## Summary
Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing
`coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1
compliance.
### Security Fixes
| Fix | Description | Commits |
|-----|-------------|---------|
| **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the
authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e`
|
| **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from
being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` +
`X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` |
| **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full
string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` |
| **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code
in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) |
`50569b9`, `d7ca315` |
| **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for
`response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at
token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` |
| **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns
`unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow)
| `d7ca315`, `91b8863` |
### Changes by File
**`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce
CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent
form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code
theft.
**`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors
'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage`
(consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI
tasks).
**`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix
matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact
matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path,
and query.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement:
`code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a
conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can
reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates
`response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for
unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri`
with the auth code when explicitly provided.
**`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now
unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If
the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it
matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`.
Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`.
**`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant
and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse
`response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error rather than failing at parameter validation.
**`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text`
column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`.
### Design Decisions
**`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required
`state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to
avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored
when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in.
**`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()`
would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the
authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow.
**CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set
only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global
CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks
([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does
not regress that.
### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting on dynamic client registration
---
<details>
<summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary>
# Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance
## Context & Why
Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover
via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security
fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements.
The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps.
## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`)
| Fix | Status | Commits |
|-----|--------|---------|
| Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` | ✅ Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` |
| CSRF token in consent form HTML | ✅ Done | `b94a64e` |
| `state_hash` column + storage | ✅ Done (hash stored, but state still
optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` |
| Tests for CSRF + state hash | ✅ Done | `e4119b5` |
## Remaining Work
### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED)
> **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state`
parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via
`hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients
are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations
that omit state.
**Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in
`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`:
```go
// BEFORE (current on branch)
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge")
// AFTER
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily.
### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching
Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching:
```go
// CURRENT — prefix match
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
```
OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to:
```go
// AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1)
if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path {
```
**File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method**
Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must
exactly match".
**Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at
the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3):
1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add
`redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to
include `redirect_uri`
3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store
`params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code
4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from
DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored
value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals,
callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must
compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the
app's callback URL.
<details>
<summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary>
Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors
(attacker can't use a sub-path).
Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an
attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different
redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC
6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1.
</details>
### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page
The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is
the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent
framing.
**File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)**
Before writing the response, add:
```go
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
// Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
// clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
...
```
Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers,
X-Frame-Options for legacy).
### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE
Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during
authorization (`tokens.go:258`):
```go
// CURRENT — conditional check
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
// verify PKCE
}
```
OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to:
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"`
to required params:
```go
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```
**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE
verification unconditional:
```go
// AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1)
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
// Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
// with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in
// depth.
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
```
**File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove
`OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly
in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the
handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should
either:
- (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with
`unsupported_response_type`, OR
- (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects
`response_type=token`
Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible:
```go
// In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params:
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
"Only response_type=code is supported")
return
}
```
### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings
`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query
parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used
internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before
removing.
**Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a
**separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document
the finding.
### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code`
and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant
(`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section
above.
### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation
✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a
refresh token is used.
## Migration Plan
All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the
branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add:
- `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420.
## Implementation Order
1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps)
2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays
optional)
3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri
4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject
`response_type=token`
5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in
`authorize.go`
6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes
7. **`make gen`** after DB changes
## Out of Scope (separate PRs)
- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration
</details>
---
_Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
Relates to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/21676
* Replaces all existing usages of `httpapi.Heartbeat` with `httpapi.HeartbeatClose`
* Removes `httpapi.HeartbeatClose`
Add comprehensive OAuth2 enum types to codersdk following RFC specifications:
- OAuth2ProviderGrantType (RFC 6749)
- OAuth2ProviderResponseType (RFC 6749)
- OAuth2TokenEndpointAuthMethod (RFC 7591)
- OAuth2PKCECodeChallengeMethod (RFC 7636)
- OAuth2TokenType (RFC 6749, RFC 9449)
- OAuth2RevocationTokenTypeHint (RFC 7009)
- OAuth2ErrorCode (RFC 6749, RFC 7009, RFC 8707)
Add OAuth2TokenRequest, OAuth2TokenResponse, OAuth2TokenRevocationRequest,
and OAuth2Error structs to the SDK. Update OAuth2ClientRegistrationRequest,
OAuth2ClientRegistrationResponse, OAuth2ClientConfiguration, and
OAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata to use typed enums instead of raw strings.
This makes codersdk the single source of truth for OAuth2 types, eliminating
duplication between SDK and server-side structs.
Closes#21476
Fixes all our Go file imports to match the preferred spec that we've _mostly_ been using. For example:
```
import (
"context"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/agentsdk"
"github.com/coder/serpent"
)
```
3 groups: standard library, 3rd partly libs, Coder libs.
This PR makes the change across the codebase. The PR in the stack above modifies our formatting to maintain this state of affairs, and is a separate PR so it's possible to review that one in detail.
Upgrades to slog v3 which includes a small, but backward incompatible API change to the acceptible call arguments when logging. This change allows us to verify via compile time type checking that arguments are correct and won't cause a panic, as was possible in slog v1, which this replaces (v2 was tagged but never used in coder/coder).
It also updates dependencies that also use slog and were updated.
I've left the `aibridge` dependency as a commit SHA, under the assumption that the team there (cc @pawbana @dannykopping ) will tag and update the dependency soon and on their own schedule.
Other dependencies, I pushed new tags.
There is currently an issue with subdomain workspace apps on workspace
proxies, where if you have a workspace proxy wildcard nested beneath the
primary wildcard, cookies from the primary may be sent to the server
before cookies from the proxy specifically.
Currently:
1. Use a subdomain app via the primary proxy `*.coder.corp.com`
a. Client sends no cookies
a. Server does token smuggling flow
a. Server sets a cookie `coder_subdomain_app_session_token` on
`*.coder.corp.com`
a. Server redirects client to reload the page
a. Request should succeed as usual
1. Wait until the primary proxy's session token cookie has expired in
the database (or make it invalid yourself)
1. Use a subdomain app via a separate proxy `*.sydney.coder.corp.com`
a. Client sends `coder_subdomain_app_session_token` cookie from
`*.coder.corp.com`
a. Server validates supplied cookie, it fails because it's expired
a. Server does token smuggling flow
a. Server sets a cookie `coder_subdomain_app_session_token` on
`*.sydney.coder.corp.com`
a. Server redirects client to reload page
a. Client sends BOTH cookies.
a. The server will only process the first cookie it receives, so if the
expired cookie for the primary proxy is sent first the request will end
up in a permanent loop on step b.
The fix is to append `_{hash(wildcard_access_url)}` to the subdomain
cookies as we cannot control browser behavior further. This avoids the
conflict as each proxy will only read it's specific cookie.
Follows similarly to the bash tool (and some code to connect to an agent
was extracted from it).
There are two main parts: a new agent endpoint, and then a new MCP tool
that consumes that endpoint.
Coder Tasks requires us to create a workspace, but we want to be able to
return a `codersdk.Task` instead of a `codersdk.Workspace`. This
requires untangling `createWorkspace` from directly writing to
`http.ResponseWriter`.
## Summary
In this pull request we're adding support for additional filtering
options to the `provisioners list` CLI command and the
`/provisionerdaemons` API endpoint.
Resolves: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/18783
### Changes
#### Added CLI Options
- `--show-offline`: When this option is provided, all provisioner
daemons will be returned. This means that when `--show-offline` is not
provided only `idle` and `busy` provisioner daemons will be returned.
- `--status=<list_of_statuses>`: When this option is provided with a
comma-separated list of valid statuses (`idle`, `busy`, or `offline`)
only provisioner daemons that have these statuses will be returned.
- `--max-age=<duration>`: When this option is provided with a valid
duration value (e.g., `24h`, `30s`) only provisioner daemons with a
`last_seen_at` timestamp within the provided max age will be returned.
#### Query Params
- `?offline=true`: Include offline provisioner daemons in the results.
Offline provisioner daemons will be excluded if `?offline=false` or if
offline is not provided.
- `?status=<list_of_statuses>`: Include provisioner daemons with the
specified statuses.
- `?max_age=<duration>`: Include provisioner daemons with a
`last_seen_at` timestamp within the max age duration.
#### Frontend
- Since offline provisioners will not be returned by default anymore
(`--show-offline` has to be provided to see them), a checkbox was added
to the provisioners list page to allow for offline provisioners to be
displayed
- A revamp of the provisioners page will be done in:
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/17156, this checkbox change was
just added to maintain currently functionality with the backend updates
Current provisioners page (without checkbox)
<img width="1329" height="574" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-20 at 10 51
00 AM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77b73650-0b62-44f0-a77f-acbe5710809f"
/>
Provisioners page with checkbox (unchecked)
<img width="1314" height="626" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-20 at 10 48
40 AM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ba164ad-6d3f-417b-bd39-338c0161b145"
/>
Provisioner page with checkbox (checked) and URL updated with query
parameters
<img width="1306" height="597" alt="Screenshot 2025-08-20 at 10 50
14 AM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e78d0986-bbf8-491b-9d56-b682973237a0"
/>
### Show Offline vs Offline Status
To list offline provisioner daemons, users can either:
1. Include the `--show-offline` option
OR
2. Include `offline` in the list of values provided to the `--status`
option
## Summary
This PR implements critical MCP OAuth2 compliance features for Coder's authorization server, adding PKCE support, resource parameter handling, and OAuth2 server metadata discovery. This brings Coder's OAuth2 implementation significantly closer to production readiness for MCP (Model Context Protocol)
integrations.
## What's Added
### OAuth2 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414)
- Add `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` endpoint for automatic client discovery
- Returns standardized metadata including supported grant types, response types, and PKCE methods
- Essential for MCP client compatibility and OAuth2 standards compliance
### PKCE Support (RFC 7636)
- Implement Proof Key for Code Exchange with S256 challenge method
- Add `code_challenge` and `code_challenge_method` parameters to authorization flow
- Add `code_verifier` validation in token exchange
- Provides enhanced security for public clients (mobile apps, CLIs)
### Resource Parameter Support (RFC 8707)
- Add `resource` parameter to authorization and token endpoints
- Store resource URI and bind tokens to specific audiences
- Critical for MCP's resource-bound token model
### Enhanced OAuth2 Error Handling
- Add OAuth2-compliant error responses with proper error codes
- Use standard error format: `{"error": "code", "error_description": "details"}`
- Improve error consistency across OAuth2 endpoints
### Authorization UI Improvements
- Fix authorization flow to use POST-based consent instead of GET redirects
- Remove dependency on referer headers for security decisions
- Improve CSRF protection with proper state parameter validation
## Why This Matters
**For MCP Integration:** MCP requires OAuth2 authorization servers to support PKCE, resource parameters, and metadata discovery. Without these features, MCP clients cannot securely authenticate with Coder.
**For Security:** PKCE prevents authorization code interception attacks, especially critical for public clients. Resource binding ensures tokens are only valid for intended services.
**For Standards Compliance:** These are widely adopted OAuth2 extensions that improve interoperability with modern OAuth2 clients.
## Database Changes
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `resource_uri` to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `audience` field to `oauth2_provider_app_tokens` for resource binding
- **Audit Updates:** New OAuth2 fields properly tracked in audit system
- **Backward Compatibility:** All changes maintain compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows
## Test Coverage
- Comprehensive PKCE test suite in `coderd/identityprovider/pkce_test.go`
- OAuth2 metadata endpoint tests in `coderd/oauth2_metadata_test.go`
- Integration tests covering PKCE + resource parameter combinations
- Negative tests for invalid PKCE verifiers and malformed requests
## Testing Instructions
```bash
# Run the comprehensive OAuth2 test suite
./scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh
Manual Testing with Interactive Server
# Start Coder in development mode
./scripts/develop.sh
# In another terminal, set up test app and run interactive flow
eval $(./scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh)
./scripts/oauth2/test-manual-flow.sh
# Opens browser with OAuth2 flow, handles callback automatically
# Clean up when done
./scripts/oauth2/cleanup-test-app.sh
Individual Component Testing
# Test metadata endpoint
curl -s http://localhost:3000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | jq .
# Test PKCE generation
./scripts/oauth2/generate-pkce.sh
# Run specific test suites
go test -v ./coderd/identityprovider -run TestVerifyPKCE
go test -v ./coderd -run TestOAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata
```
### Breaking Changes
None. All changes maintain backward compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows.
---
Change-Id: Ifbd0d9a543d545f9f56ecaa77ff2238542ff954a
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
`BuildError` response from `wsbuilder` does not support rich errors from validation. Changed this to use the `Validations` block of codersdk responses to return all errors for invalid parameters.
Closes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16775
## Changes made
- Added `OneWayWebSocket` function that establishes WebSocket
connections that don't allow client-to-server communication
- Added tests for the new function
- Updated API endpoints to make new WS-based endpoints, and mark
previous SSE-based endpoints as deprecated
- Updated existing SSE handlers to use the same core logic as the new WS
handlers
## Notes
- Frontend changes handled via #16855
- Update go.mod to use Go 1.24.1
- Update GitHub Actions setup-go action to use Go 1.24.1
- Fix linting issues with golangci-lint by:
- Updating to golangci-lint v1.57.1 (more compatible with Go 1.24.1)
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
Add the `--github-user-id` option to `coder users list`, which makes the
command only return users with a matching GitHub user id. This will
enable https://github.com/coder/start-workspace-action to find a Coder
user that corresponds to a GitHub user requesting to start a workspace.
Using negative permissions, this role prevents a user's ability to
create & delete a workspace within a given organization.
Workspaces are uniquely owned by an org and a user, so the org has to
supercede the user permission with a negative permission.
# Use case
Organizations must be able to restrict a member's ability to create a
workspace. This permission is implicitly granted (see
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16546#issuecomment-2655437860).
To revoke this permission, the solution chosen was to use negative
permissions in a built in role called `WorkspaceCreationBan`.
# Rational
Using negative permissions is new territory, and not ideal. However,
workspaces are in a unique position.
Workspaces have 2 owners. The organization and the user. To prevent
users from creating a workspace in another organization, an [implied
negative
permission](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/policy.rego#L172-L192)
is used. So the truth table looks like: _how to read this table
[here](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/README.md#roles)_
| Role (example) | Site | Org | User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|------|--------|
| non-org-member | \_ | N | YN\_ | N |
| user | \_ | \_ | Y | Y |
| WorkspaceBan | \_ | N | Y | Y |
| unauthenticated | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
This new role, `WorkspaceCreationBan` is the same truth table condition
as if the user was not a member of the organization (when doing a
workspace create/delete). So this behavior **is not entirely new**.
<details>
<summary>How to do it without a negative permission</summary>
The alternate approach would be to remove the implied permission, and
grant it via and organization role. However this would add new behavior
that an organizational role has the ability to grant a user permissions
on their own resources?
It does not make sense for an org role to prevent user from changing
their profile information for example. So the only option is to create a
new truth table column for resources that are owned by both an
organization and a user.
| Role (example) | Site | Org |User+Org| User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|--------|------|--------|
| non-org-member | \_ | N | \_ | \_ | N |
| user | \_ | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
| WorkspaceAllow | \_ | \_ | Y | \_ | Y |
| unauthenticated | \_ | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
Now a user has no opinion on if they can create a workspace, which feels
a little wrong. A user should have the authority over what is theres.
There is fundamental _philosophical_ question of "Who does a workspace
belong to?". The user has some set of autonomy, yet it is the
organization that controls it's existence. A head scratcher 🤔
</details>
## Will we need more negative built in roles?
There are few resources that have shared ownership. Only
`ResourceOrganizationMember` and `ResourceGroupMember`. Since negative
permissions is intended to revoke access to a shared resource, then
**no.** **This is the only one we need**.
Classic resources like `ResourceTemplate` are entirely controlled by the
Organization permissions. And resources entirely in the user control
(like user profile) are only controlled by `User` permissions.
![Uploading Screenshot 2025-02-26 at 22.26.52.png…]()
---------
Co-authored-by: Jaayden Halko <jaayden.halko@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: ケイラ <mckayla@hey.com>
Migrates us to `coder/websocket` v1.8.12 rather than `nhooyr/websocket` on an older version.
Works around https://github.com/coder/websocket/issues/504 by adding an explicit test for `xerrors.Is(err, io.EOF)` where we were previously getting `io.EOF` from the netConn.
* chore: implement deleting custom roles
* add trigger to delete role from organization members on delete
* chore: add comments to explain populated field
Fixes#13910
Adds testutil.GetRandomName that replaces namesgenerator.GetRandomName but instead appends a monotonically increasing integer instead of a number between 1 and 10.
* Updates OIDC and GitHub OAuth login to fetch set name from relevant claim fields
* Adds CODER_OIDC_NAME_FIELD as configurable source of user name claim
* Adds httpapi function to normalize a username such that it will pass validation
* Adds firstName / lastName fields to dev OIDC setup
This more closely aligns with GitHub's label search style. Actual search params need to be converted to allow this format, by default they will throw an error if they do not support listing.
- Adds a new query BatchUpdateLastUsedAt
- Adds calls to BatchUpdateLastUsedAt in app stats handler upon flush
- Passes a stats flush channel to apptest setup scaffolding and updates unit tests to assert modifications to LastUsedAt.
The `SingleTailnet` behavior only checked to see if the `MultiAgent` was
closed, but the websocket error was not being propogated into the
`MultiAgent`, causing it to never be swapped for a new working one.
Fixes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/11401
Before:
```
Coder Workspace Proxy v0.0.0-devel+85ff030 - Your Self-Hosted Remote Development Platform
Started HTTP listener at http://0.0.0.0:3001
View the Web UI: http://127.0.0.1:3001
==> Logs will stream in below (press ctrl+c to gracefully exit):
2024-01-04 20:11:56.376 [warn] net.workspace-proxy.servertailnet: broadcast server node to agents ...
error= write message:
github.com/coder/coder/v2/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk.(*remoteMultiAgentHandler).writeJSON
/home/coder/coder/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk/wsproxysdk.go:524
- failed to write msg: WebSocket closed: failed to read frame header: EOF
```
After:
```
Coder Workspace Proxy v0.0.0-devel+12f1878 - Your Self-Hosted Remote Development Platform
Started HTTP listener at http://0.0.0.0:3001
View the Web UI: http://127.0.0.1:3001
==> Logs will stream in below (press ctrl+c to gracefully exit):
2024-01-04 20:26:38.545 [warn] net.workspace-proxy.servertailnet: multiagent closed, reinitializing
2024-01-04 20:26:38.546 [erro] net.workspace-proxy.servertailnet: reinit multi agent ...
error= dial coordinate websocket:
github.com/coder/coder/v2/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk.(*Client).DialCoordinator
/home/coder/coder/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk/wsproxysdk.go:454
- failed to WebSocket dial: failed to send handshake request: Get "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/workspaceproxies/me/coordinate": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:3000: connect: connection refused
2024-01-04 20:26:38.587 [erro] net.workspace-proxy.servertailnet: reinit multi agent ...
error= dial coordinate websocket:
github.com/coder/coder/v2/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk.(*Client).DialCoordinator
/home/coder/coder/enterprise/wsproxy/wsproxysdk/wsproxysdk.go:454
- failed to WebSocket dial: failed to send handshake request: Get "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/workspaceproxies/me/coordinate": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:3000: connect: connection refusedhandshake request: Get "http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/workspaceproxies/me/coordinate": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:3000: connect: connection refused
2024-01-04 20:26:40.446 [info] net.workspace-proxy.servertailnet: successfully reinitialized multiagent agents=0 took=1.900892615s
```
* Add database tables for OAuth2 applications
These are applications that will be able to use OAuth2 to get an API key
from Coder.
* Add endpoints for managing OAuth2 applications
These let you add, update, and remove OAuth2 applications.
* Add frontend for managing OAuth2 applications
Thomas Kosiewski