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b776a14b46
## Summary Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing `coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1 compliance. ### Security Fixes | Fix | Description | Commits | |-----|-------------|---------| | **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` | | **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` + `X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` | | **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` | | **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) | `50569b9`, `d7ca315` | | **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for `response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` | | **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns `unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow) | `d7ca315`, `91b8863` | ### Changes by File **`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code theft. **`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage` (consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI tasks). **`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path, and query. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement: `code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates `response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri` with the auth code when explicitly provided. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`. Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`. **`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse `response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type` error rather than failing at parameter validation. **`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`. ### Design Decisions **`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required `state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in. **`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()` would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type` error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow. **CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks ([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does not regress that. ### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs) - Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit) - Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens - Rate limiting on dynamic client registration --- <details> <summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary> # Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance ## Context & Why Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements. The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps. ## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`) | Fix | Status | Commits | |-----|--------|---------| | Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` | ✅ Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` | | CSRF token in consent form HTML | ✅ Done | `b94a64e` | | `state_hash` column + storage | ✅ Done (hash stored, but state still optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` | | Tests for CSRF + state hash | ✅ Done | `e4119b5` | ## Remaining Work ### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED) > **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state` parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via `hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations that omit state. **Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`: ```go // BEFORE (current on branch) p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge") // AFTER p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge") ``` No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily. ### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching: ```go // CURRENT — prefix match if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) { ``` OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to: ```go // AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1) if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path { ``` **File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method** Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must exactly match". **Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3): 1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add `redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes` 2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to include `redirect_uri` 3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store `params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code 4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals, callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the app's callback URL. <details> <summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary> Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors (attacker can't use a sub-path). Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC 6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1. </details> ### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent framing. **File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)** Before writing the response, add: ```go func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) { rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") // Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate // clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121). rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'") rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") ... ``` Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers, X-Frame-Options for legacy). ### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during authorization (`tokens.go:258`): ```go // CURRENT — conditional check if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" { // verify PKCE } ``` OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to: **File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"` to required params: ```go p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge") ``` **File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE verification unconditional: ```go // AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1) if req.CodeVerifier == "" { return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" { // Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen // with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in // depth. return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) { return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } ``` **File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should either: - (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with `unsupported_response_type`, OR - (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects `response_type=token` Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible: ```go // In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params: if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode { httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType, "Only response_type=code is supported") return } ``` ### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings `coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before removing. **Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a **separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document the finding. ### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows ✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code` and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant (`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section above. ### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation ✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a refresh token is used. ## Migration Plan All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add: - `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes` The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420. ## Implementation Order 1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps) 2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays optional) 3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri 4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject `response_type=token` 5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in `authorize.go` 6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes 7. **`make gen`** after DB changes ## Out of Scope (separate PRs) - Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit) - Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens - Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration </details> --- _Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
166 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
166 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
package httpmw_test
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/justinas/nosurf"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpmw"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
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)
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func TestCSRFExemptList(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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cases := []struct {
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Name string
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URL string
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Exempt bool
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}{
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{
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Name: "Root",
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URL: "https://example.com",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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{
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Name: "WorkspacePage",
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URL: "https://coder.com/workspaces",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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{
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Name: "SubApp",
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URL: "https://app--dev--coder--user--apps.coder.com/",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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{
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Name: "PathApp",
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URL: "https://coder.com/@USER/test.instance/apps/app",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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{
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Name: "API",
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URL: "https://coder.com/api/v2",
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Exempt: false,
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},
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{
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Name: "APIMe",
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URL: "https://coder.com/api/v2/me",
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Exempt: false,
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},
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{
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Name: "OAuth2Authorize",
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URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize",
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Exempt: false,
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},
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{
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Name: "OAuth2AuthorizeQuery",
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URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/authorize?client_id=test",
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Exempt: false,
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},
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{
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Name: "OAuth2Tokens",
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URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/tokens",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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{
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Name: "OAuth2Register",
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URL: "https://coder.com/oauth2/register",
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Exempt: true,
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},
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}
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mw := httpmw.CSRF(codersdk.HTTPCookieConfig{})
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csrfmw := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {})).(*nosurf.CSRFHandler)
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for _, c := range cases {
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t.Run(c.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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r, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodPost, c.URL, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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r.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: codersdk.SessionTokenCookie, Value: "test"})
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exempt := csrfmw.IsExempt(r)
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require.Equal(t, c.Exempt, exempt)
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})
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}
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}
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// TestCSRFError verifies the error message returned to a user when CSRF
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// checks fail.
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//
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//nolint:bodyclose // Using httptest.Recorders
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func TestCSRFError(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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// Hard coded matching CSRF values
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const csrfCookieValue = "JXm9hOUdZctWt0ZZGAy9xiS/gxMKYOThdxjjMnMUyn4="
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const csrfHeaderValue = "KNKvagCBEHZK7ihe2t7fj6VeJ0UyTDco1yVUJE8N06oNqxLu5Zx1vRxZbgfC0mJJgeGkVjgs08mgPbcWPBkZ1A=="
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// Use a url with "/api" as the root, other routes bypass CSRF.
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const urlPath = "https://coder.com/api/v2/hello"
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var handler http.Handler = http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
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writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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})
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handler = httpmw.CSRF(codersdk.HTTPCookieConfig{})(handler)
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// Not testing the error case, just providing the example of things working
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// to base the failure tests off of.
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t.Run("ValidCSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodPost, urlPath, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: codersdk.SessionTokenCookie, Value: "session_token_value"})
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: nosurf.CookieName, Value: csrfCookieValue})
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req.Header.Add(nosurf.HeaderName, csrfHeaderValue)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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resp := rec.Result()
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode)
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})
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// The classic CSRF failure returns the generic error.
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t.Run("MissingCSRFHeader", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodPost, urlPath, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: codersdk.SessionTokenCookie, Value: "session_token_value"})
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: nosurf.CookieName, Value: csrfCookieValue})
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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resp := rec.Result()
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, resp.StatusCode)
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require.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), "Something is wrong with your CSRF token.")
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})
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// Include the CSRF cookie, but not the CSRF header value.
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// Including the 'codersdk.SessionTokenHeader' will bypass CSRF only if
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// it matches the cookie. If it does not, we expect a more helpful error.
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t.Run("MismatchedHeaderAndCookie", func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodPost, urlPath, nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: codersdk.SessionTokenCookie, Value: "session_token_value"})
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: nosurf.CookieName, Value: csrfCookieValue})
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req.Header.Add(codersdk.SessionTokenHeader, "mismatched_value")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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resp := rec.Result()
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, resp.StatusCode)
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require.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), "CSRF error encountered. Authentication via")
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})
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}
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