens.go:258`):
```go
// CURRENT — conditional check
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
// verify PKCE
}
```
OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to:
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"`
to required params:
```go
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE
verification unconditional:
```go
// AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1)
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
// Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
// with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in
// depth.
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
```
**File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove
`OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly
in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the
handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should
either:
- (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with
`unsupported_response_type`, OR
- (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects
`response_type=token`
Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible:
```go
// In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params:
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
"Only response_type=code is supported")
return
}
```
### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings
`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query
parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used
internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before
removing.
**Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a
**separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document
the finding.
### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code`
and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant
(`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section
above.
### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a
refresh token is used.
## Migration Plan
All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the
branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add:
- `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420.
## Implementation Order
1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps)
2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays
optional)
3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri
4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject
`response_type=token`
5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in
`authorize.go`
6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes
7. **`make gen`** after DB changes
## Out of Scope (separate PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration
</details>
---
_Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
I was trying to figure out why `goleak` was complaining about a dangling
http2 connection goroutine in tests. Turns out that `taskname.Generate`
will call out to Anthropic if an API key is set, and we're calling it in
`dbgen`. Modified to use testutil method instead.
Update provisionerdserver to handle the changes introduced to
provisionerd in https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/21602
We now create a relationship between `workspace_agent_devcontainers` and
`workspace_agents` with the newly created `subagent_id`.
The removal of that permission from the role broke valid use cases (e.g.
a site owner user creating a workspace owned by a system account and
then trying to share it with another user).
The bulk of the PR is made up of the rollbacks of the previously
introduced test updates necessitated by the removal.
Related to: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1285
Fixes all our Go file imports to match the preferred spec that we've _mostly_ been using. For example:
```
import (
"context"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/agentsdk"
"github.com/coder/serpent"
)
```
3 groups: standard library, 3rd partly libs, Coder libs.
This PR makes the change across the codebase. The PR in the stack above modifies our formatting to maintain this state of affairs, and is a separate PR so it's possible to review that one in detail.
This PR adds a command to view the provisioner and agent logs for a
given workspace.
Note: I did investigate using the existing `cliui` methods to tail the
logs but they are tailored to a very specific use-case.
Other changes:
- Adds `Agents` to `dbfake.WorkspaceResponse`
- Adds methods to generate provisioner and agent logs in `dbgen`
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
Upgrades to slog v3 which includes a small, but backward incompatible API change to the acceptible call arguments when logging. This change allows us to verify via compile time type checking that arguments are correct and won't cause a panic, as was possible in slog v1, which this replaces (v2 was tagged but never used in coder/coder).
It also updates dependencies that also use slog and were updated.
I've left the `aibridge` dependency as a commit SHA, under the assumption that the team there (cc @pawbana @dannykopping ) will tag and update the dependency soon and on their own schedule.
Other dependencies, I pushed new tags.
fixes#21303
Update user last_seen_at when we mark them active on login. This prevents a narrow race where they can be re-marked dormant and fail to log in.
closes: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/858
Similar to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/19375, this one uses
system permissions for fetching actual user and group data.
Modifies the `workspaces_expanded` view to fetch the required data; this way it's made available to all code paths that make use of it.
Also fixes a bug in a test helper function that can result in `null` being saved to the DB for `user_acl` or `group_acl` and break tests; a defensive check constraint that prevents this is worth a PR, e.g:
`ALTER TABLE workspaces
ADD CONSTRAINT group_acl_is_object CHECK (jsonb_typeof(group_acl) = 'object');`
Also adds missing `OwnerName` in `ConvertWorkspaceRows`.
Adds `--disable-workspace-sharing` option.
Workspace sharing is disabled by not including user and group ACLs in
the workspace RBAC object, which prevents ACL-based authz.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1072
The commit also adds saving of workspace user/group ACLs in the test DB
data generator.
## Problem
Tasks currently only expose a machine-friendly name field (e.g.
`task-python-debug-a1b2`), but this value is primarily an identifier
rather than a clean, descriptive label. We need a separate
display-friendly name for use in the UI.
This PR introduces a new `display_name` field and updates the task-name
generation flow. The Claude system prompt was updated to return valid
JSON with both `name` and `display_name`. The name generation logic
follows a fallback chain (Anthropic > prompt sanitization > random
fallback). To make task names more closely resemble their display names,
the legacy `task-` prefix has been removed. For context, PR
https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/20834 introduced a small Task icon
to the workspace list to help identify workspaces associated to tasks.
## Changes
- Database migration: Added `display_name` column to tasks table
- Updated system prompt to generate both task name and display name as
valid JSON
- Task name generation now follows a fallback chain: Anthropic > prompt
sanitization > random fallback
- Removed `task-` prefix from task names to allow more descriptive names
- Note: PR https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/20834 adds a Task icon to
workspaces in the workspace list to distinguish task-created workspaces
**Note:** UI changes will be addressed in a follow-up PR
Related to: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/20801
This PR uses the same sha256 hashing technique as we use for APIKeys. So
now all randomly generated secrets will be hashed with sha256 for
consistency.
This is a breaking change for the oauth tokens. Since oauth is only
allowed for dev builds and experimental, this is ok.
This change updates the `task_workspace_apps` table structure for
improved linking to workspace builds and adds queries to manage tasks
and a view to expose task status.
Updates coder/internal#948
Supersedes coder/coder#20212
Supersedes coder/coder#19773
# Add API key allow_list for resource-scoped tokens
This PR adds support for API key allow lists, enabling tokens to be scoped to specific resources. The implementation:
1. Adds a new `allow_list` field to the `CreateTokenRequest` struct, allowing clients to specify resource-specific scopes when creating API tokens
2. Implements `APIAllowListTarget` type to represent resource targets in the format `<type>:<id>` with support for wildcards
3. Adds validation and normalization logic for allow lists to handle wildcards and deduplication
4. Integrates with RBAC by creating an `APIKeyEffectiveScope` that merges API key scopes with allow list restrictions
5. Updates API documentation and TypeScript types to reflect the new functionality
This feature enables creating tokens that are limited to specific resources (like workspaces or templates) by ID, making it possible to create more granular API tokens with limited access.
## Description
Send a notification to the workspace owner when an AI task’s app state
becomes `Working` or `Idle`.
An AI task is identified by a workspace build with `HasAITask = true`
and `AITaskSidebarAppID` matching the agent app’s ID.
## Changes
* Add `TemplateTaskWorking` notification template.
* Add `TemplateTaskIdle` notification template.
* Add `GetLatestWorkspaceAppStatusesByAppID` SQL query to get the
workspace app statuses ordered by latest first.
* Update `PATCH /workspaceagents/me/app-status` to enqueue:
* `TemplateTaskWorking` when state transitions to `working`
* `TemplateTaskIdle` when state transitions to `idle`
* Notification labels include:
* `task`: task initial prompt
* `workspace`: workspace name
* Notification dedupe: include a minute-bucketed timestamp (UTC
truncated to the minute) in the enqueue data to allow identical content
to resend within the same day (but not more than once per minute).
Closes: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/19776
# Canonicalize API Key Scopes
This PR introduces canonical API key scopes with a `coder:` namespace prefix to avoid collisions with low-level resource:action names. It:
1. Renames special API key scopes in the database:
- `all` → `coder:all`
- `application_connect` → `coder:application_connect`
2. Adds support for a new `scopes` field in the API key creation request, allowing multiple scopes to be specified while maintaining backward compatibility with the singular `scope` field.
3. Updates the API documentation to reflect these changes, including the new endpoint for listing public API key scopes.
4. Ensures backward compatibility by mapping between legacy and canonical scope names in relevant code paths.
* provisionerdserver: Expires prebuild user token for workspace, if it
exists, when regenerating session token.
* dbauthz: disallow prebuilds user from creating api keys
* dbpurge: added functionality to expire stale api keys owned by the
prebuilds user
This pull request introduces support for external workspace management, allowing users to register and manage workspaces that are provisioned and managed outside of the Coder.
* Added has_external_agent field to workspace builds and template versions
## Description
This PR ensures that prebuilt workspaces are properly excluded from the
lifecycle executor and treated as a separate class of workspaces, fully
managed by the prebuild reconciliation loop.
It introduces two lifecycle guarantees:
* When a prebuilt workspace is created (i.e., when the workspace build
completes), all lifecycle-related fields are unset, ensuring the
workspace does not participate in TTL, autostop, autostart, dormancy, or
auto-deletion logic.
* When a prebuilt workspace is claimed, it transitions into a regular
user workspace. At this point, all lifecycle fields are correctly
populated according to template-level configurations, allowing the
workspace to be managed by the lifecycle executor as expected.
## Changes
* Prebuilt workspaces now have all lifecycle-relevant fields unset
during creation
* When a prebuild is claimed:
* Lifecycle fields are set based on template and workspace level
configurations. This ensures a clean transition into the standard
workspace lifecycle flow.
* Updated lifecycle-related SQL update queries to explicitly exclude
prebuilt workspaces.
## Relates
Related issue: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/18898
To reduce the scope of this PR and make the review process more
manageable, the original implementation has been split into the
following focused PRs:
* https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/19259
* https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/19263
* https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/19264
* https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/19265
These PRs should be considered in conjunction with this one to
understand the complete set of lifecycle separation changes for prebuilt
workspaces.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/780
## Summary of changes:
- added `user_secrets` table
- `user_secrets` table contains `env_name` and `file_path` fields which
are not used at the moment, but will be used in later PRs
- `user_secrets` table doesn't contain `value_key_id`, I will add it in
a separate migration in a dbcrypt PR
- on one hand I don't want to add fields which are not used (because
it's a risk smth may change in implementation later), on the other hand
I don't want to add too many migrations for user secrets table
- added unique sql indexes
- added sql queries for CRUD operations on user-secrets
- introduced new `ResourceUserSecret` resource
- basic unit-tests for CRUD ops and authorization behavior
- Role updates:
- owner:
- remove `ResourceUserSecret` from site-wide perms
- add `ResourceUserSecret` to user-wide perms
- orgAdmin
- remove `ResourceUserSecret` from org-wide perms; seems it's not
strictly required, because `ResourceUserSecret` is not tied to
organization in dbauthz wrappers?
- memberRole
- no need to change memberRole because it implicitly has access to
user-secrets thanks to the `allPermsExcept`
- is it enough changes to roles?
Main questions:
- [ ] We will have 2 migrations for user-secrets:
- initial migration (in current PR)
- adding `value_key_id` in dbcrypt PR
- is this approach reasonable?
- [ ] Are changes to roles's permissions are correct?
- [ ] Are changes in roles_test.go are correct?
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
This PR sets a constraint of 1MB on the provisioner job logs written to
the database. This is consistent with the constraint we place on
workspace agent logs:
https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/4ac6be6d835dc36c242e35a26b584b784040bf28/coderd/database/dump.sql#L2030
It also adds a message printed to the front end about the provisioner
log overflow, and updates the message printed to the front end when
workspace startup logs exceed the max, as it was causing some customers
to think their startup script had failed to run.
Solves https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/15096
This is a slight rework/refactor of the earlier PRs from @dannykopping
and @Emyrk:
- https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/15669
- https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/15684
- https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/17596
Rather than having a per-app CORS behaviour setting and additionally a
template level setting for ports, this PR adds a single template level
CORS behaviour setting that is then used by all apps/ports for
workspaces created from that template.
The main changes are in `proxy.go` and `request.go` to:
a) get the CORS behaviour setting from the template
b) have `HandleSubdomain` bypass the CORS middleware handler if the
selected behaviour is `passthru`
c) in `proxyWorkspaceApp`, do not modify the response if the selected
behaviour is `passthru`
<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit
* **New Features**
* Added support for configuring CORS behavior ("simple" or "passthru")
at the template level for all shared ports.
* Introduced a new "CORS Behavior" setting in the template creation and
settings forms.
* API endpoints and responses now include the optional `cors_behavior`
property for templates.
* Workspace apps and proxy now honor the specified CORS behavior,
enabling conditional CORS middleware application.
* Enhanced workspace app tests with comprehensive scenarios covering
CORS behaviors and authentication states.
* **Bug Fixes**
* None.
* **Documentation**
* Updated API and admin documentation to describe the new
`cors_behavior` property and its usage.
* Added examples and schema references for CORS behavior in relevant API
docs.
* **Tests**
* Extended automated tests to cover different CORS behavior scenarios
for templates and workspace apps.
* **Chores**
* Updated audit logging to track changes to the `cors_behavior` field on
templates.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
---------
Signed-off-by: Callum Styan <callumstyan@gmail.com>
## Description
This PR adds support for `description` and `icon` fields to
`template_version_presets`. These fields will allow displaying richer
information for presets in the UI, improving the user experience when
creating a workspace.
Both fields are optional, non-nullable, and default to empty strings.
## Changes
* Database migration with the addition of `description VARCHAR(128)` and
`icon VARCHAR(256)` columns to the `template_version_presets` table.
* Updated the `CreateWorkspacePageView` in the UI
Note: UI changes will be addressed in a separate PR
The main goal of this PR is to remove Workspace Apps and Workspace Agents from the auto-generated audit log documentation, that incorrectly claims they are audited resources (no longer true with the addition of the connection log).
Though I believe we haven't touched any codepaths for returning audit logs, this PR also adds a test that ensures we continue to return *existing* connection, disconnect and open events correctly from the audit log API.
### Breaking Change (changelog note):
> User connections to workspaces, and the opening of workspace apps or ports will no longer create entries in the audit log. Those events will now be included in the 'Connection Log'.
Please see the 'Connection Log' page in the dashboard, and the Connection Log [documentation](https://coder.com/docs/admin/monitoring/connection-logs) for details. Those with permission to view the Audit Log will also be able to view the Connection Log. The new Connection Log has the same licensing restrictions as the Audit Log, and requires a Premium Coder deployment.
### Context
This is the first PR of a few for moving connection events out of the audit log, and into a new database table and web UI page called the 'Connection Log'.
This PR:
- Creates the new table
- Adds and tests queries for inserting and reading, including reading with an RBAC filter.
- Implements the corresponding RBAC changes, such that anyone who can view the audit log can read from the table
- Implements, under the enterprise package, a `ConnectionLogger` abstraction to replace the `Auditor` abstraction for these logs. (No-op'd in AGPL, like the `Auditor`)
- Routes SSH connection and Workspace App events into the new `ConnectionLogger`
- Updates all existing tests to check the values of the `ConnectionLogger` instead of the `Auditor`.
Future PRs:
- Add filtering to the query
- Add an enterprise endpoint to query the new table
- Write a query to delete old events from the audit log, call it from dbpurge.
- Implement a table in the Web UI for viewing connection logs.
> [!NOTE]
> The PRs in this stack obviously won't be (completely) atomic. Whilst they'll each pass CI, the stack is designed to be merged all at once. I'm splitting them up for the sake of those reviewing, and so changes can be reviewed as early as possible. Despite this, it's really hard to make this PR any smaller than it already is. I'll be keeping it in draft until it's actually ready to merge.
## Description
This PR updates the lifecycle executor to explicitly exclude prebuilt
workspaces from being considered for lifecycle operations such as
`autostart`, `autostop`, `dormancy`, `default TTL` and `failure TTL`.
Prebuilt workspaces (i.e., those owned by the prebuild system user) are
handled separately by the prebuild reconciliation loop. Including them
in the lifecycle executor could lead to unintended behavior such as
incorrect scheduling or state transitions.
## Changes
* Updated the lifecycle executor query
`GetWorkspacesEligibleForTransition` to exclude workspaces with
`owner_id = 'c42fdf75-3097-471c-8c33-fb52454d81c0'` (prebuilds).
* Added tests to verify prebuilt workspaces are not considered in:
* Autostop
* Autostart
* Default TTL
* Dormancy
* Failure TTL
Fixes: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/18740
Related to: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/18658
# Implement OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591/7592)
This PR implements OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration according to RFC 7591 and Client Configuration Management according to RFC 7592. These standards allow OAuth2 clients to register themselves programmatically with Coder as an authorization server.
Key changes include:
1. Added database schema extensions to support RFC 7591/7592 fields in the `oauth2_provider_apps` table
2. Implemented `/oauth2/register` endpoint for dynamic client registration (RFC 7591)
3. Added client configuration management endpoints (RFC 7592):
- GET/PUT/DELETE `/oauth2/clients/{client_id}`
- Registration access token validation middleware
4. Added comprehensive validation for OAuth2 client metadata:
- URI validation with support for custom schemes for native apps
- Grant type and response type validation
- Token endpoint authentication method validation
5. Enhanced developer documentation with:
- RFC compliance guidelines
- Testing best practices to avoid race conditions
- Systematic debugging approaches for OAuth2 implementations
The implementation follows security best practices from the RFCs, including proper token handling, secure defaults, and appropriate error responses. This enables third-party applications to integrate with Coder's OAuth2 provider capabilities programmatically.
This pull request implements RFC 8707, Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8707), to enhance the security of our OAuth 2.0 provider.
This change enables proper audience validation and binds access tokens to their intended resource, which is crucial
for preventing token misuse in multi-tenant environments or deployments with multiple resource servers.
## Key Changes:
* Resource Parameter Support: Adds support for the resource parameter in both the authorization (`/oauth2/authorize`) and token (`/oauth2/token`) endpoints, allowing clients to specify the intended resource server.
* Audience Validation: Implements server-side validation to ensure that the resource parameter provided during the token exchange matches the one from the authorization request.
* API Middleware Enforcement: Introduces a new validation step in the API authentication middleware (`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go`) to verify that the audience of the access token matches the resource server being accessed.
* Database Schema Updates:
* Adds a `resource_uri` column to the `oauth2_provider_app_codes` table to store the resource requested during authorization.
* Adds an `audience` column to the `oauth2_provider_app_tokens` table to bind the issued token to a specific audience.
* Enhanced PKCE: Includes a minor enhancement to the PKCE implementation to protect against timing attacks.
* Comprehensive Testing: Adds extensive new tests to `coderd/oauth2_test.go` to cover various RFC 8707 scenarios, including valid flows, mismatched resources, and refresh token validation.
## How it Works:
1. An OAuth2 client specifies the target resource (e.g., https://coder.example.com) using the resource parameter in the authorization request.
2. The authorization server stores this resource URI with the authorization code.
3. During the token exchange, the server validates that the client provides the same resource parameter.
4. The server issues an access token with an audience claim set to the validated resource URI.
5. When the client uses the access token to call an API endpoint, the middleware verifies that the token's audience matches the URL of the Coder deployment, rejecting any tokens intended for a different resource.
This ensures that a token issued for one Coder deployment cannot be used to access another, significantly strengthening our authentication security.
---
Change-Id: I3924cb2139e837e3ac0b0bd40a5aeb59637ebc1b
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
## Summary
This PR implements critical MCP OAuth2 compliance features for Coder's authorization server, adding PKCE support, resource parameter handling, and OAuth2 server metadata discovery. This brings Coder's OAuth2 implementation significantly closer to production readiness for MCP (Model Context Protocol)
integrations.
## What's Added
### OAuth2 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414)
- Add `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` endpoint for automatic client discovery
- Returns standardized metadata including supported grant types, response types, and PKCE methods
- Essential for MCP client compatibility and OAuth2 standards compliance
### PKCE Support (RFC 7636)
- Implement Proof Key for Code Exchange with S256 challenge method
- Add `code_challenge` and `code_challenge_method` parameters to authorization flow
- Add `code_verifier` validation in token exchange
- Provides enhanced security for public clients (mobile apps, CLIs)
### Resource Parameter Support (RFC 8707)
- Add `resource` parameter to authorization and token endpoints
- Store resource URI and bind tokens to specific audiences
- Critical for MCP's resource-bound token model
### Enhanced OAuth2 Error Handling
- Add OAuth2-compliant error responses with proper error codes
- Use standard error format: `{"error": "code", "error_description": "details"}`
- Improve error consistency across OAuth2 endpoints
### Authorization UI Improvements
- Fix authorization flow to use POST-based consent instead of GET redirects
- Remove dependency on referer headers for security decisions
- Improve CSRF protection with proper state parameter validation
## Why This Matters
**For MCP Integration:** MCP requires OAuth2 authorization servers to support PKCE, resource parameters, and metadata discovery. Without these features, MCP clients cannot securely authenticate with Coder.
**For Security:** PKCE prevents authorization code interception attacks, especially critical for public clients. Resource binding ensures tokens are only valid for intended services.
**For Standards Compliance:** These are widely adopted OAuth2 extensions that improve interoperability with modern OAuth2 clients.
## Database Changes
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `resource_uri` to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `audience` field to `oauth2_provider_app_tokens` for resource binding
- **Audit Updates:** New OAuth2 fields properly tracked in audit system
- **Backward Compatibility:** All changes maintain compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows
## Test Coverage
- Comprehensive PKCE test suite in `coderd/identityprovider/pkce_test.go`
- OAuth2 metadata endpoint tests in `coderd/oauth2_metadata_test.go`
- Integration tests covering PKCE + resource parameter combinations
- Negative tests for invalid PKCE verifiers and malformed requests
## Testing Instructions
```bash
# Run the comprehensive OAuth2 test suite
./scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh
Manual Testing with Interactive Server
# Start Coder in development mode
./scripts/develop.sh
# In another terminal, set up test app and run interactive flow
eval $(./scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh)
./scripts/oauth2/test-manual-flow.sh
# Opens browser with OAuth2 flow, handles callback automatically
# Clean up when done
./scripts/oauth2/cleanup-test-app.sh
Individual Component Testing
# Test metadata endpoint
curl -s http://localhost:3000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | jq .
# Test PKCE generation
./scripts/oauth2/generate-pkce.sh
# Run specific test suites
go test -v ./coderd/identityprovider -run TestVerifyPKCE
go test -v ./coderd -run TestOAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata
```
### Breaking Changes
None. All changes maintain backward compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows.
---
Change-Id: Ifbd0d9a543d545f9f56ecaa77ff2238542ff954a
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
George K