Files
coder/docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md
T
Thomas Kosiewski b776a14b46 fix(coderd): harden OAuth2 provider security (#22194)
## Summary

Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing
`coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1
compliance.

### Security Fixes

| Fix | Description | Commits |
|-----|-------------|---------|
| **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the
authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e`
|
| **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from
being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` +
`X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` |
| **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full
string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` |
| **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code
in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) |
`50569b9`, `d7ca315` |
| **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for
`response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at
token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` |
| **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns
`unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow)
| `d7ca315`, `91b8863` |

### Changes by File

**`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce
CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent
form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code
theft.

**`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors
'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage`
(consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI
tasks).

**`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix
matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact
matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path,
and query.

**`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement:
`code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a
conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can
reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates
`response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for
unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri`
with the auth code when explicitly provided.

**`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now
unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If
the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it
matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`.
Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`.

**`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant
and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse
`response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error rather than failing at parameter validation.

**`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text`
column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`.

### Design Decisions

**`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required
`state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to
avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored
when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in.

**`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()`
would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the
authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type`
error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow.

**CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set
only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global
CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks
([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does
not regress that.

### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs)

- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting on dynamic client registration


---

<details>
<summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary>

# Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance

## Context & Why

Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover
via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security
fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements.
The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps.

## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`)

| Fix | Status | Commits |
|-----|--------|---------|
| Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` |  Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` |
| CSRF token in consent form HTML |  Done | `b94a64e` |
| `state_hash` column + storage |  Done (hash stored, but state still
optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` |
| Tests for CSRF + state hash |  Done | `e4119b5` |

## Remaining Work

### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED)

> **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state`
parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via
`hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients
are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations
that omit state.

**Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in
`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`:

```go
// BEFORE (current on branch)
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge")

// AFTER
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```

No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily.

### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching

Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching:

```go
// CURRENT — prefix match
if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) {
```

OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to:

```go
// AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1)
if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path {
```

**File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method**

Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must
exactly match".

**Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at
the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3):

1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add
`redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to
include `redirect_uri`
3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store
`params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code
4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from
DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored
value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals,
callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must
compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the
app's callback URL.

<details>
<summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary>

Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors
(attacker can't use a sub-path).
Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an
attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different
redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC
6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1.
</details>

### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page

The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is
the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent
framing.

**File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)**

Before writing the response, add:

```go
func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) {
    rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
    // Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate
    // clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121).
    rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'")
    rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
    ...
```

Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers,
X-Frame-Options for legacy).

### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE

Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during
authorization (`tokens.go:258`):

```go
// CURRENT — conditional check
if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" {
    // verify PKCE
}
```

OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to:

**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"`
to required params:

```go
p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge")
```

**File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE
verification unconditional:

```go
// AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1)
if req.CodeVerifier == "" {
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" {
    // Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen
    // with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in
    // depth.
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) {
    return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE
}
```

**File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove
`OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly
in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the
handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should
either:
- (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with
`unsupported_response_type`, OR
- (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects
`response_type=token`

Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible:

```go
// In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params:
if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode {
    httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest,
        codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType,
        "Only response_type=code is supported")
    return
}
```

### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings

`coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query
parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used
internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before
removing.

**Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a
**separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document
the finding.

### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows

 **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code`
and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant
(`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section
above.

### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation

 **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a
refresh token is used.

## Migration Plan

All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the
branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add:
- `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes`

The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420.

## Implementation Order

1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps)
2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays
optional)
3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri
4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject
`response_type=token`
5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in
`authorize.go`
6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes
7. **`make gen`** after DB changes

## Out of Scope (separate PRs)

- Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit)
- Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens
- Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration

</details>

---
_Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_
2026-02-23 12:18:44 +01:00

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9.4 KiB
Markdown

# OAuth2 Provider (Experimental)
> [!WARNING]
> The OAuth2 provider functionality is currently **experimental and unstable**. This feature:
>
> - Is subject to breaking changes without notice
> - May have incomplete functionality
> - Is not recommended for production use
> - Requires the `oauth2` experiment flag to be enabled
>
> Use this feature for development and testing purposes only.
Coder can act as an OAuth2 authorization server, allowing third-party applications to authenticate users through Coder and access the Coder API on their behalf. This enables integrations where external applications can leverage Coder's authentication and user management.
## Requirements
- Admin privileges in Coder
- OAuth2 experiment flag enabled
- HTTPS recommended for production deployments
## Enable OAuth2 Provider
Add the `oauth2` experiment flag to your Coder server:
```bash
coder server --experiments oauth2
```
Or set the environment variable:
```env
CODER_EXPERIMENTS=oauth2
```
## Creating OAuth2 Applications
### Method 1: Web UI
1. Navigate to **Deployment Settings****OAuth2 Applications**
2. Click **Create Application**
3. Fill in the application details:
- **Name**: Your application name
- **Callback URL**: `https://yourapp.example.com/callback`
- **Icon**: Optional icon URL
### Method 2: Management API
Create an application using the Coder API:
```bash
curl -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CODER_SESSION_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "My Application",
"callback_url": "https://myapp.example.com/callback",
"icon": "https://myapp.example.com/icon.png"
}' \
"$CODER_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps"
```
Generate a client secret:
```bash
curl -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CODER_SESSION_TOKEN" \
"$CODER_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$APP_ID/secrets"
```
## Integration Patterns
### Client Authentication Methods
Coder supports the following OAuth2 client authentication methods at the token endpoint (`/oauth2/tokens`):
- `client_secret_basic` (recommended): HTTP Basic authentication (RFC 6749 §2.3.1). The username is `client_id` and the password is `client_secret`.
- `client_secret_post`: Form-based authentication where `client_id` and `client_secret` are sent in the request body.
Coder supports both methods for compatibility; existing integrations using `client_secret_post` do not need to change.
If you use Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591) and omit `token_endpoint_auth_method`, clients default to `client_secret_basic`. To request `client_secret_post`, set `token_endpoint_auth_method` to `client_secret_post` in the registration request.
If client authentication fails, the token endpoint returns **HTTP 401** with an OAuth2 `invalid_client` error and a `WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="coder"` response header.
### Standard OAuth2 Flow
1. **Authorization Request**: Redirect users to Coder's authorization endpoint:
```url
https://coder.example.com/oauth2/authorize?
client_id=your-client-id&
response_type=code&
redirect_uri=https://yourapp.example.com/callback&
state=random-string
```
2. **Token Exchange**: Exchange the authorization code for an access token.
**Option A: HTTP Basic authentication (`client_secret_basic`, recommended)**
```bash
curl -X POST \
-u "$CLIENT_ID:$CLIENT_SECRET" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
-d "code=$AUTH_CODE" \
-d "redirect_uri=https://yourapp.example.com/callback" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens"
```
**Option B: Form parameters (`client_secret_post`)**
```bash
curl -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
-d "code=$AUTH_CODE" \
-d "client_id=$CLIENT_ID" \
-d "client_secret=$CLIENT_SECRET" \
-d "redirect_uri=https://yourapp.example.com/callback" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens"
```
3. **API Access**: Use the access token to call Coder's API:
```bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
"$CODER_URL/api/v2/users/me"
```
> [!NOTE]
> The PKCE flow below is the **required** integration path. The example
> above is shown for reference but omits the mandatory `code_challenge`
> parameter. See [PKCE Flow](#pkce-flow-required) for the complete flow.
### PKCE Flow (Required)
PKCE is **required** for all OAuth2 authorization code flows. Coder enforces
PKCE in compliance with the OAuth 2.1 specification. Both public and
confidential clients must include PKCE parameters:
1. Generate a code verifier and challenge:
```bash
CODE_VERIFIER=$(openssl rand -base64 96 | tr -d "=+/" | cut -c1-128)
CODE_CHALLENGE=$(echo -n $CODE_VERIFIER | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=+/" | cut -c1-43)
```
2. Include PKCE parameters in the authorization request:
```url
https://coder.example.com/oauth2/authorize?
client_id=your-client-id&
response_type=code&
code_challenge=$CODE_CHALLENGE&
code_challenge_method=S256&
redirect_uri=https://yourapp.example.com/callback
```
3. Include the code verifier in the token exchange (see [Client Authentication Methods](#client-authentication-methods)):
```bash
curl -X POST \
-u "$CLIENT_ID:$CLIENT_SECRET" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
-d "code=$AUTH_CODE" \
-d "code_verifier=$CODE_VERIFIER" \
-d "redirect_uri=https://yourapp.example.com/callback" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens"
```
## Discovery Endpoints
Coder provides OAuth2 discovery endpoints for programmatic integration:
- **Authorization Server Metadata**: `GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`
- **Protected Resource Metadata**: `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`
These endpoints return server capabilities and endpoint URLs according to [RFC 8414](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414) and [RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728).
## Token Management
### Refresh Tokens
Refresh an expired access token.
**Option A: HTTP Basic authentication (`client_secret_basic`)**
```bash
curl -X POST \
-u "$CLIENT_ID:$CLIENT_SECRET" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=refresh_token" \
-d "refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens"
```
**Option B: Form parameters (`client_secret_post`)**
```bash
curl -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=refresh_token" \
-d "refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN" \
-d "client_id=$CLIENT_ID" \
-d "client_secret=$CLIENT_SECRET" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens"
```
### Revoke Access
Revoke all tokens for an application:
```bash
curl -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $CODER_SESSION_TOKEN" \
"$CODER_URL/oauth2/tokens?client_id=$CLIENT_ID"
```
## Testing and Development
Coder provides comprehensive test scripts for OAuth2 development:
```bash
# Navigate to the OAuth2 test scripts
cd scripts/oauth2/
# Run the full automated test suite
./test-mcp-oauth2.sh
# Create a test application for manual testing
eval $(./setup-test-app.sh)
# Run an interactive browser-based test
./test-manual-flow.sh
# Clean up when done
./cleanup-test-app.sh
```
For more details on testing, see the [OAuth2 test scripts README](../../../scripts/oauth2/README.md).
## Common Issues
### "OAuth2 experiment not enabled"
Add `oauth2` to your experiment flags: `coder server --experiments oauth2`
### "Invalid redirect_uri"
Ensure the redirect URI in your request exactly matches the one registered for your application.
### "PKCE verification failed"
Verify that the `code_verifier` used in the token request matches the one used to generate the `code_challenge`.
## Security Considerations
- **Use HTTPS**: Always use HTTPS in production to protect tokens in transit
- **Implement PKCE**: PKCE is mandatory for all authorization code clients
(public and confidential)
- **Validate redirect URLs**: Only register trusted redirect URIs for your applications
- **Rotate secrets**: Periodically rotate client secrets using the management API
## Limitations
As an experimental feature, the current implementation has limitations:
- No scope system - all tokens have full API access
- No client credentials grant support
- Implicit grant (`response_type=token`) is not supported; OAuth 2.1
deprecated this flow due to token leakage risks, and requests return
`unsupported_response_type`
- Limited to opaque access tokens (no JWT support)
## Standards Compliance
This implementation follows established OAuth2 standards including
[RFC 6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749) (OAuth2 core),
[RFC 7636](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636) (PKCE), and the
[OAuth 2.1 draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-12).
Coder enforces OAuth 2.1 requirements including mandatory PKCE for all
authorization code grants, exact redirect URI string matching, rejection
of the implicit grant, and CSRF protections on consent pages.
## Next Steps
- Review the [API Reference](../../reference/api/index.md) for complete endpoint documentation
- Check [External Authentication](../external-auth/index.md) for configuring Coder as an OAuth2 client
- See [Security Best Practices](../security/index.md) for deployment security guidance
## Feedback
This is an experimental feature under active development. Please report issues and feedback through [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues) with the `oauth2` label.